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 The denial of defeat, the harsh Versailles Treaty and unsuccessful attempts by 
paramilitary units to recover losses in the Baltic produced in post-war Germany an anti-
Bolshevik, anti-Entente, radical right-wing cabal of officers with General Ludendorff 
and Colonel Bauer at its core. Mistakenly citing a lack of breadth as one of the reason 
for the failure of their amateurishly executed Hohenzollern restoration and Kapp Putsch 
schemes, Bauer and co-conspirator Ignatius Trebitsch-Lincoln devised the highly 
ambitious White International plot. It sought to form a transnational league of Bavaria, 
Austria and Hungary to force the annulment of the Paris Treaties by the coordinated use 
of paramilitary units from the war vanquished nations. It set as its goals the destruction 
of Bolshevism in all its guises throughout Europe, the restoration of the monarchy in 
Russia, the systematic elimination of all Entente-sponsored Successor States and the 
declaration of war on the Entente.  
 Archival documents, memoirs and other sources expose the underlying flaw in 
the plot: individual national priorities would always override transnational cooperation. 
Bavaria and Hungary were already seeking treaty revision through a rapprochement 
with the Entente; White Russian forces had turned from German support in favour of 
the French; and finally—as pointed out by their own leaders—the member states’ 
paramilitary units were either untested or wholly ineffective, and thus would be no 
match for the national armies of the Successor States and the Entente. 
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Introduction 
 
 
 
The map of Europe was drastically changed. Czechoslovakia no longer existed; 
Russia and Germany again shared a border where Poland had once been; the Baltic 
Successor States were under German control; Austria was made a province of the 
Greater German Reich, bordering Hungary in a Danubian Federation; the demilitarized 
Rhineland was occupied anew by Germany; and France and England had been 
neutralized. A single Führer ruled Germany and the Versailles Treaty was a dead letter. 
This was not 1940, however, but 1920 and the circumstances described above were 
merely the envisioned outcome of a secret grand plan conceived in the small Bavarian 
city of Rosenheim to return to pre-World War I borders and nullify the Paris Peace 
Treaties by force of arms. 
On May 15, 1920, some eight weeks after the failed Kapp Putsch, Colonel 
Maximilian Bauer,1 as personal envoy of General Erich Ludendorff, stepped off the 
steamer from Vienna on to the quay in Budapest. The purpose of his visit was to invite 
the Hungarian Head of State and Regent, Admiral Miklós Horthy, to join in the 
establishment of a Budapest-based, multinational, counter-revolutionary organization—
a ‘White International’ that would implement and direct the plan drawn up in 
Rosenheim. 
The Rosenheim plan called for Freikorps (Volunteer Corps) units led by 
German officers to come into Hungary disguised as settlers, be secretly armed and 
trained, and mount an attack on Austria to destroy the social-democratic Renner 
government in ‘red Vienna’. This completed, Austrian, Bavarian and Hungarian 
paramilitary forces would then invade Czechoslovakia. Meanwhile, Freikorps units 
from northern Germany would topple the Weimar Republic and set General Ludendorff 
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up as military dictator of a new provisional government in Berlin. Next, émigré White 
Russian officers in Germany and northern German Freikorps units would launch 
counter-revolutionary forces, made up of Russian prisoners of war still interned in 
Germany, on Bolshevik Russia. Poland would disappear and the tsarist regime would be 
restored. The Entente-sponsored Successor States would then be divided between the 
participating states of the White International. The last phase of the plan was to wage 
war on the Entente with the troops of a newly established Confederation of Greater 
Germany, Russia and Hungary. The entire endeavour was to be financed by a 
combination of German industrialists, Hungarian state funds and 2 million counterfeit 
Russian Duma roubles printed for that purpose. 
Two weeks after Colonel Bauer’s audience with the Regent, Admiral Horthy, 
the latter informed General Ludendorff’s envoy that he was ‘in agreement with each and 
every point [of the plan] and that work could now be taken up’.2 Thus Horthy’s name 
was added to a growing if tentative list of powerful people which included, besides 
General Ludendorff, representatives of the vast White Russian émigré community in 
Germany, the Minister-President of Bavaria, Gustav von Kahr, and official and semi-
official leaders in Austria and Italy. 
  
This dissertation contends that the political aims of the Rosenheim plan, which 
called for the establishment of a White International,3 render this little-known plot the 
most ambitious of all interwar revisionist endeavours. It also argues that the very 
internationalist pretension of the plot was its fatal flaw. The principal participants 
envisaged in the Rosenheim plan were from among the states vanquished in World War 
I, either at the hands of the Entente forces or by social revolution. Thus they all shared 
an extreme rightist, generally anti-Bolshevik and anti-Entente orientation. While this 
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served as sufficient grounds for interest in cooperation, each partner had their own 
agenda specific to their national—as opposed to international—concerns. 
Each had territorial demands. Germany proper sought to deprive the new 
Bolshevik Russia of the Baltikum, incorporating the Baltic lands into East Prussia. Both 
Germany and Austria were intent on an Anschluß, a joining of the two states—
interestingly, this was a condition that had not existed since 1866 and then under quite 
different circumstances. Apart from pan-German hopes, there were competing Bavarian 
particularist aspirations, which ranged from absorbing the Austrian Alpine provinces 
south of the border to form a Greater Bavaria, to the creation of a Catholic Bavarian-
Austrian union, independent of the rest of Germany. Hungarian territorial concerns 
centred round a complete revision of the Trianon Treaty, which had reduced the Magyar 
state to a fraction of its former self. Relations with the Entente and with the Entente-
sponsored Successor States aside, Hungary contested the loss of the western Hungarian 
province of Burgenland awarded to Austria according to the Treaty of Saint-Germain-
en-Laye. For the émigré Russian community and White Russian officers, hope was 
simply defined as the destruction of the Bolshevik regime in Moscow. Complications 
set in, however, with regard to the future of the Ukraine and the Baltic Successor States. 
These were compounded by an internecine struggle over official recognition of exactly 
who represented the old regime in the émigré community. 
Clearly, the only common thread shared by all members of the would-be White 
International was frustration and discontent that they blamed on the Entente. Beyond 
that, each grasped at every diplomatic opportunity—in most cases secretly and with the 
involvement of the Entente Powers—which might serve their national interests, while 
feigning commitment to the multinational scheme outlined in the Rosenheim plan. At 
no time did the broad aims of the White International replace national priorities. 
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The grandiose plan dates back to the turbulent months following the German 
Armistice of 1918. Within this context the German radical right and the military were 
unable psychologically to accept defeat. As a result they consciously tried to 
disassociate themselves from the Ebert government—which the Reichswehr (German 
Army) conveniently blamed for the defeat—and to pursue a stridently aggressive 
foreign policy on their own. This was manifested in the Baltic Campaign and the failed 
Kapp Putsch, both of which contained a number of elements that would later be echoed 
in the Rosenheim plan. 
With the tacit blessing of the Entente, German Freikorps units moved into the 
Baltic region in the spring of 1919, ostensibly to protect the newly created, Entente-
sponsored Baltic Successor States from the Bolshevik steamroller. Their real mission 
was the fulfilment of pre-war foreign policy. The venture failed for several important 
reasons but the significance for this study lies in two specific areas. One was that the 
Entente Powers soon grasped the reality that the undisciplined nature of the German 
Freikorps units was perhaps more of a threat to the infant Baltic Successor States than 
were the Bolsheviks. The resulting demand by the Entente for the withdrawal of all 
German forces in the Baltic was, however, interpreted by the Freikorpskämpfer 
(Volunteer Corps soldier’s) as just another stab in the back from the hated ‘socialist 
regime’ in Berlin, which was at that very moment about to sign the Versailles Treaty. 
The unhappy circumstances of these simultaneous events caused an unbridgeable chasm 
to form between the young Weimar Republic and the ultra-right. 
The second telling significance lies in the response of General Rüdiger von der 
Goltz, Supreme Commander of all German Forces in the Baltic, to Ebert’s orders to 
withdraw. After a long delay he simply placed his troops under the White Russian flag 
of émigré Prince Bermondt-Avalov in thinly veiled defiance of Berlin’s authority. 
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Besides a glaring display of a ‘loose cannon’ attitude against Weimar Republic 
authority by a number of high military commanders, such German-White Russian 
cooperation would feature prominently in the international aspect of the Rosenheim 
plan. Though ultimately a failure, the partnership between von der Goltz and Bermondt-
Avalov produced another element that would be echoed later: short of funds during the 
last death throes of their unsuccessful campaign in November 1919, they just printed 
their own currency. This remedy to financial need would subsequently be resurrected on 
a massive scale in the Rosenheim plan. 
The Baltic Campaign also serves to introduce White Russian General Vasili 
Vasilievich Biskupsky, a monarchist and political schemer who would represent the 
Russian émigré factor in the German-Hungarian-Russian combination of the White 
International. General Biskupsky was very much involved in the dark, often sinister 
political world of the Russian émigré community and cultivated links with some of the 
more nefarious individuals of the time. Throughout, Biskupsky kept in close contact 
with the German extreme right via his involvement with the Berlin-based, right-wing 
political organization the National Union (Nationale Vereinigung or NV).  
The NV, founded by Freikorps leader Major Waldemar Pabst, was hardly 
ambiguous in its proclaimed mission. It was an organization of like-minded officers, 
politicians and financially important people from the extreme right whose sole goal was 
the removal of the Weimar Republic and the formation of a military provisional 
government in its place. Most NV members tended to gravitate towards the so-called 
Ludendorff circle led by Ludendorff’s political adviser and closest confidant during and 
after the war, Colonel Maximilian Hermann Bauer, who was to be the real author of the 
Rosenheim plan and the guiding force behind the establishment of the White 
International. General Ludendorff himself would remain as a kind of éminence grise. 
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Associated with the circle were Colonel Bauer’s closest collaborator and political 
schemer Hungarian-born Ignatius Trebitsch-Lincoln and Freikorps commander Major 
Franz von Stephani. Also to be found, at least closely affiliated with the NV, were 
industrialists, journalists, holders of senior government positions, high-ranking 
monarchists of the Russian émigré colony and several émigré Baltic Germans. The 
latter represented the most radical wing of the German nationalist movement. 
Cooperation between Baltic Germans, Russian monarchists and the German extreme 
right endured from the founding of the NV, throughout the development of the White 
International and, indeed, beyond into the Nazi period. 
One of the great talents of the Ludendorff circle leader, Colonel Bauer, was his 
ability to identify mutual frustrations and interests between very diverse groups and use 
them to his advantage. He observed that disdain for the Weimar Republic was shared by 
the German left, who saw in the Republik a watered-down, revisionist programme too 
attached to bourgeois ideology. He also realized that any revitalization of Germany 
would be impossible without the support of the working class. He thus reached over the 
ideological chasm to certain representatives from the German left, as well as Bolshevik 
representatives then in Berlin, in the hope of some kind of collaborative effort shortly 
before and during the Kapp fiasco. This formula that some would refer to as ‘national 
Bolshevism’, that is an ultra-nationalist state ruled along the lines of the Leninist 
socialist model of complete control within the upper echelons of power, came to 
naught—especially after the Kapp Putsch experience. Nevertheless, the idea of actually 
working with the left in the good fight to destroy the lukewarm social-democratic 
governments of Ebert in Germany and Renner in Austria would reappear in some of the 
more imaginative innovations of the Rosenheim plan. 
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  By January 1920, there were lessons learned which were significant to the 
development of the White International. Firstly, the Baltic experience taught the official 
government in Berlin that if the Freikorps was a force that could be used outside 
Germany against the wishes of the Weimar government, it could be used within 
Germany’s borders in the same way. Secondly, it was not lost on President Ebert that 
the growing ties between the German extreme right and émigré Russian notables 
indicated a potential danger for the state posed by the 150,000 Russian internees left 
over from the war still in and around Berlin. Thirdly, the most valuable lesson learned 
by the German right wing was that they could not look to the Weimar Republic to fulfil 
their nationalist dreams because, in their eyes, Berlin was simply a puppet of the 
Entente, a fact supposedly confirmed by the signing of the Versailles Treaty and the 
Baltic fiasco. The conclusion was that in order to save Germany, the Weimar 
government must be removed. 
The framework of a plan to that end was well under way within the NV during 
the closing months of 1919 and tentatively slated to take place sometime in the autumn 
of 1920. However, the Entente decision that irregular paramilitary units be included in 
the 100,000-troop limit specified in the Versailles Treaty forced the issue to come to the 
fore. Rather than acquiesce in Berlin’s order to dissolve the irregulars, the more militant 
elements of the NV decided to use them in the ill-fated bid to topple the republican 
government in March 1920. Directly prior to the Kapp Putsch attempt, one sees certain 
figures rise to the top such as Trebitsch-Lincoln, Colonel Bauer’s closest collaborator 
who would make important early contacts within his native Hungary, and Major Franz 
von Stephani, Freikorps chieftain and future liaison officer for the White International 
between the Bavarian extreme right and their Prussian counterparts. Another 
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noteworthy feature of the Rosenheim plan originally found in the Kapp Putsch was the 
use of Freikorps units as the preferred instrument of political change.  
 The Kapp Putsch disaster of mid-March 1920 served as the ultimate example of 
how not to orchestrate a coup d’état. Such lessons were all to appear in the next phase of 
the conspirators’ ceaseless endeavours at counter-revolution: the Rosenheim plan. One 
lesson was that the decisive strike could not come from the Prussians, whom Bauer now 
blamed as being tainted by ‘Jewish socialism and bourgeois values’. The Reichswehr 
too had proven their unreliability in Defence Minister General Noske’s refusal to 
support the Freikorps units with regular troops. Bauer was also convinced that it had 
been a mistake to attempt to set up a civilian government that did not have the courage 
to trust in the Freikorps component that had marched on Berlin to do the job. In fact, 
Bauer was now certain that the enterprise had failed not because it was too radical but 
because it was not radical enough; and his next plan would reflect this judgement. It was 
for this reason that the Ludendorff circle, especially the group around Colonel Bauer, 
sought and was granted exile in the rightist-friendly atmosphere of Bavaria after the 
failure of the Kapp Putsch; and it was here that the Rosenheim plan was conceived. 
Colonel Bauer, Trebitsch-Lincoln and Major von Stephani resettled south of 
Munich in Garmisch-Partenkirchen and wasted no time in formulating a new plan, more 
ambitious than anything heretofore. It called for the creation of an international ‘white 
alliance’ of all vanquished nations, whose goal would be the destruction of all so-called 
socialist regimes and the annulment of the treaties of Paris by force of arms, as 
mentioned above. The plot devised in Rosenheim, where General Ludendorff had taken 
up residence, was approved by the general and then presented to the new Bavarian 
Minister-President, Gustav von Kahr, and his government dominated by the Bayerische 
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Volkspartei (BVP; Bavarian People’s Party), which had replaced that of moderate 
socialist Johannes Hoffmann in the wake of the Kapp fiasco.  
The Bavarian leadership was amenable to the Rosenheim plan in principle, but it 
had its own political interests and diplomatic aims to consider. Bavaria was attempting 
to regain the special status it had enjoyed during the Kaiserreich (Empire) and had 
recently lost in the new Weimar Constitution. Munich’s approach in its independent 
foreign policy was thus particularist, and in some circles even separatist, as well as 
being Francophile and patently anti-Prussian. Bavaria played the anti-Prussian card to 
ingratiate itself with the French who, in the opinion of BVP leader Georg Heim, would 
rather see a weak confederation of Germany than a strong, Berlin-based federation. The 
key issues regarding Bavaria’s negotiations with France were the pending disarmament 
order and the proposed Anschluß between the two Catholic states of Bavaria and 
Austria, leaving Prussia and the rest of Germany out of the equation entirely. 
The Bavarian overtures to France serve as the first example of one of the 
problems which would plague the plotters: the practice of White International partners 
negotiating with outside powers not included within their ranks. But, for the time being, 
it was more important for the Bauer group to turn a blind eye to the particularist 
tendencies of their hosts for the sake of gaining their support for the Rosenheim plan. 
Federalist tendencies aside, Bavaria had one year earlier witnessed the brutal 
put-down of the Munich Soviet in the latter’s bid for power after the chaos following 
the assassination of socialist Kurt Eisner. The resulting Ordnungsstaat (conservative 
state of law and order) of Bavaria hoped to present itself as a bulwark against the spread 
of Communism that was a genuine concern in the spring of 1920. Béla Kun had 
established a Communist regime in Hungary and it was feared the ‘red’ Renner 
government in Vienna would be the next to go. In this light the von Kahr government 
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was Colonel Bauer’s most promising initial ally in organizing collective, counter-
revolutionary action. 
Minister-President von Kahr supported the continued building of his own, 
enormous Bavarian Einwohnerwehr (Citizens’ Guard) under the leadership of organizer 
Georg Escherich. The Einwohnerwehr was mostly comprised of Bavarian village and 
small-town paramilitary groups of scant military bearing who had had little to do with 
the smashing of the short-lived Bavarian Soviet Republic. This had been chiefly 
undertaken by hardened, non-Bavarian Freikorps units rushing into Bavaria fresh from 
quelling leftist uprisings in the Ruhr and elsewhere after the Kapp-inspired general 
strike. The Einwohnerwehr was to form the core of a Munich-based organization that 
would serve as the successor to the now defunct NV. In May 1920, representatives from 
over sixty Freikorps units from across the Reich attended a secret meeting in the eastern 
Bavarian city of Regensburg presided over by BVP founder Georg Heim. It was agreed 
there that all paramilitary groups in Germany would recognize Organisation Escherich 
(Orgesch) as the supreme body responsible for counter-revolutionary action. It was 
decided too that Escherich would work closely with Colonel Bauer and the Ludendorff 
group through liaison officer Major von Stephani as outlined in the Rosenheim plan.  
Meanwhile, Colonel Bauer and Trebitsch-Lincoln met with leading members of 
the large Russian émigré colony in Munich. There were old friends—General 
Biskupsky among them—who had been involved in the Kapp venture and had fled to 
Munich as well. Also in the Bavarian capital were the equally radical Baltic Germans 
(many coming in the wake of the Bermondt-Avalov defeats) who, like the Russians and 
the Ludendorff group, had been driven from their homes. For this reason, Bauer and his 
group would find the strongest support for the Rosenheim plan from these two émigré 
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colonies though, in reality, neither of them would be in any position to bring about the 
plan’s fulfilment. 
The Regensburg Meeting of May 1920 and the creation of Orgesch, coupled 
with the enthusiasm of certain émigré Russians and Baltic Germans, marked the first 
milestones in the realization of the Rosenheim plan. Relations between the Bavarian 
right and the Ludendorff group were not closely defined at this point. There remained 
areas of disagreement that would surface later. For the time being, however, Colonel 
Bauer, Trebitsch-Lincoln and their co-conspirators were ready to move on to the next 
phase in the establishment of the White International. Securing travel passes in false 
names provided them by both the Munich Police Chief and the Hungarian Consulate, 
Colonel Bauer, his private secretary and Trebitsch-Lincoln passed over the border into 
Austria and then on to Budapest to set up their central base of operations with the help 
of Admiral Horthy, or so they hoped. 
There are two important factors relating to Hungary in May 1920. The Regency 
of Admiral Miklós Horthy had just been established in March, some months after 
Romanian forces had put an end to the Soviet experiment led by Béla Kun. Horthy had 
been heavily reliant on radical paramilitary leaders in positioning himself as national 
leader. Now installed as Regent, he was surrounded by a kind of advisory camarilla of 
the more radical of these individuals. 
 The second factor regarding Hungary was the imminent signing of the Trianon 
Treaty, which would reduce the territory of Hungary to a fraction of its pre-war size. 
Colonel Bauer and his entourage were welcomed with enthusiasm because they 
represented the possibility, however remote, of a treaty revision either through a 
‘Rosenheim’ fait accompli or the formation of an anti-Communist league to save 
Western Europe from Bolshevism. Seemingly convinced by Bauer that the foundation 
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of a White International would be a means to re-establish Hungary’s pre-war borders, 
Horthy gave the Rosenheim plan his full support. What Horthy, especially his 
legitimist-oriented Foreign Ministry, did not tell Bauer was that negotiations with 
France had been in progress since January 1920 concerning economic concessions in 
exchange for French support for territorial revisions of the soon-to-be-signed Treaty of 
Trianon. Thus during the summer of 1920, the Hungarians played a double game of 
going through the motions of support for Bauer’s White International scheme while 
being equally active in talks with the sworn enemies of Ludendorff’s emissaries. Such 
Byzantine intrigue also extended to those ultra-radical elements in Budapest that 
genuinely supported Bauer and his plan, but were opposed by the professional 
diplomatic corps surrounding Prime Minister Teleki and others in the Foreign Ministry. 
It would not be until the end of the summer when this duplicity was discovered; by that 
time it was too late. Bauer and his supporters had simply been outmanoeuvred.  
Such was also the case with the Austrians. The initial goal of the plan was the 
removal of the ‘socialist’ Renner government in Vienna by coordinated military 
incursions of Hungarian troops and Bavarian Freikorps units who had recently been 
placed under the overall command of Georg Escherich at the Regensburg Meeting. The 
Austrian extreme right was willing to allow this, as long as it seemed necessary. By 
August, however, strong indications that the Renner government would lose its 
parliamentary majority in favour of a conservative coalition at the polls prompted the 
Austrian right to rethink their collaboration with the Bavarian Orgesch, and they 
decided to withdraw from the whole affair. Constitutional processes had thus made 
moot one of the chief reasons for the very existence of the White International. 
The Russian connection unravelled in a similar fashion. It lasted only until 
General Biskupsky was summarily rebuffed by White Russian General Wrangel, then 
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fighting in southern Russia. After receiving promises of support from France, General 
Wrangel refused to recognize the authority of the Budapest Russian Committee of the 
White International. Hungarian financial support for the Russian Committee was 
likewise soon withdrawn. 
During the summer of 1920 the Bauer group had managed to assemble a rather 
impressive international team while in Budapest. By the end of August, however, 
Colonel Bauer’s beautiful illusion had been tragically destroyed by fact. Each member 
state saw the plan only in the light of how it might serve their respective goals. 
Separatist and particularist inclinations in Bavaria, parliamentary processes in Austria, 
changing fortunes of war in Eastern Europe, adept diplomatic manoeuvring in Hungary 
and the declared refusal of Italy to have anything to do with it—all rendered the plan 
stillborn.  
The critical moment in the demise of the White International plot came when, 
fearing for his life at the hands of his fellow anti-Semitic conspirators, Colonel Bauer’s 
most trusted confidant showed up in mid-September at the French Legation in Vienna 
with a suitcase packed with damaging secret White International documents. His 
treachery was not what brought down the White International. That had already taken 
place. But it does serve as a fitting conclusion to a scheme that surely deserved to end. 
 There were many reasons behind the failure to establish an effective White 
International in 1920. Firstly, national ambitions took precedence over international 
concerns. Individual participants sought practical solutions for themselves, not illusory 
international panaceas. Secondly, planning—let alone execution—could not keep pace 
with the ever-changing political situations between and inside nations. This caused parts 
of the plan to become suddenly irrelevant. Thirdly, the lack of cohesion, the internecine 
strife and the outright betrayal within—even among the core initiators of the Rosenheim 
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plan—weakened the centre. Fourthly, none of the participants wanted to change Europe; 
rather, they wanted to change it back to a time that was irretrievable. One detects here 
the last vestiges of those who had not yet learned that the world had changed forever in 
1914. 
 
This thesis is presented in three parts. Part I discusses the period from the 
collapse of Imperial Germany in November 1918 to the end of the Kapp Putsch in 
March 1920. Part II covers the time from mid-March to early May at the beginning of 
the Bavarian exile. It discusses the development of the White International plot and the 
context of political isolation the authors found themselves in at that time. This part 
focuses on the task of convincing the Bavarian right to support the radical Bauer plan 
despite an agenda that, to a large degree, did not include the Kappists. Part III deals with 
the Hungarian phase when Bauer, Trebitsch and Stephani travelled to Budapest to invite 
the Horthy regime to participate. It accounts for the general failure of the plan before it 
was ever initiated. 
This thesis aims to demonstrate the originality and scope of the audacious plot. 
In addition, it is shown that key elements within the White International plot—
transnational military cooperation, the use of paramilitary formations as first-line 
offensive units against the Entente-sponsored Successor States, the removal by force of 
social-democratic ‘red’ governments including the Weimar Republic—were 
continuations of ideas and activities already employed during the Baltic Campaign in 
the first year after the Armistice. 
It is also argued here that while the creation of a White International as a focal 
organization to coordinate actions against left-wing activity within Central Europe had 
its merits in reason, the ultimate goals of the plot as envisioned by its creators to 
 15 
 
militarily destroy the Successor States, abrogate the Paris Treaties, re-establish tsarist 
Russia, renew hostilities against the Entente and essentially return to the borders of 
1914 had absolutely no chance of success. Explanations for this include an altogether 
misplaced faith in the military capabilities of paramilitary units, the planners’ inability 
to understand that the participating nations would invariably place national agendas 
before international considerations, the failure to consider the ever-shifting dynamics of 
the general international landscape and, finally, the rank dilettantism of the key planners 
themselves. 
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Notes 
 
                                                 
1 Colonel Max Bauer (1875-1929), besides being an expert in field artillery during the 
war, served as Chief of Section I of the German General Staff and as a close political 
adviser to General Erich Ludendorff. Colonel Bauer had long been involved in intrigue 
and was instrumental in plotting the dismissal of pro-armistice Chancellor Bethmann-
Hollweg in 1917. 
 
2 Miklós Szinai and László Szűcs (eds.), The Confidential Papers of Admiral Horthy, 
(Budapest: University Printing House, 1965), 26. 
 
3 The term ‘White International’ was not coined by the plotters as an official term but 
here taken from a chapter title in Bernard Wasserstein’s biography, The Secret Lives of 
Trebitsch-Lincoln (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), on one of the original 
authors of the plot. Variations of the term in several German sources, including those 
produced by Trebitsch, range from Weiße Allianz through Ludendorff-Bauer Plan to 
Verschwörung (Conspiracy). It is safe to assume that the term was meant as an answer 
to the ‘Red International’ of the post-war period. The term ‘white’ is consistent with the 
so-called Hungarian White Terror meted out against the remnants of the recently fallen 
Communist regime of Béla Kun, the participants of which were precisely those figures 
that would work directly with the Bauer circle in setting up the White International. As 
to why ‘white’, it is this author’s speculation that the colour may recall Charles X of 
France who, before and during his reign (1825-30), supported the excesses of the 
reactionary, noble ‘Ultras’ that, under the white flag of the House of Bourbon, terrorized 
the French countryside, targeting those who had anything to do with the French 
Revolution.  
 
 17 
 
 
Part I 
   Preconditions for the Development of the White International Plot 
 
Chapter 1 
 
The Military Component: The Freikorps as Reichswehr Surrogate 
 
 
 
A.  Revolution and the Reichswehr 
 
One of the most amazing aspects of the plot conceived in Rosenheim to create a 
White International is that there is absolutely no mention of the role of the prospective 
participants’ national armies—because they had none. The simultaneous attacks 
scheduled to take place throughout Central Europe were to be carried out by 
paramilitary units. This means that what was essentially to be a rekindling of the Great 
War would pit untrained and undisciplined mercenaries and local militias against the 
combined national armies of the Entente and the Successor States. To understand how 
Colonel Bauer and his co-conspirators arrived at such a seemingly preposterous idea, it 
is necessary to understand the relative positions of the Reichswehr and its surrogate 
force the Freikorps, and their respective relations with the early Weimar Republic. 
On December 24 the response by the Independent Social Democratic Party of 
Germany (USPD)1 to Reichskanzler Friedrich Ebert’s2 perceived betrayal of the 1918 
German Revolution prompted Berlin’s violent Workers’ and Soldiers’ Soviet to occupy 
the Imperial Palace and surround the Chancellery. The Reichswehr responded swiftly to 
Ebert’s call for help, seeing an opportunity to settle the question as to who would hold 
the keys to power in Republican Germany. A large crowd made up of workers and those 
generally sympathetic to the German Soviets had gathered around the palace. The 
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frustrated and confused regular troops, confronted with the hostile mob, refused to fire 
and some even joined in with the rebels. Thus the lack of anti-leftist élan of the German 
regular army was exposed and the first and only real attempt by Supreme Army 
Command (the Oberste Heeresleitung or OHL) to crush the revolution had failed. This 
is not to say that the OHL had abdicated its power—far from it. For the moment, 
however, it could not risk such direct action as had led to the Christmas Eve debacle of 
1918. A military surrogate was needed. 
 
 
B.  Development of the Freikorps 
 
Two things became evident to Ebert and the OHL. Firstly, the restless, leftist 
rabble of the streets must be neutralized and, secondly, the regular army was, at the 
moment, not up to the task largely due to the presence of leftist sympathizers within its 
ranks. It was at this time that Major Kurt von Schleicher3 made the suggestion of 
organizing volunteer corps recruited from the army and, as much as possible, led by 
their former company grade officers. Officially, the OHL would be out of the scheme 
but would unofficially arm and train the units. The Chief of the General Staff, General 
Groener,4 supported the idea and the OHL agreed to the formation of volunteer corps.5 
Thus the first stage of the revolution that witnessed the ascendancy of the Spartacist 
movement passed into the second stage that saw the rise of the Freikorps that would, 
however, remain long after the last vestiges of the Spartacists had disappeared. 
In January 1919 Ebert, and Defence Minister Gustav Noske of the Social 
Democratic Party of Germany (SPD),6 accepted an invitation to travel to Camp Zossen 
to review General Ludwig von Maercker’s7 newly organized ‘Volunteer Rifles’. They 
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were very impressed.8 It was at this point that the decision was made—with Ebert in full 
agreement—that von Maercker’s Freikorps was to be the model for the creation of as 
many such units as were necessary to defend the new republic. In so doing, Noske had 
unwittingly delivered the government into the hands of armed mercenaries for whom 
the fight against Bolshevism was simply a prelude to fighting against revolutionaries of 
any stripe that, in the eyes of the Freikorps, included the Weimar Republic itself. More 
significantly for this work, the sole German contingent forces to be employed in 
Bauer’s White International came into being.  
For this study, three areas of concern warrant a closer focus regarding the 
Freikorps phenomenon: the mentality and motives of the typical Freikorpskämpfer, his 
attitudes towards the older, conservative right and, finally, his military effectiveness and 
its application to a general European war that would most certainly result were Bauer’s 
plan put in motion.  
One of the most apt statements concerning the first years following World War I 
is: ‘we may not have had a revolution in Germany—but we are certainly having a 
counter-revolution.’9 The author was referring specifically to the emptying of the 
universities during the early spring of 1919 as thousands of students, heeding the call to 
protect the Fatherland from the ‘Bolshevik Russian horde’ in the Baltic—and basically 
seeking adventure—poured into the rapidly forming Freikorps units throughout 
Germany. The remark is also applicable to the tens of thousands of young men—mostly 
late of the front-line trenches—that merged into a myriad of units ranging from the 
highly disciplined to the unruly freebooters more akin to mercenaries. The second group 
was the rule, not the exception. One historian describes the Freikorps in general as 
made up of ‘semi-anarchic gangs of free-booters, mainly ex-servicemen, fiercely hostile 
to the left, and a law unto themselves’.10 
 20 
 
A look into the motives and psychological make-up of these individuals reveals 
a mindset of discontentment with, and even repugnance for, the Weimar Republic that 
was shared by the core of the radical right leaders. This is especially the case with the 
Ludendorff circle and its future leading spirit, Colonel Max Bauer. 
The typical post-war Freikorpskämpfer belonged to a generation that was 
steeped in the various pre-war youth movements, all of which shared a kind of völkisch 
preoccupation with revolt against the urban liberal, bourgeois society that had arisen as 
a consequence of the Industrial Revolution. The youth movement phenomenon was 
seen as a last chance for a ‘moral “rejuvenescence” of the German people and the return 
of the German soul to its best traditions’.11 At the time of the Armistice, these same 
individuals made up a flood of young, arrogant and capable officers who would find an 
outlet for their talents in the new Freikorps units.12 Equally, many were young officer 
cadets and students who had no experience at all and longed to fulfil their fantasies of 
heroic struggle. The Freikorps offered them the opportunity for involvement in a 
masculine world of ultra-violence in which brutality was not only acceptable but also 
desired.13 
 And what of the particular mindset of the returning front-line fighter that so 
pitted him against the Republic? The first consideration is traceable to the war years. 
Front-line soldiers learned to distrust and despise the ‘home front’. The difference 
between the ‘front’ and the ‘home front’ was as the chasm between ‘actions’ and 
‘words’.14 When defeat came, it was inevitable that blame would be put on those at 
home. Such feelings were, of course, encouraged by the successful use of propaganda 
by the OHL that spoke incessantly of the ‘November Criminals’ and the ‘stab-in-the-
back legend’ (Dolchstoßlegende). According to this legend, the civilian government—
which was in fact created by the high command to carry the load of responsibility for 
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the defeat—had betrayed the nation and the undefeated Reichswehr by seeking an 
armistice with the Entente. The latter provided the Freikorpskämpfer with all the reason 
he needed to fight towards the destruction of Weimar for, in his eyes, the army had not 
been overcome by the Entente, but by the new, civilian German government.  
These volunteer units were usually led by the very same young company and 
field grade officers that had seen the horrors of trench warfare first-hand alongside their 
men. They tended to be middle-class, former non-commissioned officers who had risen 
to their rank through battlefield promotions. As such, they tended to disdain the old-
guard officers of the privileged class. The Freikorpskämpfer were thus fiercely loyal to 
their commanders so long as they could provide them with money and a good fight, for 
fighting was their stock-in-trade.15 
By the early summer of 1919 tens of thousands of veterans and non-veterans (of 
the latter group mostly students) had joined the volunteer formations. The exact number 
is difficult to tell. The understandably alarmed USPD leader Hugo Haase reported to the 
Reichstag in July 1919 that there were over a million men in the Freikorps.16 Noske 
himself set the figure at about 400,000. It must also be remembered that counter-
revolutionary forces were not confined to the Freikorps. There were neighbourhood 
citizens’ militias, student fraternities and middle-class centres of reaction whose anti-
republican proclivities were linked officially and unofficially to conservative anti-
government peasant and landowner associations.17 
And to what degree was the new radical right embodied in the Freikorps still 
bound to the old conservatives? Could the proponents of nationalist counter-revolution 
be effective with one part looking to the future while the other looked to the past? 
As mentioned, the typical Freikorpskämpfer was drawn from the young, 
recently returned, front-line men and officers who either could not or would not adapt to 
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the humdrum, bourgeois civilian life they so detested while in the trenches. An 
important aspect of this ‘new warrior’ imbued with a sort of resentful nationalism was 
that he began to detach himself from the traditional, conservative right during the early 
Freikorps period of 1919 and would continue to go his own way—especially after the 
signing of the Versailles Treaty.18 The front-line fighter turned Freikorpskämpfer held a 
general disdain for the bourgeois establishment of his elders even before 1914. It 
follows that such resentment would only be hardened by the horrors of the war 
experience. The old-school conservatives—especially of the type that gravitated 
towards the conservative German National People’s Party (DNVP)19—were seen as 
being stuck in the past and harbouring unrealistic dreams of a restoration of the 
monarchy and a return to the halcyon days before the war. Thus the Freikorps had little 
use for the older, conservative right and none at all for the hated Weimar system they 
felt had to be smashed to ‘make room for something that was new but as yet 
unspecified, something fundamentally different from what had gone before, a form of 
“socialism” that would somehow also be “national” with a strong state and a martial 
ruling ethic’.20 
Such sentiments were mirrored in White International creator Colonel Bauer’s 
many tracts that embraced Oswald Spengler’s Prussian Socialism, rejecting the ‘false 
socialism’ of the SPD and the Weimar Republic. Bauer also depicted the Republic as a 
‘women’s state’, bemoaning the lack of the ‘soldierly virtue and ethic of duty’ necessary 
in defence of the nation. As with the Freikorps and their leaders, he made no distinction 
between the SPD and the Spartacist movement, stressing that there was no ‘going back 
to the old days’ which he portrayed as having already lost their way before 1914. For 
Bauer, mankind ‘stands for a great new revolution’ to ‘correct the path forward’.21  
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He was quite mistaken, however, to invest the Freikorpskämpfer with any sort 
of goal-oriented political awareness. They were anxious to fight the ‘reds’ at home that, 
they were told, had stolen the sure victory from the Reichswehr by demanding an 
armistice; and just as anxious to fight the Russians in the East lest Germany be overrun 
by the Bolshevik horde. But none of this had anything to do with any ideology on their 
part.22 
The ferocity and wild abandon of the Freikorpskämpfer is legendary. He was ‘a 
new type of warrior, born out of Central Europe’s “culture of defeat” and unrestrained by 
conventional military discipline and moral reservations’.23 An instructive example is 
offered by Freikorps-Potsdam leader Major Franz von Stephani24 who describes the 
retaking of the Spartacist-occupied building that housed the offices of the SPD organ 
Vorwärts in Berlin. Through the use of overwhelming force that included machine guns, 
artillery and flame-throwers, Stephani’s forces easily ‘routed the 350 defenders who, 
armed only with rifles, surrendered. They were then lined up and summarily shot one by 
one by the Freikorpskämpfer according to [my] orders.’25 This example of wanton 
brutality is significant to this work because it was committed by one of the three 
originators of the White International plot. This same Major Stephani would serve as the 
liaison officer between the Ludendorff circle, the Bavarian Freikorps forces and the 
Horthy regime during the summer of 1920.  
   The old nationalist groups so vociferous before and during the war were only 
now asking the question, ‘What way forward?’ Chief amongst such groups were the pan-
Germans. For this study, it is important to look closer into the stridently nationalist 
Weltanschauung (world view) of this group because it was from the platform of the pan-
Germans that the Ludendorff circle would find its own direction. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Pan-Germans, the Bamberg Declaration and Post-war Nationalist  
Foreign Policy 
 
 
To answer the question, ‘What way forward?’ a meeting of loosely knit pan-
German organizations26 was called in the north-eastern Bavarian city of Bamberg on 
February 16, 1919, just as the various Freikorps units were rooting out ‘Bolshevik 
elements’ throughout Germany. The result of the meeting produced the so-called 
Bamberg Declaration27 that clearly illustrated the basic tenets of a radical right-wing 
foreign policy. 
The first order of business was the adoption of a policy addressing the question 
of German territory in the new state of affairs. The decision was to hold fast to the pre-
war idea that ‘The portion of the Earth’s surface which today is under German control is 
not sufficient for the German Volk.’28 The ‘forced surrender’ of Alsace-Lorraine, North 
Schleswig and West Prussia was to be counterbalanced by the uniting of the various 
Central European areas where Germans lived. These were to include ‘all of German-
Austria as well as the ethnic German province of Burgenland in western Hungary29 and 
the ancient German colonial areas of the Baltic lands’.30 To this end, according to the 
Bamberg Declaration, there must be a re-establishment of the economic alliance with 
these areas and a reactivation of the national spirit to hinder the further ‘tainting’ of the 
German Volk by migrating non-Germans. In fact, the Auslandsdeutschen (Germans in 
foreign lands)—and more specifically the Baltic Germans—were seen as ‘The best 
source for the revitalization of German influence, German economy and culture’.31 The 
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Declaration further called for the rebuilding of the German fleet and land forces to pre-
war levels, which would not only foster a renewed pride in Deutschtum (German-ness) 
but also create much-needed employment. Above all, Germans everywhere must have 
the will to ‘extinguish the taste of defeat, and through economic and military 
cohesiveness effect the rebirth of German power’.32 
The Bamberg Declaration clearly shows that the negative conclusion of the war 
was viewed by many as merely a postponement of great-power ambitions—not a 
surrender—and the Weimar Republic itself as a temporary necessity to be removed 
when the time was right. 
The ends were certainly pre-war but not the means. The fulfilment of this 
foreign policy could not be accomplished through the continued policies of the old 
Kaiserreich that had for the past twenty years, ‘with weak hearts and failing eyes, lived 
off the fat of Bismarck’s ideas’.33 Thus the post-war right saw neither the new Weimar 
Republic nor even any kind of re-establishment of the old order as a suitable vehicle for 
the realization of their nationalist dreams. Again, one observes the desire for something 
new but as yet undefined.34 
The goals expressed in Bamberg in early 1919 guided efforts in the failed Baltic 
Campaign during that summer and autumn. These failures were never perceived as 
being due to the unobtainable nature of such goals and were simply carried over by 
Colonel Bauer to the Kapp Putsch fiasco and, failing there as well, they re-emerged in 
the designs of the White International plot. The latter was the by-product not of what 
was learned from previous failures, but of what was not learned. 
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Chapter 3 
 
The 1919 Baltic Campaign as Prologue to the White International Plot 
 
Many of the components of the Baltic Campaign of 1919 would be found in the 
White International plot and shall be addressed in the order in which they arose. Firstly, 
while the German units engaged the Bolshevik forces loosely referred to as the ‘Red 
Army’, they did so not for the protection of the Entente-sponsored, nascent Baltic 
republics but, in fact, to deny the republics their independence and bring them under 
German control, consistent with the ultra-nationalist foreign policies of the pan-
Germans. The control of the Baltic was one of the stated aims of the later White 
International plot. Secondly, German and White Russian troops, and their leaders on the 
ground, were almost exclusively paramilitary in nature with the Reichswehr remaining 
cautiously aloof. Thirdly, the Baltic Campaign became a matter of German-White 
Russian transnational military cooperation, drawing on forces from German Freikorps 
units and tsarist Russian prisoners of war held in Germany. This first real ‘international’ 
effort laid a foundation upon which an ultra-conservative, or ‘white’ international, 
revisionist force could subsequently be built using the same troop sources. Fourthly, 
while the Baltic Campaign was initially supported by Berlin and the Entente as a single 
measure against the spread of Bolshevism in the region, it soon revealed its duplicitous 
nature as a German-White Russian prerequisite for establishing a viable force strong 
enough not only to topple the still-shaky Bolshevik administration in Moscow, but also 
to use the Baltic as a base from which to launch an attack on the ‘socialist regime’ in 
Berlin. 
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A.  Extreme Rightist Foreign Policy and the Role of the Freikorps 
 
During World War I, centuries-old Latvian, Estonian and Lithuanian nationalist 
aspirations of autonomy within the Russian Empire were revived by the German 
advance deep within the Baltic region as early as 1915 on the one hand, and were 
changed to a desire for complete independence by the Bolshevik Revolution in October 
1917 on the other. With the signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk35 in March 1918 
granting the Baltic lands to Germany, such dreams of autonomy if nothing else— albeit 
under a German sphere of influence—seemed within reach. Germany, while disguising 
annexationist aims in national self-determination language, had its own agenda for 
controlling the Baltic States based on the large German-speaking populations there and 
the desire to deprive the Bolsheviks of their control of the buffer border states that had 
existed under the Tsar.36 In any case, there was little thought for the Baltic peoples 
themselves.37 Germany’s hopes were dashed—at least temporarily—with the 1918 
collapse of the Western Front and the stipulation within the resulting Armistice of the 
abrogation of the earlier German-Russian Brest-Litovsk Treaty. Ironically, the same 
Armistice also stated that until the Entente decided otherwise, German troops then in 
the east in great numbers, especially in Latvia, were to remain in position—and they 
were still there in the early spring of 1919.38 
To the government in Berlin—as in other European capitals—the danger of a 
Bolshevik ‘Red Terror’ was very real indeed. Early in 1919 soviet republics were 
declared in Bavaria, following the assassination of USPD leader Kurt Eisner,39 and in 
Hungary at precisely the same time that Russia’s Red Army was making its bid in the 
Baltic. It is thus not surprising that initially German military action in the Baltic came 
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with the implied blessing of the Entente, who wished to see the Entente-friendly 
Ulmanis40 government of the Republic of Latvia, as well as the administrations of 
Lithuania and Estonia, succeed without unpopular, direct Entente involvement. 
For the pan-Germans, the Reichswehr and its surrogate Freikorps formations, 
however, involvement in the Baltic meant something quite different. While the German 
civilian government back in Berlin struggled with peacetime readjustment and the issue 
of the coming Paris Treaties, the Reichswehr exercised its free hand in foreign policy at 
the front.41 The Baltic Campaign offered the opportunity to begin to redeem lost 
wartime annexationist dreams and to fulfil a post-war expansionist agenda as articulated 
in the Bamberg Declaration. The universally feared advancement of the Red Army 
westwards merely provided the excuse for a massive German paramilitary build-up in 
the east; a force that could conceivably march on Berlin itself. In point of fact, the actual 
suggestion to use German forces came from the Ebert-appointed General 
Plenipotentiary for the Baltic region, the ultra-nationalist August Winnig,42 who quickly 
saw how he could both soothe British anxieties without their direct intervention and 
open the door to an active German military presence in the region as a base from which 
to smash the Weimar government.43 This SPD ‘wolf in sheep’s clothing’ was later 
dismissed from the party for his involvement in the Kapp Putsch. 
Command of all Freikorps units in the area fell to Baltic German General Count 
Rüdiger von der Goltz44 who set up his base of operations in Mitau outside Riga, the 
former wartime headquarters of German Supreme Command East VIII. Long-time pan-
Germanist and co-founder with Wolfgang Kapp45 of the now-outlawed 1917 German 
Fatherland Party (Deutsche Vaterlandspartei),46 General von der Goltz had already 
made a name for himself as an anti-Bolshevik fighter, having driven out factions of the 
Red Army from Finland in the spring of 1918. He viewed the Baltic as simply the next 
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battlefield against a ‘Bolshevik plague, an Asiatic bondage . . . that must be eradicated 
to prevent the downfall of the West’.47 In such language one detects a very strong echo 
of Bauer. Both men agreed with Oswald Spengler’s thesis of the great threat 
Bolshevism represented to the survival of Western Europe, as will be seen in the 
treatment of Bauer’s political and philosophical ideas below. 
More importantly, General von der Goltz regarded control of the Baltic States as 
an opportunity to preserve Germany’s bridges to a future Bolshevik-free Russia. ‘Russia 
and Germany together, both anti-Bolshevik and anti-Entente . . . will offer the Western 
Powers a different set of circumstances and [will] thus free us from Versailles.’48 These 
are also among Bauer’s stated goals in his reasons for establishing a White 
International.49 
General von der Goltz contested two elements in the Baltic. One was, of course, 
the generally disorganized Red Army that provided him with the excuse, vis-à-vis the 
Entente, for a concentration of German military power in the area. The other was the 
nascent native governments themselves that von der Goltz would have the world believe 
he was protecting. If Germany could deny the Bolsheviks the small Baltic Successor 
States now establishing precarious governments on their own, the way would be open 
for Germany to take them, or retake them, for itself. 
The Baltic Campaign was a strictly paramilitary venture. General von der Goltz 
arranged for the transport of several Freikorps units from Germany and for the 
recruitment amongst resident Baltic Germans to join those already in existence. He 
called upon Baltic German Major Alfred Fletcher to command the Latvian Army. Major 
Fletcher, along with his Chief of Staff Captain Waldemar Pabst,50 promptly dismissed 
the native elements of the official Latvian Army to the point that it was composed of 
80% German and White Russian troops, and an all-German officer corps.51 Other forces 
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included the relatively well-disciplined Freikorps Iron Division under the command of 
the legendary Major Josef Bischoff and many smaller, less disciplined Freikorps units 
recruited from the Reich. 
Early Freikorps successes against the poorly organized Red Army led von der 
Goltz to make his next move to eradicate the native Latvian government itself. He 
engineered a coup in April 1919 using the German-dominated ‘Latvian Army’ whereby 
Entente-friendly President Kārlis Ulmanis was arrested and the Baltic, German-friendly 
quisling Pastor Andreas Needra was installed as the new leader of Latvia. General von 
der Goltz of course denied any participation.52 A shocked Entente ordered Berlin to 
immediately withdraw all German forces but settled for the promise from von der Goltz 
that he would make no more attacks.53 The wily general then simply had his puppet, 
Needra, call for an attack on Riga using the so-called Latvian Army, with the Freikorps 
units ostensibly following in support. The ensuing fall of Riga in May 1919 was 
accomplished but only with the help of Latvian anti-Bolshevik forces within the city. 
Soon the citizens of Riga learned that idle Freikorpskämpfer make very poor 
liberators. They often found themselves at the mercy of their deliverers whose 
unbounded ill behaviour resulted in excesses—even atrocities in a German-instituted 
‘White Terror’.54 In fact, the main contingent of the Red Army had vacated the Baltic 
altogether after the fall of Riga, leaving only ragtag remnants as a rear guard—but the 
Germans remained. It was not long until enraged Latvians and Estonians formed their 
own armies supplied with British arms and advisers to protect themselves from their 
purported liberators.55 These native armies soon proved their worth and exposed 
Freikorps deficiencies when von der Goltz ordered the Estonian ports cleared in 
preparation for a march on St Petersburg (the former tsarist capital). His Freikorps 
formations were twice routed at the Battle of Cēsis in June by the new native Latvian-
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Estonian Army that essentially halted von der Goltz’s advance.56 There were more 
examples of Freikorps failures as the summer wore on. In truth, Riga stood as the sole 
Freikorps victory of any consequence, and that was soon lost due to Entente demands 
that German Freikorps units withdraw. 
 
 
B.  A ‘White’ International Army: Russian-German Cooperation in the Baltic 
 
The news of Freikorps atrocities in the area prompted the Council of Principal 
Allies and Associated Powers in Paris to come to the conclusion that the problems in the 
Baltic might stem from the Germans and not the Bolsheviks. From early July to early 
August the Council repeatedly ordered through the leader of the Inter-Allied Military 
Control Commission in the Baltic States, British General H. P. Gough, the cessation of 
all hostilities, a withdrawal from Riga and a reduction in German troops (namely the 
Freikorps) to one-half of their present size. President Ulmanis was to be restored as the 
de facto leader of the Republic of Latvia, and the ‘Latvian Army’ was to be purged of 
its German elements—in other words, its entire officer corps.57 On July 24 came the 
final blow: all German forces were to be evacuated from the Baltic as soon as 
possible.58 General von der Goltz meant to defy the order. 
From the very outset, von der Goltz had favoured an eastern policy of German-
White Russian collaboration. He was certain an Ostpolitik of this nature would lead to 
an alliance between a revitalized nationalist Germany and a restored Russian monarchy 
to counter the ‘English World Empire’ and what he and others, including Colonel 
Bauer, saw as Whitehall’s desire to put the Baltic under British colonial economic 
sway.59 For this reason, von der Goltz made certain that agencies recruiting 
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Freikorpkämpfer stressed the availability of land for the German Freikorps volunteers 
to settle once the Bolshevik forces were eradicated.60 In other words, the Baltic was a 
Russo-German matter, and none of the Entente’s business. 
Throughout the spring skirmishes, von der Goltz had regularly used troops 
recruited from the vast supply of Russian internees around Berlin provided him through 
the good offices of émigré tsarist Lieutenants Sergei Taboritsky and Piotr Shabelsky-
Bork.61 In fact, Major Fletcher’s ‘Latvian Army’ (80% German) included an all-Russian 
infantry and cavalry detachment of 600 men under the command of Russian émigré 
Prince Anatol Levin.62 
The idea of using interned tsarist troops against the Bolsheviks was something 
Ludendorff had considered even before the end of the war. In September 1918 the 
German-friendly hetman (Cossack military commander) of the then still-free Ukraine, 
Pavel Skoropadsky, met with General Ludendorff at Spa where the latter suggested a 
coordinated effort between General Wrangel63 and his Southern Army, Krasnov’s Don 
Cossacks and the hetman’s Ukrainian Volunteer Army against the Bolsheviks. Further, 
Ludendorff promised to release Russian prisoners of war to augment the Ukrainian and 
Southern Armies who would together attack the Bolsheviks from the south as German 
forces attacked from the west.64 The plan was abandoned, however, amidst the chaos 
surrounding the collapse of the Central Powers in the Balkans and on the Western Front, 
but came to light again during the Baltic Campaign of 1919 and in virtually the same 
form in Ludendorff and Bauer’s White International plot of 1920. 
Concerning the Baltic Campaign of 1919, Major Fletcher regularly kept his 
friend and colleague Wolfgang Kapp apprised of the military situation in the Baltic, 
emphasizing that units were made up almost entirely of former Russian (tsarist) officers 
whom he proudly referred to as his ‘White Guard’.65 German-Russian military 
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cooperation greatly increased, however, after the aforementioned Entente order for all 
German forces to withdraw. 
Throughout the summer of 1919, General von der Goltz simply ignored the 
evacuation orders from Berlin but knew he could not do so indefinitely. In late summer 
he hit upon a desperate plan: in the same way that he had sent the German-White 
Russian dominated ‘Latvian Army’ into Riga through his puppet Latvian leader Pastor 
Needra, he could contrive to place his Freikorps commands under the tsarist flag of 
White Russian forces also fighting in the area. General von der Goltz then travelled to 
Berlin and secured tacit acknowledgement from President Ebert, Defence Minister 
Noske and Foreign Minister Müller that, legally, the German government would have 
no jurisdiction over the general serving under a private White Russian army.66 
Meanwhile, largely due to the Weimar Republic’s acceptance of the Versailles 
Treaty—which was advised by Reichswehr Supreme Command—Freikorps 
commanders were severing ties with their government. On August 24, two months after 
the evacuation order was given, the first of the troop transports was scheduled to depart 
from Jelgava Railway Station near Riga loaded with Freikorps units destined for the 
Reich and for demobilization as decreed by the Entente and Berlin. Upon von der 
Goltz’s signal from Berlin, Major Bischoff, in a blatant act of mutiny, ordered his 
Freikorps Iron Division not to board the trains.67 Within days, news of the defiance 
from Berlin spread throughout the many Freikorps volunteer formations, which 
subsequently organized themselves into the so-called German Legion of approximately 
14,000 troops that promptly put itself at General von der Goltz’s disposal. Well 
equipped with 63 planes, six cavalry units, 56 field pieces, an armoured section, a field 
hospital and 156 machine guns, von der Goltz now had a new army out of the reach of 
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both Berlin and the Entente.68All that was needed was an Imperial Russian flag under 
which he would place his new German Legion. He did not have long to wait. 
In the late summer of 1919 three White Russian detachments were already 
fighting in the area. Unfortunately, General von der Goltz’s plan to fight under the flag 
of Imperial Russia was solely accepted by the one Russian commander whose lack of 
military acumen was matched only by his dubious pedigree.69  
Colonel Prince Pavel Bermondt-Avalov70 had served undistinguished in the 
Imperial Russian Army before the Bolshevik Revolution. He fled early in 1918 to 
German-controlled Kiev where he recruited for the German-sponsored Southern Army 
fighting the Bolsheviks north of the Ukraine. After the Armistice in the West, 
Bermondt-Avalov made his way to the large Russian internment station at Camp 
Salzwedel between Berlin and Hamburg where he organized a volunteer force of some 
3,500 Russian prisoners of war that the Reichswehr agreed to send to the Baltic with 
him in command.71 
In the spring of 1919, Bermondt-Avalov’s apparent organizational skills came to 
the attention of General Max Hoffmann,72 fellow conspirator of General Ludendorff and 
Wolfgang Kapp, who generally regarded White Russian officers evacuated from the 
Ukraine as reliably anti-Bolshevik, anti-Entente and pro-German. They felt that 
Bermondt-Avalov could be of use as a counterbalance to White Russian General 
Nikolai Yudenich,73 whose army in Estonia the German generals believed was too 
much under the control of the British. In March 1919 just before the fall of Riga, 
Defence Minister Gustav Noske gave final approval of the scheme and Bermondt-
Avalov’s 3,500-strong ‘White Army of the West’ set off in May, arriving in the Baltic 
by the middle of June 1919, days before the signing of the Versailles Treaty.74 
Bermondt-Avalov offered his services to General Yudenich, but was coldly rebuffed, 
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and so turned to the Germans at Jelgava just as General von der Goltz was looking for a 
non-German flag under which to place his Freikorps.75 Between the 3,500 Russian ex-
internees and the various renegade units of the German Legion—which removed their 
old insignias and replaced them with the Russian cockade of the White Army of the 
West—von der Goltz and Bermondt-Avalov could claim an army of some 55,000, of 
whom 40,000 were German volunteers.76 The respective autobiographies of von der 
Goltz and Bermondt-Avalov indicate a close comradeship between the Russian and 
German troops, and the latter author speaks highly of the German willingness to rebuild 
Russia and, in the same breath, condemns the duplicity of the Entente motives, 
especially those of England.77 It was thus a marriage of convenience that allowed both 
General Prince Pavel Bermondt-Avalov78 and General von der Goltz to stumble from 
one defeat to the next until November 1919 when the Baltic venture finally came to a 
close. 
 Thus by September 1919 there existed in the Baltic an international German-
Russian army battling ‘Bolshevik elements’ if not the official Red Army, completely 
out of Entente and Weimar control, and supported by General Ludendorff and his circle 
of Colonel Bauer, General Hoffmann, Wolfgang Kapp and others. This would be 
exactly what was called for in the White International plot. 
Besides the establishment of a truly international force, a further development 
came into play that sharpened the focus of the German-White Russian cooperation that 
extended into the post-Kapp Putsch era and beyond. A certain Baron A. V. Belgard, a 
right-wing Baltic landowner from Latvia and leader of the Baltic German faction in 
Berlin,79 was so against von der Goltz working with the generally distrusted Bermondt-
Avalov that he travelled to the general’s base of operations outside Riga to convince 
him of his folly. Though the talks came to nothing, the meeting did have its 
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significance: Belgard was accompanied by another Russian émigré candidate vying for 
military control over Russian troops in the Baltic, General Vasili Vasilievich 
Biskupsky.80  
General Biskupsky is important in that he essentially replaced Bermondt-Avalov 
as the White Russian representative to the Ludendorff-Bauer circle and eventually 
become the representative of the Russian Committee of the White International in 
Budapest during the summer of 1920. It is thus appropriate that his background and 
activities are discussed. 
General Biskupsky was a pre-war member of the ‘Union of the Russian People’, 
a Russian rightist organization founded to preserve national values, pan-slavism, 
Orthodoxy and the rule of the elite as a response to the 1905 revolution in St Petersburg. 
Though never an active member, General Biskupsky also supported the more virulent, 
anti-Semitic wing of the ‘Union’, the ultra-conservative ‘Black Hundreds’, who 
engaged in terrorist pogroms and the assassination of prominent Jews and socialists. 
Biskupsky was of the pro-German party who, like many of the Russian patriotic 
nobility, believed war with Germany to be ill-advised.81 In fact, many of the Baltic 
German ‘Barons’, who as subjects of the Tsar served honourably in the Imperial 
Russian Army, also supported the Black Hundreds and generally enjoyed a favourable 
reputation amongst the Russian right.82 
Like Bermondt-Avalov, Biskupsky fled to the Ukraine after the Bolshevik 
Revolution, serving as commander of the First Cavalry Division of the Ukrainian 
Volunteer Army and generally cooperating with German occupying forces until the fall 
of Skoropadsky’s hetmanate in November 1918.83 Also like Bermondt-Avalov, General 
Biskupsky saw himself as a dashing, romantic figure destined by Providence to restore 
tsarist rule to Mother Russia. He too thought that a restored Russian monarchy was only 
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possible through the cooperation of Germany. He was given to wild dreams of self-
aggrandizement and political intrigue that may have surpassed even those of Bermondt-
Avalov. Upon his arrival in Berlin early in 1919, Biskupsky strolled into the Foreign 
Ministry on Wilhelmstraße and announced he would lead an army of Russian-German 
troops to Moscow (the new Bolshevik capital) and then march on Paris.84 
While Bermondt-Avalov and von der Goltz’s White Army of the West was fighting in 
the Baltic, Biskupsky remained in Berlin where he acted as the former’s political 
adviser and served as President of the Russian National Political Committee attached to 
the National Union.85  
 
Chapter 4 
 
The Versailles Treaty as Catalyst: The Ludendorff-Bauer Circle and  
Counter-revolutionary Planning and Activity 
  
 
The occasion of the presentation of the Versailles Treaty to the German 
government marked the coming together of the radical right circle around General 
Ludendorff, led by the latter’s wartime political adviser Colonel Max Bauer,86 and of 
their plans to militarily remove the Weimar Republic and establish a military 
dictatorship under General Ludendorff. The acceptance of the Treaty by Berlin also 
marked the beginning of tensions between the radical right’s demand for immediate 
action and the Reichswehr’s unwillingness to participate without adequate planning. 
The hesitancy of the Reichswehr would ultimately cause Bauer to favour the use of 
Freikorps units over the former in his myriad of wild counter-revolutionary plans. 
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A.  Disagreement within the Reichswehr and the Birth of the Ludendorff-Bauer Circle 
 
The upper echelons of Reichswehr Command back in Berlin were not in 
agreement as to an appropriate response to the severity of the Versailles Treaty. Several 
highly placed generals within the OHL advocated defying the Treaty by holding out in a 
new state—an Ostland to be carved out of East Prussia. General Wilhelm Groener, 
commander of the OHL (and Ludendorff’s replacement in November 1918), who had 
advised Ebert to sign the Treaty, was against outward defiance of the Entente, arguing 
that further resistance could endanger the unity of the Reich.87 For this he was 
denounced by the more radical elements within the Reichswehr and even branded a 
traitor by Captain Ehrhardt, leader of the famous Freikorps unit, the Marinebrigade-
Ehrhardt, who would march on Berlin in the Kapp Putsch eight months later.88 
The call for immediate action was illustrated by Major Fletcher’s Chief of Staff, 
Freikorps commander Captain Waldemar Pabst, who led a deputation of fellow officers 
to Berlin from headquarters south of Riga to invite Defence Minister Gustav Noske to 
forgo his SPD colleagues, establish a dictatorship and abolish the Weimar Constitution. 
The would-be conspirators then began distributing a pamphlet called Reflections on 
Dictatorship throughout the military stationed around Berlin. One chapter entitled ‘Die 
Person’ stressed that Noske was the strong man Germany needed and thus perfectly 
suited to the task—an odd vote of trust from the radical right for a member of a socialist 
party. The pamphlet went on to promote a  
dictator whose end goal is not to hold power but who will see his task as to save 
what there is left to save; who must be of a personality to be acceptable to a 
wide circle of differing groups. Only on such a basis [as dictator] could one, at 
this most difficult hour, . . . have the freedom of movement to do whatever is 
necessary. Anyone who searches the land will naturally see that the name of 
such a personality is: Noske.89 
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Rebuffed by Noske, the incensed Captain Pabst than took it upon himself to establish 
the National Union (Nationale Vereinigung or NV), the organization that would serve as 
a clearing house for all future ultra-nationalist, anti-Weimar activity.  
The combination of significant German forces in the east, and Noske’s ‘betrayal’ 
in the west, prompted the appeal of Freikorps leaders Major Josef Bischoff and Pabst to 
von der Goltz to use the Baltic as a base of operations for the overthrow of the Berlin 
government. The only objection made by General von der Goltz—and typical of most 
Reichswehr generals—was that such a move was still a bit premature but he was not 
opposed to making preparations to that end.90 
The Freikorps commanders were not alone in their desire to march on Berlin. 
Throughout 1919, in collaboration with ex-Chief of Staff of the Eastern Front, General 
Max Hoffmann, Wolfgang Kapp endeavoured to create dependable military units in 
Stuttgart, Darmstadt and especially Munich that were to be used, along with von der 
Goltz’s forces from the Baltic, to topple the Weimar government when the auspicious 
moment arrived.91 Early in the campaign, Kapp had also established the Ostpreußischer 
Heimatbund (East Prussian Home League) with the outwardly innocuous aims of 
‘repulsing Bolshevism and strengthening the national idea’ as a cover for plans to create 
an East Prussian vanguard for the move against Berlin.92 
The signing of the Versailles Treaty was also the event that moved future Kapp 
Putsch organizer and White International plot creator Colonel Bauer to the forefront of 
counter-revolutionary activity. For Bauer it was simple: from this point on, his goal was 
the annulment of the Versailles Treaty and the removal of the Weimar Republic. He 
judged the treaty to be ‘a noose placed round our throats which they hope to pull 
closed’,93 and a mindless expression of power politics. 
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Frustrated by the hesitancy of the army and generally reluctant to believe that 
meticulous preparation was necessary, Bauer put his complete trust—misplaced, as it 
turned out—in the Freikorps units and excluded the Reichswehr from his plans before 
and after the Kapp fiasco. In fact, in the military component of Bauer’s plan for the 
White International, there was no specific role mentioned for the armed forces of any of 
the countries involved. He spoke only of Freikorps units from northern Germany, 
Bavarian Einwohnerwehren (Citizens’ Guard units),94 Austrian Heimwehren (Home 
Guard units) and the notorious Hungarian paramilitary ‘detachments’.  
Bauer argued in late June 1919 that, on account of the universal disgust within 
the Reichswehr and Germany in general, the time was ripe for a move on Berlin. To that 
end he contacted General Lüttwitz, then in command of all Reichswehr forces around 
Berlin, who cautioned against such a move due to a lack of preparation. Unable or 
unwilling to be convinced that the time was not right, Bauer defended his insistence in a 
memorandum of August 12 wherein he argued that the coming winter would be a 
disaster as a result of little food and massive unemployment. This, he continued, ‘would 
cause a great shift to the left, to Bolshevism . . . [and] already Spartacists are preparing 
for a general strike and a “Red Terror”’. He added that ‘the . . . remedy is a military 
removal of the politically disengaged civilian government.’95 Without any real 
assessment of the situation, Bauer insisted that Germany must ‘at least establish a 
military dictatorship to take the initiative; [and] at the present, with military support, the 
action would still be easy’.96 Nor would Bauer accept the counsel of his wartime friend-
in-exile Crown Prince Wilhelm, who warned him against a forced solution because ‘a 
[counter-] revolution would very soon lose support with the majority of the people.’97 
In early July Bauer took it upon himself to sound out where England might stand 
were a forced removal of the Weimar government accomplished. In this, one sees the 
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rank amateurism that would typify Bauer’s later endeavours. In a correspondence with 
British Colonel Ryan, Chief of Staff of the British Military Governor in Cologne, Bauer 
attempted to convince the former of the advantages of a military takeover of the Berlin 
government: the fulfilment of the Treaty was only possible with a stronger German 
government; a full-blown Communist uprising was imminent (this Bauer believed); 
later a strong democratic government would replace the provisional dictatorship—
perhaps a constitutional monarch, but not a Hohenzollern; and, finally, Bauer requested 
a formal pledge that His Majesty’s government would not move to demand the 
dissolution of the Freikorps units.98 Ryan sent Bauer’s message to the British delegation 
in Paris. Foreign Minister Balfour decided not to honour the message with an answer 
but did quip, ‘I suspect there is a good deal of self-deception and misunderstanding as to 
the real feelings of the country amongst these military people.’99 Naïvely, Bauer took 
the silence as a tacit signal that England would not openly object to a rightist German 
coup. On another occasion after a communication with Bauer, the Chief of the British 
Military Mission in Berlin, General Malcolm, characterized the former as a ‘hot head 
without judgement’.100 
Bauer’s blind antipathy to the government and his passionate partisanship 
against social democracy and Communism—which he saw as one and the same—
prevented him from any kind of objective assessment of the political situation. He 
continued to pursue his demand for the establishment of a military dictatorship from 
June 1919 to the Kapp Putsch of March 1920 with all the fanatical zeal of someone 
convinced that the Reichswehr and citizens alike longed for deliverance.101 
One must ask where Ludendorff stood on the issue of an immediate move on 
Berlin. Early in July Wolfgang Kapp invited Ludendorff and other known counter-
revolutionaries to his Berlin home to win them over to the idea of a rightist uprising of 
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Captain Pabst’s own Freikorps unit, the Garde-Kavallerie-Schützendivision, in the 
capital. General Ludendorff accepted the idea in principle with two modifications. 
Control would not rest with Pabst’s staff but with the commander of all troops stationed 
in and around Berlin, General Lüttwitz. He alone could do the necessary networking 
with the entire northern German Reichswehr establishment and with sympathetic 
civilians. The other stipulation from Ludendorff—a field general who well understood 
the value of meticulous preparation—was that preparations would take at least two 
years and nothing was to be attempted before that time.102 Meanwhile, in an almost 
identical situation to that in which Bauer and Kapp would find themselves eight months 
later, Defence Minister Noske threatened to dissolve Captain Pabst’s Freikorps unit. 
The prospect of losing the most important instrument in their plans prompted Pabst to 
try to convince General Lüttwitz that they must move now. Denied, Pabst decided to 
march on Berlin himself and ordered his troops to prepare on July 19, only to be 
dissuaded by Reichswehr Generals von Lüttwitz and Maecker at the last moment. For 
his pains, Captain Pabst was discharged from the Reichswehr. 
 
 
B.  Failure of the Baltic Campaign and Lost Lessons for the Ludendorff-Bauer Circle 
 
 
In October the White Russian-German volunteer forces of Bermondt-Avalov 
and von der Goltz engaged in a thoroughly botched attempt to retake Riga, now under 
the control of President Ulmanis and the British-advised Latvian Army since the 
withdrawal order of early June. The plan had called for a move from a recaptured Riga 
through the Russian heartland and for nothing less than the removal of the Communist 
regime in Moscow.103 Bermondt-Avalov expressed his dreams for the future of Russia 
 43 
 
in an essay penned in 1921, ‘The Legacy of the Revolution and Bolshevism’, wherein 
he appealed for an advance into the interior of Russia where ‘the rights of the military 
commanders are unlimited [in order] to re-establish the mighty, strong organism of a 
great Russia.’104 
The failure of this grandiose attempt not only proved the undoing of Generals 
Bermondt-Avalov and von der Goltz, and of the whole Baltic Campaign, but also had 
ramifications back in Berlin. On the eve of the failed October 7 Riga Offensive, Kapp 
had called a special meeting attended by Ludendorff, Bauer and Pabst among others and 
put forward that a coup was to be staged against the Weimar Republic in coordination 
with the anticipated success of Bermondt-Avalov’s White Army of the West in Russia. 
This was to happen on the broad assumption that General Ludendorff would then take 
up the post of military dictator in the new German government.105 This last point was 
identical to the role Ludendorff would assume according to the White International plot 
conceived only six months later. 
Kapp’s hopes for a coup against Berlin based on military support from 
Bermondt-Avalov’s White Russian-German forces were soon dashed, however, when 
the latter found themselves up against strong resistance from Ulmanis’s Latvian Army, 
with help from the English fleet who opened fire on Bermondt-Avalov’s left wing.106 
This served as a clear indication of where the British now stood in the whole Baltic 
affair, and in the eyes of the German radical right wing it justified their Anglophobic 
assertion that England desired to establish an economic sphere of influence in the area. 
By October, ill-conceived offensives and the rank ineptitude of Bermondt-
Avalov had caused many financial supporters to change their minds in favour of 
Admiral Kolchak’s forces in Siberia and the White Russian troops of General Denikin 
and Baltic German General Wrangel in the south. At one point, to bolster his waning 
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financial base, Bermondt-Avalov even tried printing his own currency using the 
‘Imperial Russian Estates in the Baltic’, which of course no longer existed, as backing. 
This failing, he hit upon the idea of using Latvian slave labour in sawmills to produce 
paper for sale in the West. This too failed.107 
With the failure to retake Riga, arrangements were made for Bermondt-Avalov 
to cede command to Major General Eberhard who, through agreement with the Latvian 
government not to intervene, was able to successfully evacuate the White Army of the 
West back to the Reich and to demobilization by late November. 
Bermondt-Avalov himself was a casualty of the Baltic Campaign. Generals 
Ludendorff, Hoffmann and (the repentant) von der Goltz then turned their attention to 
Bermondt-Avalov’s rival General Vasili Biskupsky, who was named General Inspector 
of the Russian Forces Interned in Germany, an essentially meaningless title beyond the 
Ludendorff circle.  
By the year’s end the Baltic Campaign was finished. The Entente had withdrawn 
their support for White Russian forces, lifted their blockade of Bolshevik Russian ports 
and, acquiescing that the Bolsheviks were there to stay, instead embraced the Anglo-
French idea of a cordon sanitaire in Eastern Europe, both to contain Russia and to 
prevent Germany from further, unproductive meddling in the former’s affairs.108 Some 
5,000 Russian troops returned to West Prussia—mostly in and around Berlin. Some 
Freikorps commanders did disband as ordered but many did not. Many followed their 
leaders to Upper Silesia to work in the coalmines or laboured on the large estates owned 
by sympathetic landowners, but remained within their respective formations as 
undercover reserves awaiting the next call to act. Here many joined the well-established 
Freikorps units under General Löwenfeld and Captain Ehrhardt who would both play 
prominent roles in Wolfgang Kapp’s long-awaited Putsch some months later. It was 
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such sequestered Freikorps units as these and the re-interned Russians that Bauer would 
see as his ever-ready military force to be used in the various campaigns envisioned in 
the White International.  
In sum, the Bolsheviks were never really organized enough to continue to deny 
the Baltic States their independence; the Germans had no intention of supporting Baltic 
national aspirations (being in it for themselves) and, once that became clear to the 
Entente, were officially withdrawn; and, finally, the White Russians were too inept on 
their own either to prevent Baltic independence or to defeat the poorly organized ‘reds’ 
who simply withdrew into Russia.  
The lack of success in the Baltic did not cool the enthusiasm of the radical right, 
who saw every setback as a mere prelude to the next endeavour. There was no more a 
sense of defeat concerning the Baltic Campaign than there was concerning the war 
itself; only a deep sense of betrayal emanating from Berlin. General Turner of the Allied 
Commission to oversee the German withdrawal from the Baltic correctly defined the 
attitude of the Freikorps and their leaders in his report: 
East Prussia does not realize that Germany has lost the War. The German 
Military Party is all-powerful and Militarism in all forms is rampant . . . I have 
little doubt of a plot to overthrow the Government at the opportune moment, or 
of the power of the Military to do so. They are simply waiting for the time when 
the Peace shall have been ratified and the whole onus of it can be thrown on the 
present Government. Propaganda encouraging Militarism is being disseminated 
everywhere.109 
 
The radical right activities back in Berlin were no more dampened by the Baltic 
fiasco. There was an almost seamless shift between the closure of the German-Russian 
campaign in the East and the laying of plans for the next counter-revolutionary action. 
Planning took place at the NV headquarters under the patronage of General Ludendorff 
but the guiding spirit and by far the greatest advocate for action was Colonel Bauer. 
Because the remainder of this work deals with Colonel Bauer in greater detail, it is 
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necessary to delve into his psyche and political development as a counter-revolutionary 
activist to better comprehend the motives and decisions behind the radical course of 
action undertaken by him.  
 
 
Chapter 5 
The Political Mind of Colonel Max Bauer 
 
To understand the origins of the White International plot, one must understand the 
mind of its creator. This chapter considers two aspects of Bauer’s political interpretation 
of the world around him. Firstly, his perception of the value of democratic socialism in 
general, and that of the Weimar Republic in particular, showed a fundamental belief on 
his part in the total folly of the existing socio-political form. 
The second consideration has to do with his ideas of where Germany fitted within 
the international sphere, especially in relation to the Entente. This is important because 
Bauer would not only crusade against the ‘unnatural’ social democracy in Berlin but, 
during the pre-Kapp period, he would also feel compelled to battle against the Entente 
for the political and economic well-being of Germany. In both cases Bauer attempted to 
square the world of realities with his arsenal of theoretical models. 
 
 
A.  ‘Prussian Socialism’ and the Domestic Front 
 
Compared to his fellow Prussian officers, Colonel Bauer was a well-read 
individual as well as a prolific writer of essays and tracts both during and after the war. 
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This allows the researcher fairly thorough access into the complexities of Bauer’s much-
disciplined mind, which was often ruled by doctrines and theories with little regard to 
rational implementation of actions to bring about what he saw as necessary for the good 
of Germany. Accordingly, Colonel Bauer was unwavering in his goal to revive 
Germany’s world-power status but amazingly flexible in his means to achieve it. This 
emphasis of ends over means was what allowed Bauer to give little thought to the 
‘workability’ of his plans.  
Colonel Bauer clearly and consistently showed a tendency towards the Kantian 
notion of devotion to duty, in which the state should be the very embodiment of the idea 
of morality. He was dedicated to the school of fellow Prussian philosophers and was 
particularly drawn to Oswald Spengler, referring often to his 1919 work Preußendum 
und Sozialismus that railed against what the author called ‘false socialism’: the 
illegitimate child born of Communism, and its contradiction of so-called social 
democracy. Bauer held fast to Spengler’s judgement that there was only one authentic 
kind of socialism and that was German, or more specifically Prussian, socialism based 
on duty to the state.110 
Bauer viewed the socialists’ claim to democracy as purely utopian and even 
dangerous because the will of the majority would overwhelmingly belong to the 
incompetent masses incapable of reasonable judgement. For they, in the judgement of 
Bauer, were ‘never the noblest and best [but] windbags, fools and criminals who are 
never timid to proclaim their rights; rights that suit their egotistical natural instincts’.111  
Evidence of Colonel Bauer’s political development emerged during the last year 
of the war. As a result of a weakening of the ruling aristocratic elite, the political right 
became increasingly radicalized. This was especially so amongst those from the middle 
class, such as Ludendorff and Bauer. The more secure Bauer’s position as Ludendorff’s 
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right-hand man grew and the more precarious Germany’s position got, the more 
convinced Bauer was of the need for draconian measures.112 In a memorandum 
prepared by Bauer for the emperor on the domestic state of Germany, his political 
assessments appear crude, ill-considered and often contradictory.113 This tendency was 
to become even more evident in his writings after Germany’s defeat.  
Bauer interpreted the Great War as having been a struggle between differing 
world views (Weltanschauungen). The views held by Germany, he believed, were those 
founded on the spiritual morality—a term he uses incessantly—gifted the Reich by the 
ruling House of Hohenzollern, especially Frederick Wilhelm I and Frederick the Great, 
and guided by the great philosophers including Kant, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel—
Prussians all. In Bauer’s ‘Sparta of the North’ the soldier, as the paragon of absolute 
duty and of willingness to live and die for the state, may well claim for himself the first 
and highest level of society. Bauer maintained that the soldier’s ‘absoluteness of 
völkisch feeling [prevailed in Germany] until it became poisoned by capitalism and 
democracy’.114 He saw in the Freikorps the rebirth of such qualities. This is, of course, 
a perception based on self-delusion for there is little to indicate that the nihilistic 
Freikorpskämpfer were so imbued with anything approaching politically or 
philosophically völkisch qualities.  
For this study, it is appropriate to see what type of Weltanschauung Bauer 
assigned to the Entente and especially England, given that the German right as well as 
the émigré Russian monarchists suspected English colonial designs in both the Baltic 
region and Russia proper.115 In counterpoint to what Bauer considered as the German 
Weltanschauung sat the Weltanschauung of ‘materialism’, in which individual effort 
and labour stood ‘not for duty as an end in itself but merely as a medium for [financial] 
success’.116 Capitalist materialism, according to Bauer, was the overriding principle of 
 49 
 
English thinking and national policy, and the realization of this principle was evident in 
the imperialistic expansion of England, as well as its struggle against Germany in 1914-
1918. For Bauer, the Great War was simply a reckoning between those driven by a 
völkisch duty to the state—such as resided deep within the German psyche—and those 
of the Entente that lay ‘in the service of world capitalism’.117 Bauer bemoaned that the 
English-spawned materialist spirit had gradually spread through Germany as well: 
‘Here too [one sees] unprincipled money markets and black-marketeering; a 
consequence of the English spirit on the Continent.’118  
‘Materialism’, wrote Bauer in 1921, ‘rules the times unrestrained. It destroys 
idealism, that is to say, the spirit of duty, manly pride, self-discipline, morality and fear 
of God. Capitalism, pseudo-democracy, pseudo-socialism, parliamentarianism, atheism, 
feminism and . . . the absurd quest for general equality are all the hallmarks of 
materialism.’119 Bauer considered parliaments and democracy, liberalism, socialism, 
capitalism and materialism as synonyms, or as differing aspects of the same 
phenomenon. 
This begs the question as to which political system Bauer stood most strongly 
against: the Bolshevism of the left or the bourgeois liberalism of the Entente. It is thus 
difficult to determine which of these he assigned to the hated Weimar Republic because, 
in the minds of the radical right, the Republic was both. This was also reflected in the 
stated goals of the White International that sought to battle against the ‘red scourge’ 
throughout Central Europe and against the Entente. The position of the Entente in 
Bauer’s cast of enemies may well be expressed in the following way. The threat of 
Bolshevism was certainly of great concern to victor and vanquished alike, and rightly 
so, but in mid-1919 it was still seen as a temporary phenomenon. The threat from the 
Entente was a different matter altogether. The Paris Conference had redrawn the borders 
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of Europe, forcing Germany to accept blame for the war so as to justify the harsh 
punishment of keeping it economically and militarily weak—and the Entente meant to 
permanently fix their decisions through the internationally sanctioned Paris treaties. 
Little wonder Bauer saw the Entente as the chief obstacle to resurgent German power. 
On matters pertaining to international Jewry, what seems rather automatic, 
according to the formula thus far exhibited by Bauer, is in fact a bit more complicated. 
To be ‘international’, formulated Bauer, ‘means for us [Germans] slave-mindedness and 
Jewishness’.120 In the Jews Bauer saw not only the curse of the internationalists but also 
the embodiment of capitalism. He constantly referred to ‘Jewish banks’ and the ‘slavery 
of usurious Jewish capital’.121 Jews, alleged Bauer, were the ‘main support of 
materialism’.122 
Despite such incendiary comments about Jews, Bauer was not given to rabid 
anti-Semitism without exception. For all his hostility and hate speech, he formed and 
maintained close friendships with Jews. This was best evidenced by Bauer’s association 
with trusted co-conspirator Ignatius Trebitsch-Lincoln, a Hungarian-born Jew, who 
played a leading role in the Hohenzollern restoration plot, the Kapp Putsch and the 
White International plot. 
Bauer’s view on the exalted position of the soldier is addressed above; but what 
of the role of the military within the structure of government? In a memorandum penned 
in 1916, Bauer’s perceived role of the Reichswehr within the state applied just as clearly 
to the first years after the defeat. During the war, Bauer called for the immediate 
establishment of a military dictatorship under General Ludendorff in which the Kaiser, 
due to his feeble indecisiveness, would be excluded from power. Hindenburg and 
Ludendorff demurred—at least at the time—preferring the more oblique approach of 
allowing a chancellor and civil government to take the blame for unpopular measures 
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taken by the military, leaving the Reichswehr untouched by public opinion.123 In defeat, 
this doctrine of insulation served the army well. The most obvious examples were the 
stab-in-the-back myth, the creation of the Freikorps surrogate and the refusal of the 
OHL to be involved, one way or the other, in the Kapp Putsch. Bauer, however, had 
neither the subtlety nor the patience for such indirect domination and preferred the 
‘strong man of action’—the Führerprinzip approach. This was observable in Bauer’s 
rash desire to march on Berlin in the summer of 1919; in the Kapp Putsch that featured 
Kapp as a mere figurehead for General Lüttwitz’s rule; and in Bauer’s plans for the 
White International to establish General Ludendorff as military dictator of Germany. 
This is consistent with what Bauer held for the future: he deemed the re-
establishment of pre-war political and social institutions to be the product of short-
sighted and reactionary minds. Bauer looked on the Great War not only as a political 
and military misadventure, but also as an opportunity for a kind of national revolution 
whereby ‘holy fires are necessary to eliminate the many embers and foreign bodies that 
have collected within the officer corps’.124 In another work he wrote of the ‘coming 
blessed difficult emergency [that will] purify the people’.125 In the defeat of Germany 
Bauer thus finds meaning, as certain elements within military circles would be driven to 
a necessary impulse to national purification and rejuvenation.126 The war had to be lost 
in order for the nation to win. 
Colonel Bauer drew readily from a plethora of eccentric ideas and applied them 
to all that he saw as wrong in his world. The result was a curiously eclectic, rather 
amateurish pattern made up of a mixture of lofty ideas of morality coupled with 
shallow, narrow prejudice. Bauer’s convictions were steeped in extreme nationalism 
that led to fantastic speculation and false conclusions. This often incomprehensible and 
even conflicting collection of thoughts emerged in almost all of Bauer’s many tracts. He 
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was anti-Semitic yet his closest collaborator was Jewish; he was anti-Bolshevik yet 
reached across the chasm to the German Communists and even the Bolshevik Russians 
in his battle against the Weimar Republic and the Entente; and his extreme nationalist 
agenda he regarded as achievable only through ‘white’ international cooperation. 
Though his means were in constant flux, he held tight to his ends. This is especially 
evident in his 1925 work Das Land der roten Zaren that reveals a more or less 
unrepentant Bauer who remained steadfast in his ideas even after his long succession of 
failures, such as engineering a Hohenzollern restoration, plotting the Kapp Putsch and 
establishing a White International. 
Colonel Max Bauer’s movement from socio-political thought to counter-
revolutionary action did not take place immediately. During the waning days of 
November 1918, Bauer still held hopes of continuing a military career and requested 
reassignment to General Headquarters at Wihelmshöhe near Kassel. General Groener, 
Ludendorff’s replacement as Chief of Supreme Command and the second-highest-
ranking officer in Germany, thought better of it and informed Bauer that ‘due to 
extraordinary reasons, at this time the transfer [to Kassel] is not to be undertaken.’127 
Despite the polite nature of the rebuff, Colonel Bauer knew well that this clear refusal 
marked the end of his long military career. In a letter to Ludendorff in Swedish exile, 
Bauer stated that he understood that to General Groener he (Bauer) was a ‘red flag’ and 
thus had no place in the new order.128 
It is difficult to say exactly when Colonel Bauer turned the corner from being 
willing to serve the new government to showing active opposition to it. Hints at his new 
direction are found in a further letter to Ludendorff in Sweden. In it Bauer wrote that 
Germany now ‘mangles itself, insanely governed while our enemies mock us and 
trample even our honour underfoot’, an obvious reference to the Treaty of Versailles 
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presented to the Ebert government. On the topic of Ludendorff’s return to Germany, 
Bauer added in the same letter that the time was not yet right but ‘hopefully [your] 
return will be necessary . . . then the tissue of lies will be torn asunder and . . . the 
struggle will go on.’129 The nature of ‘the struggle’ is not explained but Bauer was 
resolved to lead it. 
 
 
B.  Bauer and National Bolshevism: Political Reorientation or Tactical Strategy?  
 
The political development of Colonel Bauer would not be complete without 
scrutinizing his alleged national-Bolshevik proclivities.130 Bauer’s fanciful idea of 
working with the radical left was based on three assumptions: firstly, the radical right 
and left shared an antipathy to the liberal, bourgeois Weimar Republic which they saw 
as a mere puppet of the equally despised Entente; secondly, both the Bolshevik 
Revolution in Russia and Germany’s defeat diplomatically isolated the two nations in 
the world community; and thirdly, by late 1919 Bauer was becoming increasingly 
convinced that, given the failures of German-White Russian collaboration in the 
Ukraine in 1918 and the Baltic in late 1919, the widely held belief that Bolshevik 
Russia was merely a temporary political experiment had no substance. As for Russia’s 
side, as early as 1919 Karl Radek, Lenin’s contact man to the German Communist 
Party, had expressed doubts that a revolution in Germany was possible given the 
basically stronger position of the middle class compared to that of pre-revolutionary 
Russia. He thus sought a modus vivendi whereby Germany and Russia could work 
together as a way out of their international isolation.131 For that reason Radek was 
amenable to Bauer’s desire to meet in mid-December. An old friend of Ludendorff’s 
from his cadet days, Baron von Reibnitz, who also viewed such a union as 
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advantageous to both countries, thus arranged a meeting. Bauer’s idea of a new 
orientation of the Reich based on cooperation between the leftist working class and the 
German officer corps in a ‘Battle against the Entente’ was presented to Radek, who 
promised only to take the matter up with Moscow.132 Other than the pledge given by 
Victor Kopp, leader of the Russian Trade Commission in Berlin involved in 
negotiations for the repatriation of Russian prisoners of war, not to intervene in the 
event of a Putsch attempt from the right, there was really nothing to show for Bauer’s 
efforts.133 
In any case, Radek did not trust Bauer, and with good reason. Even before the 
Bauer-Radek meeting, plans had been discussed within the Bauer circle of the NV for a 
German-Bolshevik Russian military move to destroy Poland and re-establish the old 
German-Russian borders of 1914. This was to be followed by a joint action against the 
Entente in the Rhineland.134 
It is here that the typically duplicitous character of Bauer’s scheming comes to 
light. Were the joint German-Bolshevik Russian plan actually enacted, General 
Biskupsky and his access to White Russian forces would be cast in the role of a hedge 
against any Bolshevik breach of promise. Formal agreements were signed between the 
Ludendorff-Bauer group and the Russian monarchists to the effect that, should the Red 
Army attempt to activate the German left to a Communist revolution, German troops 
would abandon their erstwhile Bolshevik allies and join with the Russian White Army 
under Biskupsky to smash them.135 
In any event, the Bolsheviks would have nothing to do with Bauer and his 
feigned rapprochement and, except for a brief moment on March 17 when Bauer 
desperately and unsuccessfully approached the German left in a bid to save the Kapp 
Putsch, the idea of a right-left collaboration against the Entente was dropped. 
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The significance of Bauer’s flirtation with national Bolshevism is twofold. In the 
first instance, it is difficult to ascertain whether Bauer was indeed reorienting towards 
an agenda of working with the Bolsheviks or merely trying a new, typically convoluted 
tactic of using the Red Army to achieve his anti-Entente goals only then, with the help 
of the White Russians, to destroy the Red Army and march on Moscow. There is 
support for the latter theory. A July 1920 memorandum produced by General Biskupsky 
while in Budapest is strikingly similar to those found in Trebitsch’s autobiography of 
1931. In it Biskupsky advocated a German right-Bolshevik Russian joint effort to 
destroy Poland and the re-establishment of the 1914 borders. This was to be followed by 
a general insurrection within the Red Army led by former tsarist generals.136 Another 
factor supporting the idea that Bauer had no real desire to do a complete turnabout and 
work with the Bolsheviks was the very fantastic nature of the plan itself. It was 
archetypically Baueresque in its scope and expectations of any sort of success. It was, of 
course, at root an early variant of the White International plot in that it sought to re-
establish pre-war borders and let loose an attack on the Entente in the West. 
The second significance is that influential Bavarian right-wing leaders equated 
national Bolshevism with National Socialism and wanted nothing to do with either. This 
would make Bauer’s task of selling his idea of a White International to the Bavarians 
more difficult than it might otherwise have been.  
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Chapter 6 
The National Union, October 1919 to March 1920 
 
The pan-German Bamberg Declaration of February 1919 provided a forum from 
which to espouse ‘a new way forward’. Beyond that, the meeting in Bamberg did little 
in the way of organizing a central base concerned with coordinating the actual work 
necessary for the fulfilment of the rightists’ nationalist agenda. This fell to the National 
Union (Nationale Vereinigung or NV)—a kind of right-wing political club through 
which the Ludendorff-Bauer circle’s anti-Weimar ideas of every stripe could be 
discussed and actions could be planned. 
A discussion of the NV serves to identify key figures and trends that played an 
active role in the development of the White International. It also illustrates the nature of 
the relationship between the radical right around Ludendorff and Bauer and various 
other nationalist forces, namely the more conservative right and the Reichswehr. It 
presents Colonel Bauer as the leading figure behind the radical right faction within the 
NV and his penchant for advocating direct action with little regard for what was 
achievable and what was not. 
 
 
A. Origins and Diverse Character 
  
The official beginnings of the NV are roughly traceable to the White Russian-
German failure of the Riga Offensive in October 1919. After all, the move on Riga was 
only the first step to an attack on Bolshevik Russia proper that, in turn, was to signal a 
march on Berlin. 
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As early as April 1919 like-minded counter-revolutionaries had taken to 
regularly meeting at General Ludendorff’s residence on Viktoriastraße in Berlin. 
Included were Navy Captain-Lieutenant Hermann Ehrhardt who commanded the 
famous Freikorps Marinebrigade-Ehrhardt stationed one night’s march from Berlin; 
Major Franz von Stephani, a leading figure of the rightist organization the Verband der 
nationalgesinnter Soldaten (Association of Nationalist-minded Soldiers) boasting 3,000 
members in Berlin alone; and Wolfgang Kapp.137Also present was Captain Waldemar 
Pabst, Latvian Army commander Major Fletcher’s aide-de-camp during the Baltic 
Campaign.  
With the Versailles Treaty in June, the creation of a more official organization 
was deemed urgent. In early July 1919, immediately following the signing, Captain 
Pabst—having been curtly rebuffed for his invitation that Defence Minister Gustav 
Noske assume the dictatorship of the Reich—took over the Berlin-based Nationale 
Vereinigung set up by Deutsche Vaterlandspartei founders Wolfgang Kapp and 
Admiral Tirpitz in 1917138 and breathed a decidedly new radical life into the rather 
ineffective erstwhile organization. It was not until Ludendorff lent his patronage to the 
NV after the failure of the Riga Offensive in October, however, that it became the 
generally recognized Berlin rightist nerve centre. 
Though Bauer was certainly the most active of the radical wing of the nationalist 
right, he really only represented a lively minority of the overall membership. The NV 
was not a single mass organization bent on the destruction of the Weimar Republic but a 
collection of numerous associations (Verbände) that to various degrees stood in 
opposition to the government.139 In the same building were housed several agencies 
sponsored by the nationalist German National People’s Party (DNVP), such as the 
editorial offices of the journal Eisener Blätter edited by party representative and priest 
 58 
 
Dr D. Traub, the Berlin offices of the Agricultural Association (Landesverband), the 
Office of German Nationalist Civil Servants and the Welfare Station for Discharged 
Career Soldiers.140 While all groups may have opposed the government, there was little 
consensus as to what to do about it. For the moment, it was more important for 
Ludendorff to maintain a broad network of like-minded agencies than to require an all-
out commitment to insurrection. In this way he felt the citizenry could be gradually and 
systematically prepared for an armed counter-revolution.141 
A special concern of the NV was to infiltrate the Reichswehr, so members were 
very much engaged in the dissemination of propaganda through speeches and articles. 
The majority of activity by former army officers within the NV was directed at warding 
off an anticipated coup attempt by the Communists. For the smaller, more radical 
Ludendorff circle—especially Wolfgang Kapp, Waldemar Pabst, Franz von Stephani 
and Colonel Bauer—an uprising of the left really played no role as a prerequisite for a 
right-wing military coup.142 
The task of bringing the army over to the idea of supporting a pre-emptive coup 
fell to Captain Pabst who, with the help of Dr Grabowski who headed up the 
Propaganda Department of the former’s Freikorps Garde-Kavallerie-Schützendivision, 
flooded the Reichswehr with articles and tracts disparaging the government. In one 
particular brochure, Pabst maintained that President Ebert and the SPD took their lead 
from the very left-wing USPD and the Bolsheviks, and that serving officers need not be 
concerned with their oaths of loyalty due to the government’s impending dismissal of 
them.143 General Ludendorff himself emerged from the wings to malign the government 
in the conservative, right-wing newspaper Neue Preußische Kreuzzeitung, claiming it 
was guilty of inadequately supplying troops with necessities such as warm clothing and 
proper food.144 
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Attention was also given to the more eager—if less able—numerous Freikorps 
forces still under arms. These included principally the formations late of the Baltic 
Campaign currently sequestered in work communities (Arbeitsgemeimschaften) on the 
great estates throughout East Prussia and, of course, the large and well-equipped 
Freikorps Marinebrigade-Ehrhardt housed at Döberitz Barracks only twelve hours 
march from the centre of Berlin. The latter and other units were under threat of 
dissolution when the Versailles Treaty took effect on January 1, 1920. 
Defence Minister Gustav Noske was kept apprised of NV activities through the 
Prussian State Ministry and the Berlin Police, and was told that despite its well-known 
‘secret’ agenda, the NV was basically a ‘harmless organization’.145 This was 
undoubtedly due to the comparatively unthreatening agenda of the greater part of the 
NV that purportedly would not act unless a leftist attempt on the government was to take 
place. 
Bavaria, Bauer’s post-Kapp centre of counter-revolutionary activity, had been 
successfully alerted to military preparations for a coup. The recent experience with the 
USPD Kurt Eisner regime, followed by the proclamation of a Bavarian Soviet Republic 
the previous spring, made for a heightened sense of a possible leftist threat. Pabst kept 
in close contact with Freikorps commander Captain Ernst Röhm, who was influential in 
Reichswehr Command in Munich, and with Georg Escherich, founder and leader of the 
enormous Bavarian Einwohnerwehr146 that would play a major role in the design of the 
White International plot. 
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B.  The National Union and the Russian Monarchists 
 
General Biskupsky had emerged from the Baltic experience stronger due to the 
withdrawal of support from the German right for the untrustworthy and now disgraced 
Bermondt-Avalov. The sources are vague as to exactly when Biskupsky became tied to 
the pro-Putsch Ludendorff circle. Still, it is certain that he was acquainted with the 
circle’s members, because of the mutual perception that the futures of Russia and 
Germany were linked with the destruction of the Bolsheviks and the Weimar Republic 
respectively. It is known that during the early months of 1919 General Biskupsky took 
part in the establishment of the so-called White Ruthenian government-in-exile housed 
on Wilhelmstraße that attracted certain highly placed émigré tsarist politicians and 
officers.147  
The extent of Biskupsky’s participation in the NV aside, there were contrary 
judgements within the organization as to his character. Though some saw him as a 
braggart and unreliable adventurer of dubious origins,148 others viewed him as a capable 
and honourable patriot. In any case, Biskupsky left a very positive impression on Bauer 
who characterized him as possessing a ‘clear and sober head with great political gifts’ 
and as being a ‘man with the energy and courage of a tiger’.149 Bruno Miller, who held 
the office of Foreign Minister of the White Ruthenian government-in-exile, acted as 
Biskupsky’s political adviser. The reason behind the association of the Ludendorff-
Bauer circle with the two Russian émigrés was clearly spelled out in an undated 
memorandum by Bauer probably written during the summer of 1920 wherein he stated 
that, ‘without a future [non-Bolshevik] middle class in Russia, the resurrection of 
Germany free of parliaments, social democracy and Communism is impossible.’150 In a 
memorandum by Biskupsky from roughly the same time, the latter asserted that as early 
 61 
 
as 1917 ‘clear-sighted’ Russian monarchists came to realize that further war would lead 
to the fall of the Romanov and Hohenzollern dynasties.151 While it is true that such 
predictions were made after the fact, they do speak of a certain sentiment that the 
futures of both countries were inextricably tied one with the other.  
Biskupsky’s influence among the Russian colony of émigrés and ex-prisoners of 
war in Berlin was not as much as he pretended.152 He was, however, active as an 
intermediary between Krupp Industries and Admiral Kolchak’s representatives in Berlin 
and, as such, in close contact with the darker figures involved in unofficial German 
foreign policy. His penchant for grandiose plans is of particular significance for this 
study since he would attract—and be attracted to—the growing Ludendorff-Bauer 
circle.153 
The union between the White Russian émigré and the Ludendorff circle was also 
a matter of financial exigency. To have within Berlin both a functioning Russian 
government-in-exile and undetermined thousands of loyal tsarist troops hidden away in 
the surrounding areas was something the NV deemed worthy of support. Accordingly, it 
supplied the White Ruthenian government with a monthly stipend of 50,000 marks to be 
used for the establishment of an efficient, reliable emigrant organization and 
intelligence service.154 There were also plans to counterfeit 2 million Russian Duma 
roubles through the efforts of a sympathetic publishing house in Berlin owned by a 
certain Heinrich Bauer (no relation).155 This sum was to be divided among the Russian 
monarchists and the NV, and to be used to help finance the Russian counter-revolution. 
According to a later report from Trebitsch, the manufacture of the plates for the pressing 
of the banknotes was financed by ‘esteemed German persons’.156 This counterfeiting 
scheme would carry over in its exact form into Bauer’s White International plot, with 
the exception that the banknotes were to be pressed in Budapest instead of Berlin. 
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C.  Emergence of Trebitsch-Lincoln and the Bauer-Trebitsch Conspiratorial Team 
 
 
The most important event that took place through the NV was the meeting of 
Colonel Bauer and Hungarian-born Ignatius Trebitsch-Lincoln. Trebitsch was co-
architect of the Hohenzollern restoration plot and the White International plot. He also 
played a significant role in the Kapp Putsch and would remain Bauer’s closest co-
conspirator from late September 1919 until early autumn 1920 when he betrayed the 
plot to the Austrian and Czechoslovak authorities. 
Trebitsch was born into a middle-class Jewish family in Pécs, Hungary, and as a 
young man made his way to Hamburg and converted to Christianity. He led a most 
mercurial existence, living as a Christian missionary in Canada, becoming the director 
of an oil-drilling supply company in Romania and, in England shortly before the war, 
serving as Liberal Member of Parliament for Darlington. During the war he was 
interned by the British government for forgery and was suspected of being a German 
spy. After his year of high political adventure with Colonel Bauer, Trebitsch relocated 
to China where he lived out the remainder of his life until 1941 as a Buddhist monk. It 
is rumoured that he continued his spy activities through Shanghai during the 1930s but 
this has never been proven.157 He was a highly intelligent, all-round self-aggrandizing 
dealer (and, some would say, swindler) in political plots.158 
After the war Trebitsch was released and deported to Holland. He was not sent 
to Hungary during the period of the Béla Kun regime due to the unfounded fear of Sir 
Basil Thompson at the rather over-cautious British Home Office that Trebitsch ‘might 
 63 
 
easily become a sort of Lenin of Central Europe’.159 In fact, he was not released from 
prison until nine days after the Kun regime fell on August 2, 1919.  
At the German border Trebitsch procured a temporary passport for the Berlin 
area and went there along with hundreds of expatriates, civilian internees and German 
ex-prisoners of war from England.160 Unable to reach old contacts in the city from his 
Romanian oil enterprise days, he decided that his new career would be journalism and, 
after much effort, was able to get a scathing, anti-British article published in one of 
many small newspapers in Berlin, the ultra right-wing Deutsche Zeitung with a 
readership of only 20,000. Though he made no great impact with the article, he did 
attract the attention of editor Reinhold Wulle, a violent proponent of right-wing terror, 
who advocated the setting-up of a völkisch dictatorship.161 Wulle saw in Trebitsch an 
accomplished journalist with impressive credentials, who had gone from being a 
member of the House of Commons to being interned as a German spy.162 Two things 
were certain: Wulle was duly impressed and Trebitsch was taking his first steps into 
radical right-wing German politics.  
In late September Trebitsch hit upon an idea that would secure for himself a 
position of high standing in the world of international journalism. He wished to gain an 
interview with the exiled Emperor Wilhelm II living in Holland on the Amerongen 
Estate. The chances of success were remote at best but, amazingly, Trebitsch was 
received by senior members of the royal entourage that had politely denied him his 
interview. Trebitsch thus did not get the scoop of the century but his attempt did cause a 
short-lived sensation in the world press. London’s Daily Graphic ran five dramatic 
headlines: ‘Spy “Envoy” to Ex-Kaiser’, ‘Lincoln’s Special Mission for Pronouncement 
from the Fallen War Lord’, ‘Wilhelm Remains Silent’, ‘Lincoln’s Secret’ and ‘Ex-MP 
Fails in his Promise to Startle the World’.163 Trebitsch was actually interviewed himself 
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by the less sensationalist New York Tribune, which reported that he had only ‘chatted’ 
with the ex-Emperor, but that he had remarked to the American readership that he 
would devote his whole life to working against England.164 
Another benefit gained by the episode was the contact formed with a German-
American, pro-nationalist Hearst Newspaper correspondent, Karl von Wiegand. For a 
whole year, the reporter would collaborate with Trebitsch in placing articles on 
nationalist German affairs in the American press. 
Trebitsch met Colonel Bauer through the good offices of Wulle. Bauer had 
received a letter from Trebitsch in early October 1919 requesting an interview, adding 
that the interview might last a couple of hours.165 Sources unfortunately do not reveal 
the actual content of the meeting that took place a few days later. 
On the surface it would appear that Bauer and Trebitsch had little in common, 
yet they worked very closely as co-conspirators for the next year. Bernard Wasserstein, 
in his signal work The Secret Lives of Trebitsch-Lincoln offers a plausible reason: 
The explanation [of their friendship] probably lies in the similarity of their 
characters: they shared a zest for adventure, a love of intrigue, a complete lack 
of scruples, an irrepressible wanderlust, ruthlessness, self-regard, and utter  
contempt for conventional moral values. In a sense, Bauer and Trebitsch were 
made for each other.166  
 
There was another similarity they shared: a deep dislike of England. For Trebitsch it 
was based on pure revenge for two years’ imprisonment. For Bauer it was based on a 
philosophical bent that regarded England as the harbinger of all things liberal and 
materialist, and thus in philosophical opposition to the ‘Prussian’ values he held so dear, 
and on a largely unfounded conviction that England wished to economically colonize 
Eastern Europe and so deny Germany its deserved right to control the area. 
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Chapter 7 
Dress Rehearsal for the White International Plot 
 
 
The Hohenzollern restoration plot and the Kapp Putsch marked Bauer and 
Trebitsch’s first forays into the world of conspiracy and intrigue—and it showed. The 
significance for this work is that these plots carried the stamp of amateurism and 
ineptitude with an emphasis on ends over means, a fatal flaw characteristic of all 
Bauer’s many plots including the White International. Of further note is that in both 
examples Bauer’s bungling incurred the wrath of the more moderate elements within the 
German rightist camp and even of those within the NV. This essentially constituted the 
end of any chance of future collaboration between the Ludendorff-Bauer group, the 
rightist parties in the Reichstag and, perhaps most significantly, the Reichswehr.  
 
 
A.  The Bauer-Trebitsch Hohenzollern Restoration Plot 
 
The restoration plot evolved from Trebitsch’s second attempt to interview 
members of the exiled Royal House of Hohenzollern. In a letter to Bauer dated October 
6, Trebitsch requested a letter of introduction and mused that it might be possible to 
visit Crown Prince Wilhelm and have a talk ‘on important political questions’.167 
Colonel Bauer had served with the crown prince and they held a mutual respect 
for each other.168 At the end of the war the crown prince shared his father’s fate and had 
since been residing in a modest parsonage on the Island of Wieringen in the Zuider Zee 
in Holland.  
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Armed with the letter of introduction requested from Bauer, Trebitsch made his 
way to the small island. Though he would later claim to have met Crown Prince 
Wilhelm, there is sufficient evidence that he did not according to a letter written to 
Bauer a few days later from one of the prince’s aides, Freiherr von Hünefeld.  
A flurry of missives between Bauer, Trebitsch and the two aides to Crown 
Prince Wilhelm paint a curious picture of the two conspirators fully prepared to change 
the course of history seemingly on their own initiative. Excerpts from Hünefeld’s 
personal account reveal a certain reluctance of the two aides to entangle themselves, let 
alone their master, in Trebitsch’s scheme. 
Trebitsch, who introduced himself as ‘the political writer and industrialist 
Trebitsch-Lincoln’,169 offered up a brief autobiography of his former position in 
England, his incarceration and his return to Germany. He then told the two aides that, 
having thus arrived in Berlin, ‘I soon recognized that it would be completely impossible 
to rebuild Germany with the republican regime.’ He went on to discuss his political 
views—not those of any single organization or group of like-minded individuals—
including his opinion that the ex-Kaiser might be replaced by his son as claimant to the 
German crown. Stating correctly that such a move could not be conducted by force, he 
explained to his cordial but astonished hosts that he hoped through his own efforts of 
well-placed propaganda that the US would not be against such a restoration. 
 Hünefeld continued, ‘In order not to compromise himself, His Imperial 
Highness refused to see Lincoln.’170 At a chance meeting with Hünefeld the next day, 
Trebitsch reiterated that suitable propaganda would induce the American government to 
acquiesce in a Hohenzollern restoration. He further suggested that through his 
journalistic endeavours he could plant the seed that the ex-Kaiser had gone mad which 
would facilitate his son’s ascension, an idea that the aide found abhorrent.171 
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Shortly after the meeting, Trebitsch sent a long memorandum to the two aides 
on Wieringen, detailing his plans and announcing that he had been in secret negotiations 
with the American Legation in The Hague, where he found that officially the US could 
not openly support a restoration. It would, however, not stand in the way of the 
establishment of a constitutional monarchy.172 In fact, Trebitsch did call on the 
American Legation but for the singularly audacious purpose of providing information 
concerning secret German monarchist restoration plots in exchange for an American 
visa. He was denied.173 He also forewarned the crown prince’s staff that within days he 
would be publishing an article declaring the failing mental health of the ex-Kaiser; and 
though he cautioned secrecy he disclosed that he wished to establish the monarchy 
immediately after the first National Assembly elections scheduled to take place in early 
1920.174 
Trebitsch’s unsolicited advice and outrageous projects were received with 
courtesy but were seen for what they were. In a letter to Bauer, Hünefeld asked him to 
convince Trebitsch to break off his communications with the crown prince’s staff at 
Wieringen, and indicated that Trebitsch was not to be taken seriously.175 Colonel Bauer, 
for his part, continued his unshakeable support for Trebitsch despite the opinions 
expressed. 
Undaunted by his failure to get an interview, in early November Trebitsch 
communicated to Bauer the basic distillation of his plot for the return of the 
Hohenzollern monarchy. A series of articles was to be published in the foreign press—
especially in the US—through Trebitsch’s contact with nationalist-friendly 
correspondent for Hearst, Karl von Wiegand. The plan was to slowly condition 
international public opinion to the idea of a constitutional monarchy under the crown 
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prince.176 What Trebitsch and Bauer did not know was that similar designs were in the 
works from more moderate monarchists. 
During the same month party leaders of the right-of-centre DNVP had come up 
with their own formula for a restoration but, unlike that of Bauer and Trebitsch, it would 
involve the political apparatus of the state. Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg was 
approached and accepted an invitation to run for the office of Reichspräsident on a 
DNVP ticket in the elections slated for early 1920. Hindenburg, as president, would then 
select a monarchist chancellor who would, in turn, form a monarchist government and 
Hindenburg would tacitly serve as Regent for the as yet unnamed Hohenzollern to 
follow. 
Apparently knowledgeable of the DNVP’s scheme, but with the DNVP ignorant 
of his own plot, Bauer embarked on a feverish campaign to promote the candidature of 
the crown prince on his own. With the help of Trebitsch’s link with the Hearst 
correspondent, an interview with Colonel Bauer was arranged concerning German 
aspirations to restore the monarchy wherein Bauer was introduced as—but never 
claimed to be—the ‘speaker for the German monarchist movement’177 which, of course, 
he was not; he was but one of several individuals of a very diffuse movement. In the 
interview Bauer indicated that no one in Germany entertained the idea of the re-
establishment of the monarchy by force and that it would more likely be the result of a 
plebiscite. As a model for the future monarchy, he cited England. This is interesting 
given Bauer’s disparaging position regarding ‘liberal and materialist’ England having 
contaminated the German völkisch spirit, and Trebitsch’s revengeful anti-British 
comments in Wulle’s Deutsche Zeitung only months earlier. As alleged ‘speaker for the 
German monarchist movement’, Bauer went on to explain that the present German 
government maintained a purely ‘socialist party regiment’ incapable of bringing about 
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any improvement of intra-German relations.178 He continued, ‘The idea of a monarchy 
is gaining credence in Germany. Personal memories unite virtually every family 
everywhere with the monarchy and . . . Prussia has the Hohenzollerns to thank for its 
development.’179 An especially intriguing approach employed was Bauer’s declaration 
that the contentious nature of the German people needed a point ‘where criticism stops, 
and that is the monarch, not the president’.180 This begs the question of whether Bauer 
felt that the Reichstag—or indeed any parliament with its inherent character of criticism 
and contention—should perhaps be replaced by a monarch. He resumed, ‘The return of 
the Kaiser is not in question. It is foreseen that in his place Crown Prince Wilhelm 
would assume the position as throne candidate. He has the hereditary right and 
possesses all the qualities of a modern Regent. Rumours and stories of him are untrue 
and [are spread] by the slanderous republican parties.’181 More than any other statement 
in the interview, the next might well have been the one that caused the wrath of the 
conservative monarchists and drove—or at least began to drive—a wedge between the 
conservative right and the radical right: ‘Until the definitive restoration of the 
monarchy, von Hindenburg, the future Reichspräsident, will serve as “place-holder” of 
the monarchy.’182 
 The interview was published in the New York American on December 7. The 
result was typical of the many miscalculations the team of Bauer and Trebitsch would 
make. Their intensive ‘press campaign’ launched on the American public received as 
good as no notice at all. By 1919 the entire Progressive movement, so favoured by 
wartime President Wilson and his predecessors, had lost all credibility. Reluctance to 
get involved in the European War in 1914 had been superseded by a reluctance to get 
involved in the European Peace. Congress, which was increasingly dominated by the 
Republican Party, refused to ratify the Covenant of the League of Nations and even the 
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Versailles Treaty itself.183 In short, the Americans did not care, but many in Germany 
did. The interview with Bauer was picked up by the German newspapers that 
immediately heaped indignant scorn on his thoughtless blunder. The influential 
Deutsche Zeitung, as the first to become aware of the interview, challenged Bauer on his 
right to pretend to be ‘speaker for the monarchist movement’ (despite the fact that he 
made no such pretension). The newspaper characterized Bauer’s comments as 
‘tactically false and harmful’ and continued:  
to be sure, a monarchy is indeed the only possible form of government for 
Germany and it will come about on its own when the time is right. Any 
discussion of this subject at the moment is inopportune and just serves as grist to 
the mill for the parties against Hindenburg and lays obstacles in the way for the 
candidature of the Field Marshal and does the monarchist movement a great 
disservice.184  
 
The leaders of the monarchist/pro-Hindenburg party within the DNVP maintained an 
embarrassed silence.  
 The interview was a major faux pas and heavily compromised the monarchists. 
It was done completely on Bauer’s own initiative without the knowledge of 
Hindenburg, his supporters or even the crown prince himself.185 With this, Bauer’s role 
within the monarchist movement was essentially played out. It is noteworthy that from 
this point onwards, Bauer would no longer pursue a restoration of any kind and thus 
moved a step further in the direction of the more extremist right. He was now more than 
ever in the camp of Navy Captain Ehrhardt, Major Pabst and Wolfgang Kapp as well as 
the younger Freikorps leaders whose vision of Germany’s future had room neither for a 
king nor for an elitist nobility.186 The German monarchists of a more conservative stripe 
began to distance themselves from the Ludendorff-Bauer circle in increasing numbers 
as the new year began. Further, friendly relations between Bauer and his old wartime 
friend, the crown prince, were irreconcilably shattered. 
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B.  The Kapp-Lüttwitz Putsch as the Summation of Colonel Bauer’s Political 
      Development 
 
 
 The history of the well-documented Kapp Putsch need not be discussed here. 
Instead, the purpose of this section is to illustrate Bauer’s political dilettantism and his 
inability to function effectively in the world of realities beyond a simple desire to 
achieve his goals. Moreover, the Kapp Putsch represented the sum product of a year’s 
worth of observation and planning by the Ludendorff-Bauer circle, with Bauer as its 
leading spirit. Colonel Bauer, Major Pabst, Captain Ehrhardt and others finally had their 
long-awaited chance to strike at the Weimar Republic; and with exactly the negative 
outcome predicted by those who warned against it—chiefly the Reichswehr that wisely 
abstained from taking part. 
The initiation of the Kapp Putsch emanated chiefly from the Ludendorff-Bauer 
radical minority faction within the NV that advocated a pre-emptive strike to topple the 
government without waiting for the anticipated leftist uprising. The timing—or rather 
mistiming—was the result of the government’s threat in early January to begin troop 
reductions of the 200,000-strong Reichswehr by April 1, 1920.187 This applied to the 
Freikorps as well, which meant the dissolution of the very instrument the Ludendorff-
Bauer circle had envisioned as a vanguard against the Weimar Republic, the highly 
disciplined Freikorps Marinebrigade-Ehrhardt. 
The Ludendorff-Bauer circle faced identical circumstances in early July when 
Defence Minister Noske threatened to dissolve Major Pabst’s Freikorps Garde-
Kavallier-Schützendivision. It was at this time that cooler heads dissuaded Pabst from 
staging a coup in Berlin on his own in the hope of saving his formation. This advice was 
consistent with Ludendorff’s recommendation that proper preparations for such a move 
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would take at least two years; the sources do not indicate that any such argument was 
made by the general in the case of the Kapp undertaking. 
Original document sources regarding the planning of the Putsch are limited due 
to Bauer’s private secretary, Luise Engeler,188 having removed all sensitive papers from 
the NV offices after Bauer, Pabst, Lüttwitz and Kapp were alerted by sympathetic 
persons in the Berlin police that arrest warrants had been issued in their names.189 
It is known, however, that during the last meeting of the NV on March 12 Bauer 
outlined the course of the next few days: the immediate declaration of a military 
dictatorship and the removal of all members of the government who opposed it. 
Thoroughly out of touch with popular sentiment, he also requested that ‘all good 
citizens are to join the Einwohnerwehr and temporary volunteer companies’ to combat 
threats from the left. Bauer was convinced that with ‘decisive action, in a few days [they 
would be] masters of the situation’.190 With the Ebert government safely sequestered in 
Dresden and later Stuttgart, and because, in the famous words of General Hans von 
Seeckt, ‘Reichswehr do not fire on Reichswehr’,191 there was no opposition to 
Erhhardt’s Freikorps Marinebrigade as it surrounded the government buildings. The 
‘military success’ prompted Captain Ehrhardt to later state, ‘the fault [of the failure] lies 
with the civilians; militarily I held Berlin within my hands.’192 Despite General 
Maercker’s pronouncements to the contrary, Kapp believed that the two rightist parties 
in the Reichstag and—more importantly—the Reichswehr would be behind the 
endeavour due to General Lüttwitz’s participation.193 
It must be understood that regardless of whose names were attached to the 
venture, Colonel Bauer was the wirepuller in the NV and during the Putsch. As 
‘Reichskanzler’ Kapp’s political adviser, Bauer screened all visitors and messages 
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coming in and out of the Reichskanzlei, which left Kapp curiously isolated from actual 
events.194 
For the first two days the Putsch went much as Bauer had envisioned: he himself 
took over the post of Group Commander of the Reichswehr and Ehrhardt assumed the 
position of Reich Defence Minister.195 This was, of course, nothing more than having 
walked into a deserted building, sitting at equally deserted desks and giving themselves 
official titles. Meanwhile, Reichskanzler Kapp declared a military dictatorship under 
General Lüttwitz as Ludendorff had suggested the previous July. Soon, however, Bauer 
began to doubt Kapp’s qualifications to lead the counter-revolution after the latter, upon 
hearing of the general strike issued by the Weimar government-in-exile, expressed a 
desire on the third day to capitulate. Bauer advised against it and the matter was 
temporarily dropped.196 It was at this point that Bauer assumed control of the situation 
to the point where he eventually became the outward decision-maker of the entire 
enterprise.197 
At this juncture one observes a series of fantastic actions on Bauer’s part that 
belie any sense of reason. As the probable failure of the Putsch became ever more 
apparent, Bauer turned to the British press through the new Reich Foreign Press Bureau 
Chief—his trusted co-conspirator Trebitsch, who arranged an interview with a 
correspondent of The Times. Bauer announced that the Putsch was meant to be 
temporary all along and was staged only to bring attention to the breach of 
constitutional law by the Ebert government, citing its refusal to hold new, popular-based 
presidential elections.198 Failing to be taken seriously, he then had Trebitsch announce 
that the Spartacists had formed their own government in the north of Berlin and called 
on the citizenry to support Kapp.199 It may be assumed that Bauer saw Britain as a 
sympathetic quarter based on his mistaken belief that the British tacitly approved of a 
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coup, as per his earlier correspondence with military representatives of His Majesty’s 
government in July 1919. 
As with the Hohenzollern restoration plot, Bauer and Trebitsch had completely 
miscalculated the response of the press. While Bauer’s declaration of the reasons behind 
the Putsch were disregarded as pure fantasy by the British, the fact that the interview 
was arranged by the former Member of Parliament for Darlington, a suspected German 
spy, caused a sensation. The Daily Telegraph wrote:  
Nothing could be more typical of the childishness of the Kapp gang than the fact 
than they chose this man to be their link of communication to the British Press . . 
. There was something almost Olympian about this man’s scoundrelism . . . 
[upon whose face] deceit, dishonesty, and brutality are written for all . . . to 
read.200 
 
Another example of Bauer’s fanciful tactics is that he once again approached the 
Communists for help to save the situation. In an effort to put the working class on his 
side to mitigate the power of the general strike, he invited the sworn enemy of the 
counter-revolution to join in the Putsch, promising offices in key ministries.201 The 
reaction of Major Pabst and Captain Ehrhardt was one of shock. The latter even 
threatened to withdraw his troops from Berlin if members of the left were to join the 
government.202 The representatives of the left understandably declined the offer, as did 
Ludendorff himself to take over from Kapp.203  
The five-day Kapp regime fell for a number of reasons. They included, but were 
not limited to, a widespread lack of support from the Reichswehr and even from most 
Freikorps units; the seeming lack of any concrete plan once the government offices 
were taken over; and the successful general strike called by both the SPD and the liberal 
German Democratic Party (DDP) that paralysed Berlin. In fact, the regime failed for all 
the reasons long explained to Bauer by the more moderate right and the Reichswehr 
since July 1919. The irony was, of course, that the expected leftist uprising so feared by 
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Bauer did indeed finally occur in the Ruhr—not as a precondition for the Putsch, but as 
a result. 
The above two examples of Bauer’s conspiratorial actions illustrate trends that 
emerged in the White International and contributed to its failure. In the Hohenzollern 
restoration plot, one sees a willingness by Bauer and Trebitsch to assume a position to 
change the course of history completely on their own initiative. Bauer’s desire to re-
establish the Hohenzollern dynasty was consistent with his praise of Oswald Spengler’s 
vague notions of ‘Prussian socialism’, as opposed to the ‘false democratic socialism’ of 
the Weimar Republic, and was a clear reflection of Bauer’s tendency to base political 
actions on theoretical and ideological foundations. The amateurish miscalculations and 
assumptive nature of the plot resulted in an unbridgeable chasm between himself, the 
Reichswehr and the more circumspect elements of the right who saw a better chance of 
success by working with the machinery of the state. Significantly, Bauer’s blunder put 
an end to any ideas of a restoration for the foreseeable future. In fact, neither the Kapp 
Putsch nor the White International mentioned the restoration as a goal.  
The Kapp Putsch, while also a striking example of ineptitude, serves to highlight 
elements found within the White International plot. Bauer would draw the wrong 
conclusions from the successes and failures of the experience. The successful bloodless 
coup carried out by the Freikorps Marinebrigade-Ehrhardt led him to naïvely justify 
his unswerving faith in the effectiveness of paramilitary forces. Conversely, he blamed 
the failure of the Putsch on ‘indecisive and weak-kneed civil servants’ such as Kapp, 
and on the OHL for their cowardly position of neutrality. Consequently, the White 
International plot would be cursed with the very same flaws that contributed to the 
failure of the Kapp Putsch. Further, both episodes reveal a trait characteristic of all 
Bauer’s plots: he would measure the chance of success against the degree of the need 
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for success. This compulsion justified the action before the fact and precluded any 
serious analysis after it. Failures, in Bauer’s view, were attributable to human 
deficiencies and never to plans themselves.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
It is argued that the White International plot was to a large degree a continuation 
of strategies and processes established in the period from the founding of the Freikorps 
in January 1919 to the Kapp Putsch of March 1920. 
Colonel Bauer erroneously saw the Freikorps as a politicized body of sufficient 
strength and discipline to act as the instrument of the counter-revolution to topple the 
Weimar Republic. While sufficient to brutally crush the Spartacist movement during the 
revolution (as described in Major Stephani’s own recollections of the Battle of Belle-
Alliance Platz)204 and to visit atrocities upon the citizens of the young Baltic Successor 
States (as discussed in Robert Gerwarth’s ‘The Central European Counter-revolution’ 
and in Robert Waite’s classic Vanguard of Nazism), the German Freikorps units were 
far from the politicized personification of the moral warrior, fighting for the 
rejuvenation of stolen Prussian pride, as envisioned by Bauer. They were, in fact, 
generally undisciplined freebooters made up of discontented ex-soldiers who could not 
or would not adapt to the humdrum existence of civilian life, or students with no prior 
military experience at all who romanticized the war their youth had conspired to cheat 
them of. 
The Pan-German League’s Bamberg Declaration that advocated the continuation 
of pre-war expansionist foreign policy, and the initially Entente-encouraged Baltic 
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Campaign to thwart Bolshevik Russian expansion, provided the justification and the 
opportunity—but they also demonstrated the unworthiness of Freikorps units as an 
infield military force. When faced with organized troops such as the Latvian-Estonian 
Army, the Freikorps formations continually proved themselves wanting as a field army 
and thus incapable of fighting effectively against the national armies they would 
undoubtedly be facing in an all-European war the White International would certainly 
bring about. This fact was lost on Bauer, however. 
It is further argued that the Baltic Campaign provided the model for creating a 
transnational, counter-revolutionary fighting force that would be the very core of the 
White International plot. German Freikorps formations were augmented through 
recruiting from the vast store of tsarist Russian prisoners of war sequestered in 
Germany, just as outlined in Bauer’s later plan. Persons from the Russian émigré 
monarchists directly involved in both the recruitment and the actual fighting in the 
Baltic, such as White General Vasili Biskupsky, would re-emerge as principal players in 
Bauer’s White International plot. There was also consensus among the German right 
and Russian monarchists that the two countries’ futures were tied to each other. 
The Baltic Campaign provided a further precursor. The term ‘White 
International’ implies a counter-answer to the ‘red internationalism’ of the left. Bauer’s 
writings indicate, however, that the liberal, democratic, middle-class Entente was seen 
in no less unfavourable a light than the left—especially England with its ‘poisoning 
materialism’ and with its perceived intentions of economically colonizing Eastern 
Europe. In 1919 the April coup against the Entente-supported Ulmanis’s Latvian 
government, the blatant defiance of the Entente’s June order to withdraw from the 
Baltic and the open warfare by German-White Russian forces against the Entente-
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sponsored Latvian-Estonian Army in the failed Riga Offensive of October all point to 
an early, strong anti-Entente position. 
 It is also argued that the very fantastic nature of the White International plot 
was a continuation of the far-fetched plans emanating from the mind of Bauer, which 
betrayed an apparent inability to tell the difference between what was possible and what 
was not. A good case in point was his demand for immediate military action against 
Weimar upon the acceptance of the Versailles Treaty. Rejecting caution advocated by a 
senior field commander, Bauer took it upon himself to construct grand plans for a coup 
against Berlin which included sending a memorandum to the British government to 
sound out the latter’s position were a Putsch to occur. The British decision not to 
dignify his missive with a reply was, typically, misunderstood by Bauer as being a tacit 
endorsement. 
Colonel Bauer’s two conspiratorial actions before the White International are 
significant. The Hohenzollern restoration plot and the Kapp-Lüttwitz Putsch both 
involved working with political adventurer Trebitsch-Lincoln, co-author of the White 
International plot. Each conspiracy bore the marks of amateurism and miscalculation. 
The restoration plot was undertaken entirely by Bauer and Trebitsch, and was roundly 
condemned even by Crown Prince Wilhelm, whose support was the very object of the 
effort. It also resulted in Bauer’s isolation from the German monarchists whose more 
circumspect plans he unwittingly foiled. Similarly, the Kapp Putsch isolated Bauer from 
the Reichswehr and all who had tried to convince him that plots without adequate 
preparation would fail. 
The lessons of the Kapp disaster were lost on Bauer as he placed the blame on 
the ‘weak-kneed’ civilians involved while the military, he believed, had the situation 
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‘well in hand’.205 The reasons for the initial military success of the venture eluded him, 
as did the reasons for its ultimate failure. 
The mosaic was complete: the loss of the war provided the indignant anger, the 
Freikorps provided the means, the Bamberg Declaration provided the stated goal, the 
Russian-German experience in the Baltic provided the transnational model, and social 
democracy, the Versailles Treaty and the Entente provided the enemy. All the 
components of the White International were in evidence between November 1918 and 
March 1920. 
 
 
 
Notes
                                                 
1 The moderate Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) split in 1915 when its left 
wing under Hugo Haase refused further support for war credits. In 1917 the Independent 
(unabhängige) SPD (hereafter USPD) was established by Haase in Gotha and the leftist 
group Spartakusbund merged into it. During the German Revolution of 1918, the SPD 
under Friedrich Ebert and the USPD actually worked together in the provisional 
government until the founding of the National Assembly (Nationalversammlung) in 
January 1919, when the USPD was eliminated from the government but still remained 
an effective minority in Parliament (the Reichstag). 
  
2 Friedrich Ebert (1871-1925) was leader of the majority SPD in the Reichstag. 
Appointed Chancellor (Reichskanzler) in November 1918 after the fall of the monarchy, 
he became Reichspräsident from January 1919 until his death in 1925. Far from a 
revolutionary, he hoped for a constitutional monarchy but due to the abdication of the 
Kaiser and the Declaration of the Republic by Gustav Scheidemann, Ebert was forced to 
accept the situation. He worked closely with General Groener and Defence Minister 
Gustav Noske (SPD) to steer the revolution away from the radical left by endorsing the 
founding of the Freikorps formations. 
  
3 Kurt von Schleicher (1882-1934) served as a General Staff officer under General 
Groener and was instrumental in the creation of the Freikorps. In 1933 he followed 
Franz von Papen as Reichskanzler until Reichspräsident von Hindenburg appointed 
Adolf Hitler to the office. He was assassinated by Hitler in 1934 in the Night of the 
Long Knives for his efforts to restore the Hohenzollern dynasty. 
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4 General Karl Eduard Wilhelm Groener (1867-1939) was attached to the Prussian 
General Staff in 1899, put in charge of the Army Railway Section in 1912 and became 
Prussian Deputy War Minister in 1916. He replaced General Ludendorff as First 
Quartermaster General (Deputy Chief of the General Staff) under Field Marshal von 
Hindenburg. 
 
5 This is sometimes called the Ebert-Groener Pact. Ebert promised to suppress the 
Bolshevik-led revolution and maintain the Reichswehr as it then was as a pillar of the 
German state, basically allowing it to continue as a state within a state. For General 
Groener’s part, he promised to fully support the new Ebert regime, soon to be referred 
to as the Weimar Republic. This came, however, with the proviso known as the 
‘Doctrine of Responsibility’ whereby the Reichswehr could choose not to act at the 
behest of the government if it felt to do so would compromise the army. The incident of 
General Hans von Seeckt’s refusal to intervene against the Kapp Putsch serves as an 
example. See Robert G. L. Waite, Vanguard of Nazism: The Free Corps Movement in 
Postwar Germany 1918-1923 (New York: W. W. Norton & Co. Inc., 1969), 5. 
 
6 Gustav Noske, SPD member of the Reichstag, was generally amenable to military 
needs during the war. He was instrumental in peacefully putting down the Kiel Mutiny 
in 1918 and endorsed the creation of the Freikorps to combat the Spartacist revolt. He 
served as Defence Minister under the Scheidemann government from 1919 until he 
resigned for failing to protect the government from the Kapp Putsch. After the signing 
of the Versailles Treaty, he refused to accept an invitation from the radical right to 
establish a military dictatorship and thus fell out of favour. 
 
7 General Ludwig von Maercker was reputedly the founder of the very first Freikorps 
unit, Freiwilligen Landesjägerkorps, in December 1918. 
 
8 Waite, Vanguard of Nazism, 16. 
 
9 G. Feldman, ‘Economic and Social Problems of the German Demobilisation, 1918-
19’, Journal of Modern History, vol. 47 (1975), 17. 
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13 Robert Gerwarth, ‘The Central European Counter-revolution: Paramilitary Violence 
in Germany, Austria and Hungary after the Great War’, Past and Present, no. 200 
(August 2008), 181.  
 
14 Waite, Vanguard of Nazism, 31. 
 
15 The German names for the various kinds of paramilitary groups used in this work are 
consistent with Robert Waite’s signal work Vanguard of Nazism. The most important 
groups carried names according to their degree of military readiness: the Volunteer 
Corps or Volunteer Corps soldiers (Freikorps or Freikorpskämpfer) dominated and 
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constituted actual military units often billeted outside cities throughout Germany. They 
could range from the highly disciplined Freikorps Reinhardt or Marinebrigade-
Ehrhardt that marched on Berlin in the Kapp Putsch, to virtual brigands roving the 
countryside living off intimidation of the peasantry. Other groups included the Citizens’ 
Guard (Einwohnerwehr) and the Volunteer Force (Freiwilligwehr) which can best be 
described as a kind of reserve militia found virtually everywhere in the Reich and 
seldom regarded as possessing any real military bearing. All such units were overtly or 
covertly armed and supplied by the Reichswehr though they had no official ties to it. 
The Freikorps units and their leaders represented the most radical of nationalist 
sentiments in post-war Germany, with the important exception of Bavaria where the 
units, especially the Einwohnerwehren, tended to be little more than village guards. 
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24 Franz von Stephani (1876-1939) served before the war in German West Africa 
(Cameroon). During the war he was promoted to Major in 1917 and was attached to the 
Reserve Infantry First Regiment of Foot Guards. On December 12, 1918, he took the 
remnants of his unit and the Imperial Potsdam Regiment, and created his Freikorps-
Potsdam of some 1,200 men, mostly young officers, cadets and students. He later 
founded, with Captain-Lieutenant Ehrhardt, the Association of Nationalist-minded 
Soldiers (Verband der nationalgesinnter Soldaten) and during the 1930s would serve as 
an officer in the Stahlhelm Freikorps and in Hitler’s Sturmabteilung (Storm Troops). 
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Part II 
Development of the White International Plot 
in Bavarian Exile 
 
 It is argued here that Colonel Bauer’s plot conceived in Bavarian exile to form a 
White International was essentially a highly exaggerated continuation of the same 
flawed methods and fantastic ideas previously employed by the radical right in the 
fifteen months leading up to the Kapp Putsch of March 1920. These included the use of 
ineffectual German Freikorps formations, in cooperation with sequestered tsarist 
Russian prisoners of war led by a White Russian émigré monarchist, as in the Baltic 
Campaign. The difference was simply a matter of scope: Bauer hoped to draw the 
Bavarian, Austrian and Hungarian radical right into the scheme to establish a truly 
transnational alliance or ‘international union’ for the purpose of coordinating Europe-
wide counter-revolutionary activities, which would replace the now disbanded, Berlin-
based National Union that had concerned itself with German domestic operations only. 
Bauer’s grand plan was largely grounded in the mistaken belief that the failed Putsch in 
Berlin had inspired success in Munich—a fatal misreading that would colour the role 
Bavaria was to play in the plan.  
It is further argued that beyond what would directly serve Bavarian particularist 
interests, Bauer’s proposal to annul the Paris Treaties by launching a multi-front 
military campaign against the Entente-sponsored Successor States received only vague 
support from Bavaria’s conservative right-wing leadership. The support Bauer did 
receive owed more to his close association with General Ludendorff and to the desire of 
the new conservative right-wing von Kahr government to create in Bavaria a rightist 
Ordnungszelle (sphere of law and order) with as few ties to Berlin as possible. Indeed, 
in very important ways Bauer’s plan was contrary to Bavaria’s attempt to re-establish its 
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political position within the Reich in an effort to ameliorate its relationship with the 
Entente, especially France. Any real and open support for Bauer’s scheme was found 
only from the various Munich-based, disenfranchised fringe groups such as the Russian 
monarchist émigré community, the radicalized, displaced Baltic Germans and the 
scattered Kapp Putsch sympathizers.  
  
 
Chapter 8 
Relocation of Counter-revolutionary Activity to Bavaria 
  
A.  Retreat from ‘Red Prussia’ and Illusory Assessments 
 
As the Kapp venture began to spiral downward to its ultimate demise during the 
general strike, Colonel Bauer, Captain Ehrhardt, Trebitsch-Lincoln, Major Stephani and 
other co-conspirators met in an all-night session on March 16, 1920. Grasping at straws 
to save the situation, Bauer suggested that his mentor General Ludendorff replace 
General Lüttwitz; the former wisely—and typically—refused the honour. Bauer then 
offered the command to General Seeckt who ‘saw through the chronic little conspirator 
and coolly declined his offer’.1 The Kapp Putsch was over. To Bauer, though, it merely 
seemed a lost battle in a greater war, due to the irresponsibility of others. 
The withdrawal of the Freikorps Marinebrigade-Ehrhardt from Berlin appeared 
to mark the end, politically, for General Ludendorff and his circle in Germany—at least 
around the capital. The general’s strongest connection to the Reichswehr had been 
severed with the removal of the Commander-in-Chief of the Berlin area, General 
Lüttwitz, who was superseded by General Seeckt. A very important source of financial 
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support had dried up as Hugo Stinnes, Arnold Rechberg and other sympathetic 
industrialists shied away from any association with the ex-putschists.2 Also, much of the 
top leadership of the National Union, under threat of arrest and imprisonment, had 
ceased to be active in the short run. For these reasons and for the safety of Ludendorff 
himself, the general—holding a false passport in the name of ‘Herr Lange’ acquired 
during the Putsch days for this very eventuality—donned civilian clothes and, together 
with some associates, stole away to Munich on the night of March 17-18.3 So confused 
was the situation in Berlin immediately after the Putsch attempt that Colonel Bauer 
holed up in the apartment of a certain Professor Nernst before meeting Trebitsch and 
Major Stephani again.4 
Undaunted by the failure of the Putsch, Bauer first spoke of relocating his base 
of operations to East Prussia, which he saw as the last bastion of counter-revolutionary 
action. According to Trebitsch’s autobiography, however, it was he who convinced the 
colonel that the entire Ludendorff-Bauer group should relocate to Bavaria, which was 
host to the only rightist regime in the country that had emerged in the wake of the Kapp 
Putsch. There, it was hoped, the Bauer group could engage in efforts to win over the 
already legendary leader of the Bavarian Einwohnerwehr, Georg Escherich, the radical 
nationalist Munich Police Chief, Ernst Pöhner, and the BVP sympathizer and newly 
elected Minister-President of Bavaria, Gustav von Kahr, to their agenda of active 
counter-revolution.5 
Days after Ludendorff had made his flight, Colonel Bauer, his faithful private 
secretary Luise Engeler and Major Franz von Stephani fled Berlin and alighted 
separately at Munich station, undetected in the rightist-friendly atmosphere of the 
Bavarian capital. From here Bauer and his circle travelled to the home of a well-
disposed nobleman just south-east of Munich. Trebitsch arrived some days later. In Der 
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13. März 1920, Bauer’s hastily penned apologia for the failure of the Kapp Putsch 
published only weeks after the debacle, the author revealed his reasons for favouring a 
southern basis of operations. In it the colonel came to the conclusion that  
Prussia, once the vanguard and founder of the German Reich, is now bankrupt 
[and] . . . in the hands of Jews and [leftist] revolutionaries. However, Das Volk . 
. . are as healthy and ready as ever and await only a cadre of leaders to set them 
free from the foreign yoke of the democratic and socialist government [in 
Berlin].  
 
Bauer felt that the rescue and re-establishment of Germany as a great power now lay 
in the hands of its sons who, in the war against the entire world had held out; 
sons, who in earlier times had placed themselves under the highest authority and 
had unquestioningly endured privations for the sake of the Vaterland.6  
 
These willing and able ‘sons of Germany’ were (at least in Colonel Bauer’s assessment) 
the paramilitary units who, during the Putsch in Berlin just weeks before, had removed 
the ‘red’ SPD Hoffmann regime in Munich that had been in power since the fall of the 
Bavarian Soviet one year earlier. In fact, the Hoffmann regime had not fallen to any 
‘sons of Germany’ but—while certainly pressured to resign—did so according to legal 
constitutional procedures. 
 
 
B.  The ‘Supreme Secret Committee’ and the White International Plot 
 
By late March 1920 those who would make up the core of counter-revolutionary 
action had arrived in Munich. Of these, Bauer, Stephani and Trebitsch rather 
assumingly named themselves the ‘Supreme Secret Committee of all Counter-
Revolutionary Powers in Germany’. Among others, who had also relocated but were not 
included in the immediate circle around Bauer, were General Lüttwitz who ceased all 
counter-revolutionary activity, Waldemar Pabst who went on to Austria and engaged in 
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the organizing efforts of Tyrolean paramilitary formations such as the Heimwehr and 
Major Bischoff, Commander of the Freikorps Iron Division that had fought in the 
Baltic.7 
The Committee (Bauer, Stephani and Trebitsch) wasted no time in renewing 
their counter-revolutionary campaign. Colonel Bauer maintained contact with the 
scattered remnants of the Berlin NV (renamed the Preußischen Ordnungsblock) 
supportive of the Kapp Putsch attempt, as well as with the Bavarian Freikorps leader 
Franz von Epp at that time combating resurgent leftist forces in the Ruhr. According to 
an unsubstantiated report from Trebitsch that later appeared in a Parisian weekly, a new 
plan was conceived calling for Bavarian, Silesian, Pomeranian and Mecklenburger 
Reichswehr, along with various voluntary Freikorps, to simultaneously march on Berlin 
and militarily oust the government.8  This was, of course, identical to the Kapp scheme 
that had just failed with the added component of Bavaria playing a larger role. 
The plan never went past the concept stage due to the arrival of two undercover, 
plain-clothes policemen from Berlin acting on warrants for the arrest of Bauer and 
Trebitsch. The suspects acquired false identities in the names of Dr Börner and Dr 
Lamprecht respectively through the exertions of Munich Chief of Police Ernst Pöhner.9 
In the interest of preventing any unnecessary difficulties for their Bavarian hosts, Bauer 
and his group relocated to the villa of a certain sympathetic Dr von Tust near Garmisch-
Partenkirchen to avoid detection.10 From here Bauer kept in close contact with General 
Ludendorff who was staying with Baron von Halkett in Stefanskirchen near the small 
city of Rosenheim some 50 kilometres south-east of Munich.11 
Ludendorff’s accommodation at the von Halkett estate was arranged by Georg 
Escherich who had served under General Ludendorff as Minister of Forests in Poland 
from 1915 to 1916. Forstrat (Forestry Superintendent) Georg Escherich was also the 
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powerful founder and leader of the huge Freikorps Citizens’ Guard organization in 
Bavaria, the Einwohnerwehr, which he had been slowly but steadily building ever since 
the fall of the Bavarian Soviet in 1919.12 It was Georg Escherich too who stood close to 
his friend Gustav von Kahr, the new, conservative right-wing, pro-Wittelsbach 
legitimist Minister-President of Bavaria. The former, taking advantage of the unsettling 
circumstances caused by the Putsch attempt in Berlin, had engineered the removal of 
von Kahr’s predecessor, the SPD’s Johannes Hoffmann.13 Thus Ludendorff and—if 
only by association—Bauer, Trebitsch and Stephani were immediately in contact with 
the leading spirits of the new Bavarian rightist Ordnungszelle. Escherich’s motives for 
drawing the famous general into the Bavarian rightist sphere would soon become 
evident; the role of Bauer and his associates in it would be less clear. 
The Ludendorff-Bauer circle had truly found themselves among rightist-friendly 
hosts—in Bauer’s mind fertile ground, indeed, for the cultivation of the plot to create a 
White International. 
 
 
C.  Birth of the White International Plot  
 
On April 6—a mere three weeks after the failure of the Kapp Putsch—Bauer 
communicated to Ludendorff at his residence near Rosenheim that he had a plan the 
particulars of which he would transmit in writing by courier.14 Liberally quoting from 
his soon-to-be-published work Der 13. März 1920, Bauer went on to give the reasons 
why he felt Bavaria should now serve as the new centre for counter-revolutionary 
action. The salient point of his message was as follows: ‘[The] … moment has come 
when … a new federal state (Bundesstaat) must take over the leadership’ of rightist 
 101 
 
action.15 In short, it was from Munich that ‘a new Central European Alliance must come 
into being with the aim of annulling the Paris Peace Treaties and combating the spread 
of democratic, socialist and Communistic disease in Central and Eastern Europe.’16 
Colonel Bauer and his co-conspirators were further convinced that, on the basis 
of the comrade-in-arms relationship during the war and the similarity of their respective 
political situations after the war, all the ingredients were in place for Germany to 
cooperate closely with Hungary. Both countries had lost land and people, both had lost 
their ruling dynasties, both were experiencing conflict between the political left and 
right. The important exception was that Hungary had regained a rightist leadership—
with the establishment of the Horthy regime sometime after the fall of the Hungarian 
Soviet Republic under Béla Kun—but Germany (save for right-leaning Bavaria) still 
had a leftist government to contend with. The continued social-democratic government 
in Berlin made for a poor balance with Hungary, Bauer reckoned, but Bavaria, assuming 
the leadership of Germany, would level the playing field and provide for a more equal 
partnership with the rightist leaders in Budapest.17 
Arguably, Bauer’s idea of cooperation with the Hungarians had its origins in late 
1919, months before the Kapp Putsch. Towards the end of December, shortly after the 
Hohenzollern restoration fiasco, Colonel Bauer had dispatched Trebitsch to Budapest 
where the latter mixed with members of the press and politically influential persons 
during the unsettled time following the fall of Béla Kun. The assumption is that Bauer 
wished to weigh the chances of a possible German-Hungarian ‘joint action’ 
(gemeinsame Aktion) against the Paris Treaties that were especially harsh regarding 
Hungary. Accordingly, Trebitsch met with István Friedrich, the leader of the Christian 
National Unity Party (KNEP) and an ardent Habsburg legitimist, who had served as 
State Secretary in the early post-war government of Count Mihály Károlyi and as Prime 
 102 
 
Minister of a short-lived post-soviet government before Admiral Horthy was elected 
head of state. The meetings produced no exceptional results.18 Bauer, however, saw 
developments in the Danube states as promising and on February 8 sent Trebitsch again 
to Budapest, this time with significant results. The latter met leaders of the Hungarian 
extremist right affiliated with Gyula Gömbös19 who showed a keen interest in the 
preparations for the coming Kapp Putsch and arranged an introduction for Trebitsch to 
the then Prime Minister Károly Huszár.20 Before any firm developments could take 
place, though, Trebitsch was summoned back to Berlin to prepare for the March Putsch, 
leaving the threads to be picked up at a later date.21 
So impressed was Bauer by Trebitsch’s report of the receptive nature of the 
Hungarian extreme right around Gömbös that, at this point, the colonel realized he 
might build on contacts already in place with the Hungarian right, bringing together the 
World War I vanquished to form a nationalist-based, international organization with the 
goal of smashing the Versailles system.22  
While Adolf Vogt asserts that Bauer and Trebitsch were the authors of the plot 
and worked out the basic structure during their Bavarian exile after the collapse of the 
Kapp Putsch,23 Hungarian-American historian Nicholas Nagy-Talavera points out that 
the inspiration may well have come from Gyula Gömbös himself who had earlier 
mentioned the need for a ‘Nationalist International’.24 
Whatever its origins, the new and daring plan was far more ambitious than 
anything Bauer had devised to date. It bore all the hallmarks of German extreme 
nationalist policy going back to January 1919, but in a highly exaggerated form. The 
plan (hereafter referred to as the ‘Rosenheim plan’) called for close political and 
military cooperation between Bavaria and the Horthy regime in Budapest, reinforced by 
covert, counter-revolutionary elements in Austria and Russian monarchist émigré 
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elements in Germany, to form a ‘White International’. The stated goals of this implied 
answer to the ‘Red International’ included, first of all, secreting Prussian Freikorps 
units into Hungary posing as farm labourers. Once in Hungary they would train with 
Hungarian forces,25 then cross into Austria to topple the social-democratic government 
of Chancellor Karl Renner in ‘red’ Vienna, aided by Escherich’s Bavarian 
Einwohnerwehr forces working in unison with Austrian paramilitary groups. This was 
to be followed by the declaration of a Bavarian-Austrian-Hungarian Confederation to 
take place simultaneously with the advance into Czechoslovakia of Bavarian, Austrian 
and Hungarian Freikorps units charged with ‘rescuing’ the German-Bohemian and 
Hungarian lands from Czech and Slovak control respectively.26 Depending on the 
degree of Czechoslovak opposition, Saxon, Prussian and Pomeranian Freikorps units 
would move in from the north. The next step was to establish a military dictatorship in 
Germany under General Erich Ludendorff. The new German government would then 
cooperate with the White Russian Army, at that time doing battle against Bolshevik 
forces in the Ukraine. This partnership was to be supported, in an unspecified manner, 
by the Russian monarchist émigré community (now, too, centred in Munich) and the 
Russian ex-prisoners of war still within Germany with the aim of re-establishing the 
Russian monarchy. The Baltic Successor States, along with Poland, Czechoslovakia and 
the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, were to be divided between Germany, 
Russia, Hungary and Italy in undetermined portions. Finally, with the creation of a 
Großdeutschland (Greater Germany) through an Anschluß with Austria, the first phase 
of the plan would be complete. At this juncture, there was to be a declaration of war 
against the Entente. To help meet the costs of such an expensive operation, it was 
suggested that currency to the tune of 2 million Duma roubles be forged.27 This was, of 
 104 
 
course, the same ruse of counterfeiting cash employed during the death throes of the 
Baltic Campaign by Generals von der Goltz and Bermondt-Avalov.  
The Rosenheim plan would go through important changes but in its present form 
it acted as a basic framework for the negotiations with the differing groups. The 
documents reveal little if any response from Ludendorff himself to such a grandiose 
plan. One does find in Ludendorff’s memoirs published three years after his death that 
he, Colonel Bauer and Captain Ehrhardt—the latter having relocated to Munich along 
with many of his men from the erstwhile Freikorps Marinebrigade—maintained close 
contact with one another and with Minister-President Gustav von Kahr and Police Chief 
Ernst Pöhner.28 It was, nevertheless, up to Bauer to initiate the needed communications 
with elements of the Bavarian and Austrian right as well as with the Hungarian 
Consulate in Munich.29  
The readiness of the Ludendorff-Bauer group to conceive such a fantastic 
undertaking can be seen as the act of desperate individuals who were already wanted by 
the police and had nothing to lose. The recognized national leaders that they would have 
drawn into the plot, however, jealously guarded their own political agendas and were 
unlikely to throw these over in favour of the fantastic dreams of unsuccessful Prussian 
ex-putschists, unless such a collaboration could further their own goals. The Bauer 
group sensed that persuading the Bavarians to embrace the Rosenheim plan would not 
be without its difficulties.  
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Chapter 9 
 
The Task of Convincing the Bavarians to Adopt the Rosenheim Plan 
 
This chapter argues that there was little chance of the Bavarians adopting 
Bauer’s fantastic plan for three reasons, all of which reveal a Bavarian conservatism that 
had scant room for political radicalism from either the left or the right. 
Firstly, the authors of the Rosenheim plan had abandoned the tactic of simply 
threatening existing governments with Freikorps units positioned outside ministerial 
windows as in Berlin. Bauer’s plan called for a policy of first-strike, coordinated, all-out 
military attacks throughout Central and Eastern Europe with the leading role going to 
the Bavarian paramilitary. Thus a discussion on the development of the Bavarian 
Einwohnerwehr and the attempt by its leaders to form an all-German paramilitary-
coordination organization is critical because, by the time of the Ludendorff-Bauer 
group’s arrival, the Einwohnerwehr had become a virtually autonomous paramilitary 
state within a state, with sufficient men and arms to strike anywhere in Central 
Europe—at least in theory. Colonel Bauer saw in the new Bavaria and its massive 
Einwohnerwehr the ideal instrument to initiate the redrawing of the map of Central 
Europe under the direction of the White International. What he failed to observe, 
however, was that in spite of the organization’s immense size, the great political 
influence of its leadership and the position it assumed of speaking for all paramilitary 
units within Germany, the intensely parochial nature of the rank-and-file guardsmen 
rendered Einwohnerwehr military effectiveness almost non-existent beyond the village 
level—hardly suitable as shock troops.  
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The second reason why Bavaria was unlikely to adopt Bauer’s plan is that the 
colonel was mistaken in imagining that the Kapp Putsch had triggered the political 
changes in Munich. In fact, the transition there from a social-democratic government to 
a rightist-oriented one was legally orchestrated to prevent the emergence of such an 
extreme rightist government as Kapp’s. 
The third problem Bauer faced proceeds naturally from the second. The Munich 
government hoped the Einwohnerwehr would be sanctioned by the Entente not only as a 
stabilizing agent against further spread from the left, but also as a viable Francophile, 
Central European force in an anti-Prussian reorganization of the Reich ostensibly 
conducted in the best interests of Paris. Thus while the Rosenheim plan entailed an 
eventual renewal of war between Germany and France, Bavaria was actively seeking a 
basis for a rapprochement with its fellow Catholic neighbour. Further, whereas Bauer’s 
plan was predicated on a strong, centralized Germany, Bavaria was just as passionately 
scheming to reassert the special status within the Reich it had enjoyed before the war or 
even to win a French-approved total separation of Bavaria from Prussia—in any case, a 
geopolitical arrangement wholly contrary to Bauer’s goal.  
 
 
A.  The Freikorps Question in Bavaria and the Creation of the Bavarian  
      Ordnungszelle 
 
The source of the Ordnungszelle idea is traceable to the days of the Bavarian 
Soviet in April 1919 that had so thoroughly shaken the staunch southern German 
conservatism. According to Hans Fenske, the consequence was an almost pathological 
hatred of Bolshevism and Marxism that among the middle classes and the peasantry 
manifested itself as an ‘immeasurable embitterment against all things seen as socialist 
 107 
 
and republican. Democracy, the Republic, pacifism, and all forms of socialism were 
seen as essentially the same as Bolshevism. The result was an instinctive yearning for 
… law and order (Ruhe und Ordnung), which had previously resided in the person of 
the king.’30 
It could be argued that the disappointment of the Bavarian people at Ludwig 
III’s inability to thwart the wartime centralizing policies of Berlin had been a factor in 
the proclamation of the Bavarian Republic in November 1918. It follows that the utter 
disgust with the short-lived Bavarian Soviet that succeeded USPD Minister-President 
Eisner’s assassination in January 1919—and with its chaotic and bloody fall in April at 
the hands of the predominantly northern German Freikorps—contributed to the 
Bavaria-wide ‘yearning’ for a return to ‘law and order’. In short, Bavaria had 
disastrously toyed with socialism but would no more. 
The leading spirits behind the creation of an anti-left Ordnungszelle were a 
troika made up of Einwohnerwehr founder Forstrat Georg Escherich; his close ally 
‘Bauerndoktor’ Georg Heim,31 who worked tirelessly for an anti-Prussian, Franco-
Bavarian rapprochement; and Minister-President Gustav Ritter von Kahr. The latter two 
were co-founders of the BVP (Bavarian People’s Party)32 that, with the proclamation of 
the Bavarian Republic, had split from the Catholic-dominated Zentrumspartei (Centre 
Party) in a bid against the centralizing policies of the Weimar Constitution emanating 
from Prussian Berlin.  
For the purposes of this work, it is important to discuss the development and 
character of the Einwohnerwehr movement at length to determine its value, if any, as a 
shock force capable of such a military operation as that outlined in the Rosenheim plan. 
The discussion also serves to determine the nature and overall views of the principal 
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figures behind the movement whose cooperation with Bauer—or lack thereof—would 
decide the feasibility of setting up the White International. 
With the demise of the Munich Soviet in April 1919, the loose collection of 
rightist guard units such as the Flurwehr (Harvest Guard) and Ortswehr (Village Guard) 
either joined the Reichswehr or simply went home. From early summer onwards, 
however, the Reichswehr could only absorb so many. The Versailles Treaty signed in 
June 1919 expressly restricted the manpower of the German regular army to 100,000. 
With limited room in the Reichswehr or for those unwilling to commit to years of active 
military service, there were two further alternatives. One was the already existing 
Freizeitwilligen (Temporary Volunteers) who tended to be unattached young men 
willing to leave their homes at a moment’s notice when called up to serve under the 
auspices of the Reichswehr. These units were originally ordered into existence by 
Defence Minister Gustav Noske during the Spartacist Uprising of January 1919 in 
Berlin and were later extended into Bavaria during that state’s short-lived Soviet.33 The 
other alternative was to serve in the local militia, namely the Einwohnerwehr. This 
option satisfied the impulse to do paramilitary service but offered the freedom to stay at 
home without having to muster to the Reichswehr if a call to arms arose.34 This 
particular form of paramilitary was to dominate the Bavarian scene for the next two 
years and was what Colonel Bauer envisioned as the rank-and-file troops to be used by 
the White International to redraw the map of Central and Eastern Europe.  
While Einwohnerwehr units sprang up all over Bavaria following the defeat of 
the Munich Soviet, the strongest showing was in the south-east corner in the area 
around Rosenheim under the leadership of Rudolf Kanzler, a government surveyor and 
rabid nationalist.35 His Einwohnerwehr Chiemgau (formerly Freikorps Chiemgau) 
became the model of Einwohnerwehr organization throughout Bavaria and would be the 
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departure point for Bavarian rightist activity in neighbouring western Austria. The key 
to Kanzler’s success was the encouragement and substantial financial support of the 
Hoffmann government after the fall of the Bavarian Soviet. Despite being an ardent 
anti-socialist, Kanzler may well have understood that feigned acceptance of the SPD 
Hoffmann regime for the sake of a renewed charter and 500,000 marks was well worth 
the price.36 
Although Kanzler can be acknowledged as the earliest Führer of the infant 
movement, he was soon eclipsed by Forstrat Georg Escherich who would eventually 
emerge as chief of the entire Einwohnerwehr movement throughout Bavaria. This was 
the same Escherich who would later arrange Bavarian refuge for General Ludendorff 
and his close circle after the collapse of the Kapp Putsch, acting as a kind of nexus 
between the paramilitary organizations in and around Munich and the Ludendorff-Bauer 
group. Escherich and Kanzler would continue to work with Bauer, if only due to the 
latter’s association with Ludendorff, over the next few years.  
Georg Escherich was the very embodiment of the new Germany that emerged 
during the first years of the twentieth century.37 Through his boundless enthusiasm, 
Escherich had caught the eye of Emperor Wilhelm II who appointed him in 1912 to 
study the prospects for forestry in Germany’s newly acquired African colony of the 
Cameroons. Shaped by his experiences abroad, Escherich ‘developed the classic 
personality traits of the “Great White Hunter”—mitigated only by a Teutonic passion 
for order and discipline’.38 This was coupled with a loathing for the ‘lesser orders’ that 
included Slavs and Jews.39 Escherich was also very ambitious and, though a commoner, 
had a lifelong admiration for the nobility with whom he continuously nurtured contacts 
that served him well both during the war and in paramilitary politics after it.40 
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When war broke out, Escherich enlisted at the rank of captain but was soon 
wounded and, unable to return to combat, called on his many contacts to secure a post 
as head of the German occupying forces in the heavily forested Polish district of 
Białowieski. Here he was put in charge of the thousands of tsarist Russian and Polish 
prisoners of war who worked in the huge wood-processing plants and who were later 
sequestered in Germany. It was these very same Russian prisoners of war that would 
fight in the Baltic Campaign under General Rüdiger von der Goltz and whom Bauer 
would see as the vanguard force to topple the Bolshevik Russian regime. Renowned for 
his efficiency and organizational skills, Forstrat Escherich soon attracted the attention 
of General Erich Ludendorff, then commanding the Eastern Sector of the German 
Supreme Command.41 
Not content to return to the lacklustre activities of a peacetime bureaucrat back 
in his Bavarian hometown of Isen, Escherich became involved in the struggle against 
the new socialist order. He, like Rudolf Kanzler and his ilk, despised all leftists 
including the Social Democrats in power in Berlin as much as he admired the old 
monarchist order they had replaced. By April 1919 Forstrat Escherich had become a 
high-salaried lobbyist for the Bavarian chapter of the rightist organization the 
Association of German Nobles and Estate Owners (Verein der Deutsches 
Standesherren), a conglomerate of agricultural and timber interests bent upon 
preventing the socialist threat of prominent estate owners’ extensive holdings being 
nationalized.42 
It was during this time that Escherich began a massive letter-writing campaign 
to his many well-placed and influential connections, seeking support for the 
establishment of a Bavaria-wide, counter-revolutionary militia and offering himself as 
Führer. Among the recipients were future Minister-President of Bavaria Gustav von 
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Kahr, at that time District Minister-President of Upper Bavaria; Defence Minister 
Gustav Noske; and the notorious Freikorps leader Colonel Franz Ritter von Epp.43 The 
latter had been largely responsible for the violent overthrow of the Bavarian Soviet and 
had since joined the Reichswehr. There is no mention of Escherich having contacted 
Colonel Bauer at this early stage but it is safe to assume that, as Ludendorff’s adjutant, 
Bauer was known to the Forstrat. Escherich was, however, in contact with Major 
Waldemar Pabst and other influential members of the NV before the Kapp Putsch.44 
 To the influential ‘Bauerndoktor’ and founder of the Bavarian Peasants’ Union 
(Bayerische Bauernbund), Georg Heim, Escherich sent a six-point programme calling 
for an immediate arming of the peasantry that was to be led by a civilian 
Landeshauptmann (governor) who would be ‘ruthless, energetic and unafraid of spilling 
a little blood’.45 Escherich volunteered for the position. 
With the fall of the Bavarian Soviet, Escherich insisted on the need to remain 
vigilant not only against a resurgence of the left, but also against any subsequent weak 
government in Bavaria which might not have the will necessary to implement draconian 
measures;46 no doubt he was referring to SPD Bavarian Minister-President Johannes 
Hoffmann who was reinstated after the Munich Soviet fall. 
The self-appointed Landeshauptmann immediately got to work. In April 1919 he 
organized a single Ortswehr unit, which within one month had grown to nearly thirty 
units, encompassing villages with 880 recruits and 262 rifles.47 This illustrates 
Escherich’s preferred method of expansion, which differed from that of Rudolf Kanzler 
in two important ways. Firstly, he insisted on the immediate and rapid extension of the 
Einwohnerwehr throughout the entire state of Bavaria48 and, secondly, while Kanzler 
came to eschew any association with the government, Escherich believed that the 
Hoffmann regime was ultimately responsible for financing the organization.49 Escherich 
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promised to maintain close contact with the Bavarian Ministry of Military Affairs and to 
provide the state with a reliable and loyal grass-roots defence capability.50 In fact, 
almost from the beginning, the wily Escherich was able to circumvent government and 
Reichswehr interference while continuing to secure state-sanctioned financial support 
and arms. 
Landeshauptmann Escherich’s most important assistance came from District 
Minister-President Gustav von Kahr who, after consulting with other members of his 
government, decided that Escherich should enjoy their full backing. Interestingly, it was 
also agreed at this meeting that disassociation from the military would be better served 
by avoiding military terminology such as Wehrkommando (area of military command) 
in favour of the neutral Kreis (district) and Gau (county or shire).51 This is echoed in the 
future National Socialists’ use of the terms but is not to indicate that there was any tie 
between the two. At a further district-level meeting on July 2 that Escherich attended, it 
was resolved that he would serve officially as Landeshauptmann with Rudolf Kanzler 
as his deputy. Thus by early July 1919 Gustav von Kahr had successfully insinuated 
himself into the movement. 
Reaction in Munich was telling. Bavarian Minister-President Hoffmann—von 
Kahr’s immediate superior—had become reluctant to encourage and subsidize the 
further growth of the blossoming organization but here again Escherich’s contacts paid 
off. The growing Einwohnerwehr had caught the notice of Defence Minister Gustav 
Noske who appealed to fellow SPD member Hoffmann in Munich to sponsor the 
organization, as long as it conformed to the guidelines laid out in a May 17 meeting of 
Bavaria’s Minister of the Interior and Minister of Military Affairs. State financial 
support, however, came only with the Einwohnerwehr leadership’s willingness to place 
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itself under the auspices of eleven Wehrkommissare, military inspectors made up of 
army officers stationed throughout Bavaria.52 
While assenting to the conditions outwardly, Escherich and Kanzler 
immediately began a successful, year-long campaign to release the Einwohnerwehr 
from both government and army controls.53 In fact, one element that set the Bavarian 
Einwohnerwehr apart from all other state-sanctioned paramilitary organizations was the 
degree to which Escherich was able to create a private army nominally under state 
auspices yet virtually devoid of any state interference. This is germane to this work 
because such independence would render the Einwohnerwehr all the more attractive for 
Bauer and his purposes.  
There were two causes that led to the autonomy of the Einwohnerwehr so 
desired by Escherich and Kanzler. One was the convenient but basically cogent 
argument that prevailing attitudes in the countryside where Einwohnerwehr membership 
was highest were still hostile towards the authority of the state. Any central government 
and military bureaucratic ties to the organization, Escherich argued, would result in a 
loss of members or an anti-government reaction. Escherich further argued that an 
independent force would not only win greater acceptance among the Bavarian 
population, but also prove to be a reliable ‘instrument of the state’.54 This was, in 
essence, a promise for the creation of a responsible militia in exchange for autonomy. 
The Reichswehr, however, saw in the Wehrkommissar system its one instrument 
of preventing the Einwohnerwehr from going its own way. General Arnold Ritter von 
Möhl, Commander of the Bavarian Reichswehr, actually urged an increase in army 
influence because he felt it necessary to oversee some degree of Einwohnerwehr 
coordination with the regular army in matters of tactics and training. To thwart military 
influence, Escherich and Kanzler adopted a policy of simple non-compliance with 
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directives and ignored enquiries lodged by the various Wehrkommissare. It is thus safe 
to assume that there was very little if any coordinated training with the army, which 
served to diminish the Einwohnerwehr’s usefulness in real combat situations. In defence 
of his policy of non-compliance, Escherich argued that the national army was rife with 
‘unreliable elements’ such as Communists and ‘National Bolsheviks’.55 
Here Escherich was referring to a nebulous group who entertained the idea of 
cooperation with the Bolsheviks to achieve nationalist goals. Importantly, during the 
last desperate hours of the Kapp Putsch, Colonel Bauer had approached certain 
Bolshevik contacts to save the coup, but to no avail. The fact that Bauer had previously 
courted the ‘enemy’—regardless of his reasons—was a tactical and philosophical point 
of contention between Bauer and Escherich that patently hindered any close working 
association between the two. 
The Einwohnerwehr leadership was eventually able to cast off the Reichswehr’s 
meddling with help from an unlikely quarter. On July 7 Defence Minister Noske warned 
Reichswehr Supreme Command that the Versailles Treaty, with its army manpower 
limitation of 100,000, ‘would undoubtedly forbid the development of Einwohnerwehren 
on a military basis’. He accordingly suggested that the organization be ‘divested of all 
military character’ to prevent its dissolution.56 
Thus, due to the Einwohnerwehr leadership’s appeal to maintain only the barest 
of ties to the government in order to facilitate recruitment among the citizenry, and the 
necessity to ‘demilitarize’ the Einwohnerwehr to appease the Entente, Escherich and 
Kanzler in large measure succeeded in their campaign to create an autonomous 
paramilitary organization while still maintaining all the advantages of state funding and 
materiel support. This is all the more remarkable when one remembers that both the 
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Berlin and Munich governments were in the hands of the SPD, the sworn enemies of the 
Einwohnerwehr. 
 Escherich then proceeded to organize the inner structure of his Einwohnerwehr 
so as to place himself in a position of virtual one-man rule (Führerprinzip) that trickled 
down undiluted to the smallest Ortswehr.57 An executive cadre of top aides was formed, 
which included Captain Hermann Kriebel who was appointed Chief of Staff 
(Stabsleiter) in July 1919. Important to this work is that Stabsleiter Kriebel would 
ultimately gravitate towards the more radical and anti-Semitic elements on the Bavarian 
nationalist scene such as Epp’s adjutant, Ernst Röhm. Like his friend Colonel Bauer, 
Kriebel hoped that the Einwohnerwehr would some day play an aggressive role in the 
political and military revitalization of Germany. With the organization’s eventual 
demise, Kriebel, unlike Bauer, drifted into the National Socialist group and was 
instrumental in the Bierhaus Putsch of 1923. For his pains he was sent to Landsberg 
Prison with Adolf Hitler. Kriebel would later accompany Colonel Bauer to China where 
the two served as military advisers to General Jiang Jieshi. Kriebel was subsequently 
Hitler’s Ambassador to Nationalist China.58 
In the interest of increased autonomy from the Hoffmann government, 
Escherich’s organizational skill and contacts with highly placed persons in the 
nationalist camp bore equally impressive fruit in the areas of fund-raising and 
armaments procurement. While continuing to receive large subsidies from the 
Hoffmann regime,59 Escherich early on tapped into private sources, the most important 
of which was the nationalist lobby group Homeland-Service Bavaria (Heimatdienst 
Bayern) made up of agricultural and industrial interests as well as the Munich Bankers’ 
Association and the Association of Bavarian Brew Masters.60 The most significant 
contact man in raising private funds throughout Bavaria, however, was once again 
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Upper Bavaria District Minister-President Gustav von Kahr who, on the heels of 
declaring support for Escherich in July 1919, called a secret meeting of Munich’s 
commercial and industrial leaders including the Chairman of the Chamber of Commerce 
and the Head of the Association of German Nobles and Estate Owners. After the 
meeting he was able to report that ‘the men were all agreed on the great significance of 
the Einwohnerwehr; it will clearly be indispensable to them.’61 The net result was that 
by late July 1919 the Einwohnerwehr could claim as its portion of the commercial 
generosity of the above-mentioned ‘influential sources’ a sum of over 1,340,000 
marks.62 
 So as not to compromise efforts to carry on collecting state funds from the 
Hoffmann regime, these and other private funds were handled through special bank 
accounts provided by sympathetic Munich bankers.63 In fact, as well as contriving to 
hide the private funds, the Einwohnerwehr leadership managed not to be accountable to 
the state for either its financial holdings or the purchases it made with them. Forstrat 
Escherich had achieved not only organizational and operational autonomy but also 
fiscal self-determination.64 
 The Einwohnerwehr administrative organization eventually become so large 
that, through the benevolent funding of a consortium of Munich banks, it rented the 
large Ring Hotel in the centre of Munich. The new headquarters was completely 
renovated and fitted with bars on the windows; an elaborate communications section 
was installed; and vast stockpiles of rifles, machine guns and grenades were housed in 
its armoury along with medical equipment and enough food to withstand a long siege.65 
With regard to the weapons that filled Einwohnerwehr headquarters and 
numerous hidden stockpiles, Escherich was able to build on the already widespread 
myth that the revolutionary left had secreted large caches of arms throughout Bavaria. 
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While a significant number of arms were certainly hidden during the revolution, most 
had since been collected by the reinstated Hoffmann government after the Soviet fall in 
April 1919. 
To solve the problem of securing heavier weapons—which the state was 
adamant that it would not supply—Escherich nurtured connections with Colonel Epp, in 
the latter’s new role as Commander of the Bavarian Reichswehr Schützenbrigade 21, 
who would simply direct his subordinate in charge of secret weapons stockpiles, Ernst 
Röhm, to supply the Einwohnerwehr with whatever it requested. This included light and 
heavy artillery pieces, mortars and machine guns—the very sort of weapons the 
Hoffmann regime had earlier refused to supply.66  
It was becoming ever more obvious that any promises made by the 
Einwohnerwehr leadership to support the SPD Hoffmann regime would not be fulfilled 
unless it was allowed to regulate its own affairs. To follow the logic one step further, 
such self-determination would lead to the complete abandonment of the Hoffmann 
government by the Einwohnerwehr because the former’s support was no longer 
needed.67 
As the first year of Einwohnerwehr development neared its end, Escherich, 
Kanzler and Kriebel became increasingly outspoken in their attacks on Hoffmann. From 
January 1920 onwards, a series of monthly reports issued from the leadership that 
reflected the favourite old complaint that the government was coddling socialists and 
tolerating ‘a greater boldness on the part of radical left elements’.68 Escherich further 
warned that the Einwohnerwehr was growing intolerant of the Hoffmann administration 
for allowing the leftist press to spread distrust about the self-defence movement.69 It is 
true that the leftist press was intensifying its attacks on the Einwohnerwehr. A good 
case in point was a series of articles by the official organ of the USPD that questioned 
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the real motives of the enormous right-wing organization.70 This, of course, only served 
to perpetuate the mutual attacks that became more vitriolic by the time of the Kapp 
Putsch in mid-March 1920. 
Being the best armed, the best organized and virtually independent of state 
interference, the largest paramilitary group in all of Germany would certainly have 
seemed a ready tool for any would-be proponents of change through military means. 
The truth was, however, that Einwohnerwehr members were not the renegade, 
freebooter ex-soldiers fiercely loyal only to their leaders that could be found in the 
north, as seen for example in the Baltic region. The Bavarian variety was mostly made 
up of local Flurwehren with little more to do than protect foodstuffs from marauding 
town dwellers and requisition squads left over from the war years. Due to their strong 
parochial tendencies, the virtually untested Einwohnerwehr members could never have 
acted as a viable strike force. 
Though very adept at establishing itself in towns and villages, the organization 
was weak in cities, notably the larger ones. Membership in Munich was less than in all 
the rest of Upper Bavaria wherein Munich lies. At first, membership within the cities 
did include a certain per cent of socialists, but by the early winter of 1919, the mass of 
Einwohnerwehr members throughout Bavaria were conservative peasant or middle-
class and virtually all non-urban.71 Nor were certain elements from the far right, such as 
the still insignificant National Socialists, included in the organization. Escherich in 
particular had no desire to deal with Nazis whom he referred to as ‘National 
Bolsheviks’.72 The general membership of the Einwohnerwehr from the towns and 
small cities was the epitome of middle-class respectability, having a healthy percentage 
of lawyers, court officials, inspectors, teachers, businessmen and large landowners, 
especially in the Gau leadership. One of the main reasons for the organization’s appeal 
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was that it was well represented among those who ran the political, economic and social 
life of the state.73 
In rural areas the popular appeal of the Einwohnerwehr resided in its ability to 
articulate the fear of a disintegration of what were perceived as traditional values. Even 
before the war there was a general fear that socialists from the cities and the 
encroachment of modernity would, if not checked, overwhelm and destroy what was 
considered the essence of native culture.74 Einwohnerwehr members were encouraged 
to wear their traditional local costumes, refurbish historic buildings, attend folk festivals 
and, above all, participate in the revival of the ancient alpine Schießstände (shooting 
societies or contests).75 The promotion of the cult of the Schießstände and other such 
volkstümlich (populist) activities was a conscious effort by the Einwohnerwehr 
leadership to revive the ancient traditions of decentralized village autonomy symbolized 
by their own self-defence organizations. In other words, these activities were by 
definition celebrations of local autonomy, at odds with loyalty beyond the village. The 
Reichswehr Wehrkommissar reports are filled with disparaging remarks as to the 
unwillingness of Einwohnerwehr personnel to bother themselves with anything beyond 
their own fences. The Wehrkommissar of Upper Bavaria’s report in August 1919 is 
typical: ‘we can say that the peasant population is concerned exclusively with defending 
its own property; it would take considerable effort to get these people to perform 
services outside the perimeter of (even) a single Gau.’76 
In May of that year, fully aware of the pervasiveness of this proclivity to 
localism, Kanzler had attempted to transcend the local focus with the establishment of 
mobile brigades (Landfahnen) within his Einwohnerwehr Chiemgau. These were 
smaller Freikorps units of a more soldierly bearing that had actually seen some action—
mostly during the brutal last days of the Bavarian Soviet in the spring of 1919. Still, it 
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was not until early 1920 when the Reich government, under pressure from the Entente 
since December 1919 to disband the part-time units, encouraged Landfahnen members 
to join the Einwohnerwehr within their home communities. This was seen by Escherich 
as the perfect opportunity to fuse these younger, less attached ex-soldiers, more willing 
and able to serve for extended times in distant locations, with the local Einwohnerwehr 
units in the hope that he could break the curse of localism.77 The net result, however, 
was less than desirable. The initiative only heightened the contrast between the local 
Einwohnerwehr personnel and those who had spent the last year closely associated with 
the Reichswehr. The Freikorps veterans were contemptuous of the old-fashioned 
parochialism of local members who were comfortable in their sedentary village life and 
whose military commitment went little beyond Lederhosen slap-dancing, shooting 
festivals and beer drinking with the Einwohnerwehr leadership of the locality.78 
Escherich himself admitted in a letter to his Kreis and Gau leaders that the average 
Einwohnerwehr unit was ‘dominated by middle-aged men who had neither the vigour 
nor the time to participate in extensive paramilitary activities’.79 
  
 
B.  Meaning of the Kapp Putsch in Bavaria and Implications for Bavarian Support 
      of the Rosenheim Plan 
 
 
Just as Bauer misread the potential effectiveness of the Einwohnerwehr, so, too, 
did he fail to understand that the replacement of the SPD government in Munich with 
the rightist government of von Kahr did not mean that the Kapp Putsch had been 
successful in Bavaria. In fact, the victory of the BVP over the Hoffmann government did 
not signify support for the Kappist elements in Bavaria—as Bauer might have 
imagined—but the elimination of the radical Kappists from the political scene and, at 
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the same time, the strengthening of the Bavarian rightist Ordnungszelle. The point is 
that Bauer had long exhibited a failure to grasp the reality of situations, as evidenced in 
his many publications, in his mismanaged restoration plot and in the Kapp fiasco. It 
would be consistent with his nature if he were, in addition, to misread the ascension of 
the right in Bavaria as a validation of that which had failed in Berlin. If this were the 
case, it would follow that he would also misread the establishment of the Bavarian 
Ordnungszelle as a potentially useful factor in his White International Aktionsplan. A 
brief overview of what actually took place in Munich during the Kapp Putsch serves to 
illustrate Bauer’s virtual insignificance in the matter.  
During the evening of March 13, 1920—the day the Freikorps Marinebrigade-
Ehrhardt made its fateful march on Berlin—Landeshauptmann Escherich noted a 
significant number of Kappists amongst the younger Einwohnerwehr and Landfahnen 
officers milling about the streets of Munich. He then hastened to Operational 
Headquarters where he countermanded Chief of Staff Hermann Kriebel’s orders for a 
full mobilization. Escherich opted for a more moderate—and indeed legal—course. 
Both men had been taken by surprise and were rather tepid as to the wisdom of the 
whole Kapp enterprise.80 Later that night Escherich met with his greatest supporters, 
Upper Bavaria District Minister-President Gustav von Kahr, Munich Police Chief Ernst 
Pöhner and a group of Einwohnerwehr officers, and demanded that Bavarian 
Reichswehr Commander General Arnold von Möhl declare a state of emergency. The 
general understood the situation perfectly. Having earlier that day officially proclaimed 
that the Reichswehr stood by the legitimate government,81 he would (to all intents and 
purposes) be acting according to his word by now informing Minister-President 
Hoffmann that only with the authority of martial law could he (Möhl) save the 
government from the Kappists in their midst. Nor was the situation lost on Hoffmann 
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who keenly sensed his lack of options. The declaration of martial law, as suggested by 
General Möhl, would most certainly be backed by the massive Bavarian 
Einwohnerwehr that had of late increased its condemnation of the Hoffmann 
government. Hoffmann and most of his cabinet resigned in protest at the thinly veiled 
threat of Reichswehr and Einwohnerwehr collusion. During the next few days of 
meetings at the Bavarian Provincial Chamber (Landrat), a new government headed by 
von Kahr was formed.82 Hence the legal government structure did not fall to Kappist 
elements. This is important because the Ordnungszelle had been achieved without a 
Putsch and now stood with the blessing of the legitimate government that was made up 
of its very designers. 
Thus the Kapp Putsch failed in Munich just as everywhere else. In Bavaria there 
was a twist, however. Escherich had taken full advantage of the fluidity of the situation 
to stage a lawful change of government from one he despised to one now in the hands of 
his rightist colleague and chief Einwohnerwehr supporter Gustav von Kahr. Though the 
leadership of von Kahr and Escherich gave succour to the Prussian exiles after their 
escape from Berlin, it had no desire to embrace the ill-conceived, foolhardy designs of 
the Prussian ex-Kappists themselves. 
Yet when General Ludendorff, Colonel Bauer, Trebitsch and Major Stephani 
arrived at Munich Hauptbahnhof from Berlin, they stepped into a political and 
ideological milieu seemingly—at least to them—ideal for the development of an 
Aktionsplan to further their nationalist agenda. Their hopes were further raised by 
Escherich’s attempt to consolidate the various, scattered paramilitary units throughout 
Germany under the single authority of the Bavarian Ordnungszelle. The legendary 
General Ludendorff served Escherich’s purpose by expressing his support. The question 
is, was Bauer’s plan served? It was not. While the paramilitary consolidation drive was 
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certainly consistent with the needs of the White International plot, the former was not 
engineered for the sake of the latter. 
 
 
Chapter 10 
 
Conflicting Agendas: The White International Plot in the Context of Bavarian Domestic 
and Foreign Policy 
 
 
 
A.  Creation of Orgesch and Orka, and Implications for the Rosenheim Plan 
  
 
Months before the Kapp Putsch, Georg Escherich came up with the idea of 
creating an all-German, Bavaria-based central committee for the coordination of 
paramilitary organizations throughout the Reich. His plan was not conceived in a 
vacuum, however. 
The formation of the Einwohnerwehr in the spring and early summer of 1919 
was in direct conflict with Article 177 of the Versailles Treaty signed on June 28, 1919, 
which not only limited the Reichswehr to 100,000 men but also forbade any 
organizations with military associations. Because Escherich’s organization would be 
subordinated to the regular army during times of mobilization, it clearly fell into this 
category, at least as far as the Entente was concerned. In early July 1919 Defence 
Minister Noske sought to ‘demilitarize’ the Einwohnerwehr by placing it under a 
completely civilian leadership in order to save it.83 By the end of 1919 the 
disassociation of the Einwohnerwehr from the military—at least on paper—had been 
accomplished but the Entente was not satisfied. Accordingly, at the London Conference 
in early 1920, the Entente notified Berlin that as well as regular Reichswehr troops, all 
irregular forces in Germany would be included within the 100,000-troop limit.84 Noske 
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then decided to dissolve all paramilitary formations throughout the Reich, opting to 
sacrifice the Einwohnerwehr rather than weaken the Reichswehr.85 All the German 
states except Bavaria complied with the Berlin order.  
Bavaria now stood as the hope and model of all counter-revolutionary 
organizations in the north that, though officially dissolved, were loath to succumb either 
to the wishes of the social-democratic Ebert government or to those of the Entente.86 
Forstrat Escherich resolved to go one step further and create in Bavaria an all-German 
organization to coordinate paramilitary action for the entire Reich. 
In January 1920 he went to Berlin in response to a letter from a municipal 
official called Schliephacke, the leader of a paramilitary organization there with a rather 
innocuous name, the Vereinigung zur Sicherung der Volksernährung (Union for the 
Safeguarding of People’s Foodstuffs).87 Escherich met with Schliephacke who, as it so 
happened, was working in close cooperation with General Ludendorff and his circle 
through the NV. Present at discussions about the creation of an all-German paramilitary-
coordination organization were Schliephacke, Stahlhelm Freikorps leader Franz Seldte 
and Major Waldemar Pabst, all of whom were at that time busily preparing for the Kapp 
Putsch.88 It was concluded that Bavaria would host a secret meeting to that end. 
The venue for the meeting, held on May 8-9, 1920, was provided by the third 
member of the Bavarian troika, Georg Heim, at his Bauernzentrale (Peasants’ Union 
headquarters) in Regensburg, the capital of the Bavarian Upper Palatinate District 
(Oberpfalz).89 It was decided there that all the Freikorps units north of the river Main 
(the northernmost border of Bavaria), as well as the Jungdeutscher Orden or Jungdo 
(Young German Order) that was particularly strong in western Germany, would be 
placed under the overall leadership of Einwohnerwehr head Georg Escherich. Stahlhelm 
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leader Franz Seldte90 christened the resulting organization Der Deutsche Hort but 
Escherich immediately changed the name to Organisation Escherich or Orgesch.91 
For the authors of the plot conceived in Rosenheim, the creation of Orgesch as a 
central administrative structure for the coordination of all paramilitary activity was 
clearly in line with their dreams of establishing a White International. Moreover, the 
establishment of Orgesch appeared to mark Bavarian recognition of the Ludendorff-
Bauer circle as re-entering the counter-revolutionary sphere. Sources do not indicate 
that either Bauer or Ludendorff attended the Regensburg Meeting but they do suggest a 
rather dramatic moment when General Ludendorff’s emissary, Major Stephani, coming 
directly from a session of the Ludendorff-Bauer group in Rosenheim, arrived at the 
Bauernzentrale. He carried with him the general’s wish that the northern paramilitary 
representatives place themselves under the Bavarian leadership of Forstrat Georg 
Escherich.92 
The professed goals of Orgesch, solemnly declared at the Regensburg Meeting, 
with which (at least openly) the Jungdo and the Stahlhelm had agreed, were in fact 
directly counter to Bauer’s plan but consistent with Bavarian efforts to present to the 
Entente—especially the French—a conciliatory face. These included the maintenance of 
law and order through the defence of the Weimar Constitution and the rejection of all 
revolts from both the left and the right.93 Another avowed goal was to combat 
Bolshevism and national Bolshevism; the second point certainly posed an obstacle to 
Bauer’s chances of acceptance on the part of the Bavarians. For Bauer’s part, however, 
there would have been nothing objectionable about Escherich’s statement, made in his 
opening address to the Regensburg Meeting on May 9, that the challenges ahead were a 
matter of ‘the White Army against the Red Army’.94 
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The act of Ludendorff lending his illustrious name to Orgesch could well be 
viewed as a strategic move on the part of the Ludendorff-Bauer circle to gain Bavarian 
support for the White International in return. It was arguably the intention of Bauer and 
Trebitsch to cast the anti-Versailles, counter-revolutionary old general, the hero of the 
Battle of Tannenberg, in the role of rallying point for all national and international 
paramilitary activity—a fact not lost on Escherich. Indeed, in a letter to Munich Police 
Chief Pöhner, Bauer maintained that through all the machinations after the Kapp 
Putsch, Ludendorff ‘from the very beginning was seen as [the] inter-allied military 
leader’.95 
Thus the Regensburg Meeting of early May 1920 occasioned the re-
establishment of a central coordination committee of rightist counter-revolutionary 
activity in Munich to replace the Berlin-based NV banned in the wake of the Kapp 
Putsch. In a newspaper interview with the München-Augsburger Abendzeitung, 
Escherich stated that Orgesch was a direct product of the Kapp Putsch venture that had 
left the northern German paramilitary organizations in tatters and the NV outlawed.96 
For the Ludendorff-Bauer group, Orgesch repaired some of that damage because not 
only did it replace the erstwhile Berlin-based central organization, but it also claimed to 
speak for all of Germany, something the NV never did. Such control of all paramilitary 
groups within the Reich was exactly what the Bauer plan required if it were ever to set 
in motion multiple, well-coordinated military attacks across Germany’s southern and 
eastern borders. 
The second outcome of the Regensburg Meeting had an even more direct 
relevance to the formation of a White International. Along with the creation of Orgesch 
and its reach into northern Germany came the creation of Organisation Kanzler (Orka) 
that sought to reach southwards for the coordination of paramilitary activities between 
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Bavaria and Austria. The Einwohnerwehr Deputy and founder-leader of Freikorps 
Chiemgau, Rudolf Kanzler, was the logical choice for its leadership due to his extensive 
experience in the Alpine area of Bavaria and its close proximity to the Tyrol of western 
Austria. The establishment of Orka is crucial for the purposes of this work because it 
marked a genuine attempt at setting up a body of international cooperation beyond 
Germany’s borders that was very much in line with Bauer’s dream. 
The decisions at Regensburg in May 1920 were nothing less than the first step in 
realizing the Rosenheim plan and creating the White International. It must be pointed 
out, however, that sources dealing specifically with the Regensburg Meeting barely 
mention Ludendorff and none mention Bauer.97 It would appear that the resolutions at 
Regensburg, while certainly favourable to the Rosenheim plan, were not passed 
specifically for its sake. For Bauer and his group, this mattered little. 
The above facts of Bauer and Trebitsch’s virtually negligible role at the 
Regensburg Meeting are not consistent with testimony offered by Trebitsch in Vienna at 
his trial for high treason in February 1921.98 According to his diary entry of May 8, 
1920, ‘[at] the conference of the German [paramilitary] associations in Regensburg, a 
new plan was worked out . . . [and] Colonel Bauer laid the Aktionsprogramm before the 
assembly and it was approved.’99 One suspects that, in an attempt to cast himself as 
having prevented a possible all-European war by coming forward, Trebitsch may have 
altered his own diary to give the appearance that the plot had been widely approved and 
adopted by the Bavarian leadership, which was not the case. Whatever Trebitsch’s 
motives were later to be, for the moment the Supreme Secret Committee was satisfied 
enough that on the day before the meeting adjourned, it departed Munich to initiate the 
next step in the Rosenheim plan to establish a White International, one that would take 
it to Budapest. 
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Regardless of whatever credibility Ludendorff’s name may have lent to Orgesch 
and Orka, the Ludendorff-Bauer circle’s propensity for ill-advised military 
Aktionspläne was quite out of step with the more circumspect, conservative Bavarian 
leadership that was committed to more diplomatic means. Markedly at variance were 
Bauer’s declared anti-French leanings in the face of Bavaria’s ongoing attempts at a 
Franco-Bavarian rapprochement in the hope of keeping its precious Einwohnerwehr 
intact and seeing a revision to the Versailles Treaty as it pertained to Bavaria.100  
  
 
B.  Bavarian Foreign Policy and its Incongruity with the Rosenheim Plan 
 
The point of possible conflict between the new Bavarian leadership and the 
Bauer circle arose from the question of Bavaria’s position within the Reich and the 
related question of Bavaria’s foreign policy regarding delicate, ongoing attempts at a 
Franco-Bavarian rapprochement. Bavaria sought to cast Catholic southern Germany in 
general—and Bavaria in particular—as a victim of Protestant Prussian militarism and 
thus worthy of reconsideration in respect of the Entente demand for the dissolution of 
the Bavarian Einwohnerwehr and Article 80 of the Treaty of Versailles which forbade 
an Anschluß with Austria (Article 88 of the Treaty of Saint-Germain forbade the same). 
Munich realized that any hope of success in this area required a return to the pre-
war Reservatrechte, an arrangement whereby certain sovereign rights extended to 
Bavaria under the 1871 Imperial Constitution. This alone would give France the 
opportunity to recognize Bavaria as a quasi-autonomous entity, and Bavaria the 
opportunity to present itself to France through such reinstated ambassadorial channels 
as had existed before the war.101 To fully appreciate Bavaria’s position and how very 
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out of line it was with Bauer’s plan, it is necessary to touch on Bavaria’s endeavours 
from the defeat of November 1918 in regard to federalism.102 
Bavaria’s pre-war privileges within the Reich were considerable and included 
the right to exchange and receive ambassadors—a prerogative Bavaria would retain 
unofficially throughout the early 1920s.103 Immediately after the collapse in November 
1918, Bavaria scrambled to undo the centralizing policies set in motion by Berlin to 
meet the exigencies of managing a wartime economy. Indeed, this was the prime reason 
for the founding of the BVP by none other than the aforementioned ‘Bauerndoktor’ 
Georg Heim who facilitated the creation of Orgesch and Orka. 
Days before the collapse in 1918, and after Austria’s withdrawal from the war 
on November 3, Dr Heim travelled to Innsbruck to inform the Provincial President of 
Tyrol that due to the fluid situation caused by the imminent Armistice and the fall of the 
Central Powers’ royal houses (Kaiser Karl I of Austria-Hungary did not abdicate but, 
rather, renounced all participation in the affairs of state on November 11), the time was 
propitious for doing away with the border crossing between Germany and Austria—an 
act Heim felt would be impossible later.104 Despite unanimous support for the suggested 
Anschluß in the Austrian Constituent Assembly, by the end of November Heim had 
revised his position in a series of articles for the Munich BVP organ the Bayerischer 
Kurier wherein he recognized that, ‘Under no circumstances would the Entente permit 
the inclusion of ten million German-Austrians’ as part of the German Reich.105 He 
proposed, instead, two alternative possibilities: either Germany would return to its 
federalist status, as before the war, with the inclusion of Austria as a rump state or—his 
preferred arrangement—areas of German-Austria (minus its non-German portions) 
would secede from Vienna and unite with areas of the former German Kaiserreich. 
More specifically, he envisioned an association of the western Austrian panhandle 
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provinces of Vorarlberg, Tyrol, Styria and Upper Austria with Bavaria, not Germany. 
He went on to say that later, ‘when Vienna again belongs to the Viennese and has freed 
itself from the international Bolshevik quagmire [of the Renner government], it too can 
be added.’106 Heim was referring to Chancellor Karl Renner, leader of the Social 
Democratic Party of Austria (SPÖ).107 Here one finds agreement between Bauer and 
Heim in their characterization of the Viennese government. Thus the White 
International plot originated in a desire to topple the ‘red’ Renner regime. 
Other points within the same series of Heim’s articles were also in agreement 
with Bauer’s ideas. The former suggested that the French-occupied Rhineland, Hanover 
and western Germany as far eastwards as the river Elbe be attached to the proposed 
Greater Austria-Bavaria. This, he explained, would provide the new state with mineral 
and coal reserves as well as access to the sea. As for northern Germany—meaning 
Prussia—Heim wrote that the ‘Jewish, Marxist ulcer must be isolated but the south must 
never give up hope that the Reich in its entirety will one day be reunited’.108 He 
concluded that with such a novel configuration of the Reich, the Entente would have no 
difficulty with an Anschluß with the German ethnic areas of Austria.109 This was more 
than a year before Bauer came up with a similar arrangement but for far different 
reasons.  
The sticking point in the approaches of Heim and Bauer was not the political 
reconfiguration itself but the Bavarian focus on a rapprochement with the French both 
before the Versailles Treaty in an attempt at a ‘special consideration’ for Bavaria, and 
after the Treaty in an attempt at revision. On March 19, 1919, shortly before the fall of 
the Bavarian Soviet, Heim met with French General Desticker, an intimate friend of 
Marshal Foch, in Luxembourg. There the Bavarian federalist proposed the 
establishment of a ‘katholischen und konservativen Bloc’110 made up of Austria and 
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south-western Germany as a bulwark against Bolshevism that had already spread to 
Hungary and Bavaria. Heim also argued that such an arrangement would serve as a 
hedge against the re-establishment of a Germany under Prussian control. He further 
proposed that the Entente assume a protectorate role mainly in the sphere of 
economics.111  
 Nothing came of this meeting partly due to the French Prime Minister, Georges 
Clemençeau, still harbouring the wartime longing to see Germany reduced to a 
collection of petty principalities as had existed before Bismarck.112 The French military 
under Marshal Foch, however, saw French interests as well served by the formation of 
an anti-Prussian, anti-Bolshevik bloc to the east but was concerned with having to 
maintain its economic viability at a time when France could ill afford it.113 
Bavarian approaches to the French were not limited to moderates such as Heim. 
Bavarian pan-German activist Count Karl Bothmer engaged in ongoing efforts from a 
much more extreme rightist position than that of his more conservative compatriot.114 
On matters of federalism he went further than Heim in calling for the reduction of 
Prussia to a mere Bundesstaat confined within the borders as they stood in 1863. Like 
Heim, Bauer, Ludendorff and most of those who held to the Ordnungszellenideologie, 
Bothmer considered that Berlin had become a bridgehead of the ‘Red International’, and 
that Bavaria must take the initiative lest it too become contaminated by Bolshevism.115 
In fact, Bothmer saw the Reich itself as no longer a viable political entity; it solely 
existed, he postulated, in the inner yearning for order within the German Volk. Only 
when the Ordnungszelle of Bavaria stopped believing the lie of a living Reich could 
Germany be saved.116 
Count Bothmer’s rather völkisch approach to Realpolitik aside, from January 
1919 until well into the summer of 1920 Heim collaborated with him in an attempt to 
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broaden his BVP base to include the old conservative, pro-Wittelsbach legitimist faction 
along with the pan-Germans who favoured an Anschluß with Austria as a hedge against 
leftist influences from the north. This was especially the case during the post-Kapp 
leftist revolts in the Prussian Ruhr area that sent a new wave of fear of the north falling 
under Bolshevism. Such alarm was reflected in Einwohnerwehr Chief of Staff Major 
Kriebel’s remarks at the Regensburg Meeting that created Orgesch in May 1920. In his 
opening address he stated that with the Prussian dissolution of its own 
Einwohnerwehr—at Berlin’s insistence—it was all the more urgent that Bavaria 
maintain its own formations to contain Bolshevism to the north.117 Regardless of hopes 
that the French would allow Bavaria to keep its Einwohnerwehr, the idea of a strong 
Bavarian Ordnungszelle was all very consistent with Bauer’s approach, but even the 
more rightist individuals with whom Bauer and his circle had to deal were Bavarians 
first and foremost, and saw their future as closely tied to France. 
According to Heim, the aim of his negotiations was to confuse the French into 
believing he had total separation from the north in mind—not just a return to the pre-
war federalism. In this way he wished to, as he put it, ‘throw sand in their eyes’.118 On 
the surface, Bauer would be in favour of this tactic. A key element of the Rosenheim 
plan called for united military action against Czechoslovakia. Because the new 
Successor State was a close ally of the Entente, the plotters could expect that any attack 
against it would result in an immediate and strong countermeasure—especially from 
France. If the Bavarians, however, were to appear to favour loosening the ties with 
northern Germany or—better yet—separating entirely from it, the French would see in 
this a weakening of German potential for danger in Central Europe, causing France to 
‘let down its guard’119 concerning Czechoslovak security. Taking advantage of France’s 
lack of attention, Bavaria (not Germany) would thereupon attach itself to Austria to 
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form a southern German state sharing a border with Hungary to the east. Both northern 
Germany and the new Bavarian-Austrian-Hungarian Confederation would then jointly 
attack Czechoslovakia while the French struggled to respond.120 
Bauer, though, could not be certain if Heim was trying to deceive the French or 
him. Every approach Heim made to France in the name of Bavaria would bother 
Ludendorff and Bauer, as would the tensions that threatened the unity of Prussia and 
Bavaria.121 There was a justified fear that Bavaria, at the urging of the very influential 
Heim, might refuse reunification with northern Germany after ‘Groß-Bayern’ (Anschluß 
with Austria) had been achieved.122 This was especially worrisome because, were it to 
take place, it might well be with the blessing of France. This would certainly preclude 
any need for Bavaria to participate in Bauer’s scheme. 
The amenability of the Bavarians to the idea of an Anschluß gave Bauer pause 
for another reason. Munich had, since late 1919, been considering the possibility of an 
Austrian Anschluß with the Bavarian state to the point that preparations were well under 
way within the Bavarian Reichswehr—albeit unofficially—by the time Bauer, 
Ludendorff and their circle arrived in Munich. In other words, Bavaria sought an 
Anschluß for uniquely Bavarian reasons. Here Bruno Thoß speculates that Bauer might 
have been uncomfortable with the pro-Catholic rhetoric in much of the language in 
support of an Anschluß. Such unilateral action on Bavaria’s part would come 
dangerously close to rekindling the historical dichotomy between the Lutheran Prussian 
north and the Catholic Austrian south, as was the case during the Hohenzollern-
Habsburg conflict that contributed to the Kulturkampf and the Austro-Prussian War 
some 50 years earlier.123 
Indeed, the differences of a historical and cultural nature between Prussia and 
Bavaria were still very real concerns in post-war Bavaria. Whatever political 
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philosophies Ludendorff and his circle shared with the Bavarians, they were tainted by a 
general distrust held by some of the more prominent Bavarian rightist leaders who saw 
Bauer and his circle as ‘Prussian’—and inept Prussians at that. For though Bavaria 
provided a safe haven and the Bavarians even exhibited a vague willingness to work 
with the ex-putschists, non-Bavarian Germans have always been—and to a degree still 
are—treated as foreigners. Trebitsch-Lincoln was to later show his frustration at what 
he perceived as an obstructionist attitude of his hosts when he wrote in his diary, ‘The 
Orgesch, which was absolutely Bavarian, separatist and hostile to Prussia, was spinning 
webs everywhere around us.’124 Such a split along cultural lines was manifestly 
inconsistent with the idea of any kind of united front with Prussia that was needed for 
the Rosenheim plan to be successful. 
 Plainly, there were sufficient reasons for Colonel Bauer to be wary of the 
Bavarians’ motives behind their politics—even those consistent with the outlines of the 
Rosenheim plan. There was yet one more venture of Georg Heim’s that—like the 
creation of Orgesch, Orka, the Einwohnerwehr, the Anschluß with Austria and, indeed, 
the entire Ordnungszellekonzept—seemed tailor-made for the Rosenheim plan. 
Since early 1920 ‘Bauerndoktor’ Georg Heim, in his capacity as leader of the 
influential Bavarian Peasants’ Union, had been organizing a ‘Green International’ for 
the sake of transnational cooperation in agricultural matters and—more importantly—as 
an anti-Bolshevik measure to combat leftist influences among the peasantry.125 By the 
time the ex-putschists arrived in Munich in March, the organization had already grown 
to include Germany, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania.126  
The importance of the Green International was not lost on either Bauer or Heim 
who both recognized the value of working with one another. Heim—his particularist 
leanings notwithstanding—saw the opportunity to further strengthen his movement 
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around Bauer’s united-front advocacy within Germany and beyond. Bauer, for his part, 
hoped to build an international foundation of anti-Bolshevism at the agrarian level upon 
the network already set down by Heim. At first glance it appeared that the Peasants’ 
Union leader would be a valuable co-conspirator in the execution of the Rosenheim 
plan. It was Heim and Munich Police Chief Pöhner who had invited Ehrhardt and 
several of his leading officers to Munich for talks and had arranged their billeting after 
the Kapp disaster. It was also Heim who, for whatever reason, had recommended the 
strengthening of Orgesch and the inclusion of Escherich in the inter-workings of the 
Rosenheim plan.127 
Ostensibly, there was common ground for collusion between the Bavarian 
leadership structure (von Kahr, Escherich, Heim) and the authors of the Rosenheim plan 
(Bauer, Trebitsch). The truth was, though, that regardless of similar philosophies—and 
there were many—their Bavarian hosts were reluctant to allow Bauer and his fellow 
Prussian officers into the inner circles of Bavarian political business. This did not go 
unnoticed by Bauer who hoped to eventually win them over to his plan once the 
participation of Hungary was established.128 For the time being, however, the politically 
active Bavarian right was not going to commit itself to Bauer and Trebitsch’s fantastic 
scheme. 
This is not to say that Munich lacked those ready to embrace Bauer’s plan. The 
Supreme Secret Committee of Colonel Bauer, Trebitsch and Major Stephani would 
receive their greatest support from radical refugees who, like themselves, had little to 
lose. It is not difficult to understand the enthusiasm displayed by the Russian 
monarchist and Baltic German émigré communities of Munich towards Bauer’s plan. 
Included in its goals were both the revival of the Russian monarchy and the dismantling 
of the Entente-sponsored Baltic Successor States. The problem lay, of course, in that 
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these groups were essentially ‘stateless’ and though long on enthusiasm, they were short 
on any real means to set such an endeavour in motion. 
 
 
Chapter 11 
Dubious Fellow Conspirators: Support from Russian Monarchist and Baltic German 
Émigré Communities 
 
 
The Bauer circle did find support, beyond the lip service of its Bavarian 
leadership hosts, from the more radical factions that had gathered in Munich during the 
course of the last year and since the Kapp disaster. Amongst these factions were 
Russian monarchist émigrés made up of several fleeing leaders such as General 
Biskupsky and Pavel Bermondt-Avalov who had worked with the Ludendorff circle 
through the NV in Berlin, and displaced, ultra-nationalist, anti-Semitic Baltic Germans 
who had retreated westwards into the Reich with the Freikorps formations at the close 
of the failed Baltic Campaign in 1919. To a very great extent during the spring and 
summer of 1920, Munich would witness a resurrection of the Baltic Campaign by many 
of the very same persons displaced by Bolshevik and Entente victories in Eastern 
Europe less than a year earlier—except that this time efforts would be on a continental 
scale. 
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 A.      The Russian Monarchist Émigré Community of Munich 
 
 
There were important differences between the Russian émigré community in and 
around Berlin and the one in Munich, especially in their respective political 
orientations. The existence of a short-lived (Bolshevik) Russian Embassy in the capital 
in 1918 (a residual of the abrogated Treaty of Brest-Litovsk), and ongoing negotiations 
with the Weimar government concerning the repatriation of the 150,000 ex-tsarist 
prisoners of war, provided a Bolshevik presence, no matter how slight. To the German 
radical right, this was simply a further example of the red contamination of northern 
Germany in general and of Berlin in particular. 
In Munich a markedly anti-Bolshevik character was apparent in the émigré 
community even before the Berlin-based Ukrainian government-in-exile re-established 
itself in the Bavarian capital after the Kapp Putsch. During the term of the von Kahr 
government, Munich Police Chief Pöhner required two references from already existing 
members of the Munich émigré community before anyone wishing to take up residence 
in the city could do so. Consequently, even those moderate leftists who stood opposed 
to the Bolshevik regime such as Constitutional Democrats, Socialist Revolutionaries or 
Mensheviks were very few in number.  
Many White Russian émigré nobles, bureaucrats and officers within the upper 
echelons of the Imperial Russian Army had belonged to the radical rightist clandestine 
organization the Black Hundreds. Such groups were in easy contact with the more 
völkisch German elements found in the post-Kapp Ordnungszelle atmosphere that 
dominated in Munich.129 
White Russian émigré arrivals there involved in—or associated with—the Kapp 
Putsch included Colonel Pavel Bermondt-Avalov of the Baltic Campaign,130 and Piotr 
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Shabelsky-Bork and Sergei Taboritsky who in Berlin had edited the anti-Bolshevik 
newspaper Der Ruf and had been active in the erstwhile Ruthenian government-in-exile. 
Soon General Vasili Biskupsky was to follow, keeping his close ties with Bauer and 
Trebitsch as well as with pro-German White Russian groups organizing paramilitary 
forces to some day aid in establishing monarchical regimes in Central and Eastern 
Europe.131  
 
 
B.  The Baltic German Émigré Community of Munich 
 
Another group disenfranchised by both the Russian Revolution and the Entente-
sponsored Successor States was the Baltic Germans. One of the more virulent, anti-
Bolshevik, anti-Semitic leaders, Max von Scheubner-Richter,132 would work closely 
with White Russians Fedor Vinberg, Shabelsky-Bork and Taboritsky as well as his 
Baltic German compatriots of the ultra-nationalistic Rubonia fraternity from his Riga 
Polytechnical Institute student days, Otto von Kursell,133 Arno Schickendanz134 and 
Alfred Rosenberg.135 
After his arrival in Munich following the Kapp failure, Scheubner-Richter along 
with other Baltic Germans and members of the White Russian émigré community 
sought to foster a Bavarian-Ukrainian military and economic alliance in the hope of 
supplying Russian and German officers, troops and supplies to fellow Baltic German 
General Piotr Wrangel’s White Army of the South in the Crimea.136 Simply put, the 
Baltic Germans and their Russian émigré co-conspirators wished to resurrect the Baltic 
Campaign, this time waging it from the Ukraine in the south instead of from the Baltic 
region in the north-west.  
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To this end, the ‘Society for Ukrainian-Bavarian Import and Export’ was 
established as a front organization with an operating capital of some 300,000 German 
marks from right-wing firms such as the Munich-Augsburg Machine Factory.137 
Discussions of forming a delegation to General Wrangel were held in May 1920 in 
Regensburg with General Ludendorff, Colonel Bauer and Iron Division Commander 
Major Bischoff of the Baltic Campaign representing the German side.138 For the 
Russians were the ex-Mayor of Odessa Boris Pelikan, Black Hundreds publicist Mikhail 
Kommissarov and General Biskupsky, with Scheubner-Richter and Rosenberg 
mediating between the two sides.139 
According to French intelligence reports, the above meeting of the so-called 
Society for Ukrainian-Bavarian Import and Export produced two significant outcomes. 
It was decided the participants should adopt Bauer’s overall plan to annul the Paris 
Peace Treaties by force; overthrow the Bolshevik regime by uniting Germans, Russians, 
Hungarians, Bulgarians and Turks; re-establish the ex-monarchies of Central and 
Eastern Europe; and, finally, partition the Successor States amongst them—in other 
words, the Rosenheim plan. The second outcome was the decision to send a delegation 
on a mission via Vienna and Budapest to General Wrangel in the Crimea to outline the 
terms of mutual assistance.140 In June 1920 the delegation made up of Scheubner-
Richter, White Russian émigré leaders including Kommissarov and Pelikan, and some 
Hungarian and Austrian rightist representatives travelled first to Vienna and then on to 
Budapest141 where the entourage benefited from advance work conducted by Bauer, 
Trebitsch, Major Stephani and General Biskupsky in mid-May.142  
Earlier on May 8, 1920—the very day Major Stephani travelled to the 
Regensburg Meeting as Ludendorff’s personal representative to lend the General’s 
name to the establishment of Orgesch—Trebitsch, Colonel Bauer, his personal secretary 
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Luise Engeler and Baron Kovács, a member of the Hungarian Consulate, left Bavaria 
for Budapest to initiate the next part of their scheme: convincing the Hungarian 
government to support the Rosenheim plan.143 
Before their departure they made one last visit to Police Chief Pöhner to procure 
documentation to ease their passage over the Austrian border. Fräulein Engeler recalled 
in her memoirs the curious particulars of the meeting. Police Chief Pöhner opened his 
desk drawer allowing a box containing the necessary stamps for passage to come into 
full view of Bauer. At this point he excused himself from the room for a few minutes, 
which gave Bauer and his secretary enough time to stamp the forged passports of Dr 
Börner (Bauer) and Karl Lamprecht (Trebitsch-Lincoln) that they had obtained some 
days earlier on April 28 from the Hungarian Consulate in Munich.144 Besides the forged 
passports, Pöhner also arranged for the group’s sensitive documents needed in Budapest 
to be sent ahead by diplomatic courier, which precluded the possibility of them being 
found on the persons of Bauer and Trebitsch.145 
The fugitives passed into Austria via Salzburg with some anxious moments.146 
In Vienna they once again changed their identities. The Hungarian Legation in the 
Austrian capital supplied Bauer and Trebitsch with new passports in the names of Dr 
Bürger and Dr Tibor Lehotzky respectively. As a further precaution, the last leg of the 
journey from Vienna to Budapest was made by passenger steamer. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
It is argued that the Rosenheim plan to create a Europe-wide White International 
reflected a continuation of policies and actions that had already failed. In Bauer’s mind, 
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however, the failures were due to a lack of scope, a misplaced reliance on civilians over 
paramilitary forces and a ‘red’ contamination of Prussia that had reached a stage that 
rendered Berlin unsuitable as a base from which to stage the counter-revolution. He thus 
produced a plan on an all-European scale involving mostly paramilitary or ex-military 
personnel within the rightist-friendly atmosphere of the Bavarian Ordnungszelle. Any 
thought that the earlier plans were themselves ill conceived or amateurishly executed 
was pushed aside. 
It is also argued that Bauer’s task of persuading his more circumspect and 
conservative Bavarian hosts was bound to fail for a number of reasons. Firstly, he 
misread the potential military effectiveness of the Bavarian-based Einwohnerwehr that 
was to be used as a vanguard in the White International forces. A critical assessment of 
its development shows that despite its incredible size and its characterization as a ‘state 
within a state’, the Einwohnerwehr was virtually untested and its own founder and 
leader bemoaned its uselessness beyond the defence of its members’ home villages. 
Secondly, given Bauer’s record of poor assessment, one may assume he saw in 
the removal of the SPD Hoffmann government and the setting-up of the rightist 
Bayerische Ordnungszelle a kind of Bavarian Kapp Putsch success. In fact, it was a 
legal transfer of power—albeit highly opportunistic—motivated partly by preventing 
dilettante Kappist forces, as ill prepared to rule as was Bauer himself, from taking 
power in Munich. It was also a bid to prevent continued centralist rule from Berlin—as 
it surely would have been under a Prussian-dominated Kapp regime. The Bavarians 
were in no hurry to trade one Prussian master in Berlin for another. 
Thirdly, Bauer’s plan was fundamentally inconsistent with Bavarian domestic 
and foreign policy. Bavaria saw that its best chance of winning a consideration for 
treaty revision from the Entente was to cast itself as a victim of centralized Prussian 
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militarism. To that end, delicate attempts at a Franco-Bavarian rapprochement were 
under way with the view of isolating Prussia through the creation of a French-friendly, 
Bavarian-Austrian Catholic bloc. This included the not-unrelated Bavarian plea to retain 
its Einwohnerwehr to thwart any further spread of Bolshevism. Such policy was clearly 
incompatible with Bauer’s Rosenheim plan that wished to use the Einwohnerwehr to 
first destroy the Entente-sponsored Successor States and then declare war on France. 
Fourthly, were the Bavarians and the Bauer group actually of like mind as to 
goals, the fact still remained that the plan was simply so fantastic and politically 
naïve—as were the Hohenzollern restoration plot and the Kapp Putsch before it—that it 
could not possibly meet with any measure of success. 
Reasons for the Rosenheim plan’s likely failure aside, it is argued that there was 
much to encourage Bauer. This came from three sources. One was the effective re-entry 
of Ludendorff and, by association, Bauer into the Bavarian counter-revolutionary 
movement occasioned by the establishment of the all-German paramilitary-coordination 
organizations of Orgesch and Orka. Ludendorff’s support accounted for much of the 
success of their launch; and such organizations as Orgesch and Orka were consistent 
with—perhaps even necessary for—the establishment of a White International. Another 
was the willingness of BVP founder and politically influential Georg Heim to work with 
Bauer within the Green International. The agrarian organization had established a 
Central European transnational network that could greatly facilitate Bauer’s connections 
with potential participating countries. 
The greatest source of encouragement came from the disaffected émigré 
communities of Russian monarchists and Baltic Germans who had joined forces in post-
Kapp Munich. Being basically landless and, like the Bauer group, having little to lose, 
they were receptive to any plan, regardless of how fantastic, that promised the return of 
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their lands and status in the east. The extreme nature of the Rosenheim plan suited the 
equally extreme hopes and plans of the émigrés. In fact, the readiness of the Baltic 
Germans and the White Russians to commit to the plan would set the course for the next 
phase: to enlist the help of the Hungarian government. 
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Part III 
 
 
Establishment and Fall of the White International in Budapest 
 
 
Hungary was wracked by the shock of defeat and the collapse of the old order, 
by foreign invasion and the failure of a pro-Entente, liberal republic. The establishment 
of the Magyar Tanácsköztársaság (Hungarian Soviet Republic) that followed produced 
two self-exiled, counter-revolutionary communities: one in Vienna and one in French-
occupied Szeged. It will be shown that beyond their shared goal to sweep away the 
soviet regime, the two groups were internally too diverse in make-up and outlook either 
to form a cohesive, functioning body capable of any coordinated military 
countermeasures against the soviet regime or to take back the reins of power with any 
measure of facility once the Soviet Republic had fallen. It will also be demonstrated that 
the various groups, whether vying for influence with the government-in-exile or 
pursuing their own agendas independently of it, carried their factious nature into the 
post-soviet transitional stage and even into the Horthy Regency. 
From among these groups, General Ludendorff’s emissary Colonel Max Bauer 
was attracted to and found his greatest support from the ultra-nationalist group that 
tended to be anti-Semitic, anti-Habsburg and militant in its rhetoric. Conversely, 
Bauer’s detractors were mostly from the aristocratic, pro-Habsburg legitimist groups 
wherein one found traditional politicians and the scions of pre-war Hungary, generally 
well versed in the art of diplomacy and compromise, who would hold key ministerial 
positions in the Hungarian government.  
It is argued here that the new Hungarian National Army, under the nominal 
command of Admiral Horthy but recruited, organized and led by renegade detachment 
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commanders, was paramilitary in nature and, like its Einwohnerwehr counterpart in 
Bavaria, totally unsuited for the military role the Rosenheim plan had assigned it. 
It is further argued that despite claims in the historical literature to the contrary, 
after the failed Bolshevik experiment in 1919, Horthy exhibited an instinctive political 
acumen as he consolidated his position in the eyes of the Entente by assuming the title 
of Commander-in-Chief while distancing himself from the notorious renegade 
detachments and the legitimists that the Entente objected to. He was particularly 
effective in securing British acceptance and even a degree of political support, which 
lasted for most of the 1920s.1 Clearly, Horthy was fully aware that the creation of the 
new Hungarian state would only be possible by working closely with the Entente, who 
saw in him the best chance for any semblance of lasting stability in the southern flank of 
Central Europe. He had therefore made common cause with the Entente well before 
Bauer showed up with other ideas. This is not to say, however, that Horthy shied away 
from all military adventures. 
From the moment of the signing of the Treaty of Trianon in early June 1920, 
Hungary’s foreign policy centred on treaty revision. Horthy and his government were 
willing to pursue any avenue to that end. It is thus argued that Hungary played a double 
game: while secretly engaged in more traditional modes of diplomacy with Austria and 
the Entente, Horthy affirmed his commitment to Bauer’s plan—as fantastic and ill-
conceived as it was—as a contingency against the failure of diplomacy.  
In Chapters 14-17, the reasons for the ultimate foundering of the plan to create a 
White International are discussed. They include distrust between members; the refusal 
of key national leaders to recognize the authority of the White International; rank 
amateurism; a general growing awareness that chances to achieve national goals would 
be better met by working with the Entente, not defying it; and lastly, the lack of 
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solidarity within the Bauer group itself, evidenced by Ludendorff’s unwillingness to 
stand behind the plan that was conceived in his name. 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 12 
 
Background: Hungary from the Collapse of 1918 
to the Treaty of Trianon 
 
 
 
In the wake of Austria-Hungary’s collapse in October 1918, the Hungarian 
Democratic Republic was declared under the leadership of the liberal-progressive Count 
Mihály Károlyi.2 It was hoped by the people and the ‘Red Count’ himself that his earlier 
parliamentary opposition to the war and his embrace of a pro-Western, liberal approach 
would pave the way for favourable—or at least less objectionable—terms from the 
Entente at the Peace Conference due to open in January 1919.3  
The young republic was immediately beset with insurmountable difficulties. The 
lack of a viable military force, on account of its near abolition ordered by the pacifist 
Károlyi, invited an invasion of Transylvania by Romanian troops and of Slovakia by 
Czech troops—in direct contravention of armistice terms––who grabbed what they 
could in the hope of presenting a territorial fait accompli at the Peace Conference at 
Hungary’s expense. At the same time, fleeing Hungarians streamed into the heart of the 
country, increasing the burgeoning unemployment and severely taxing the means to 
feed the people.4 
Convinced that a new armistice under the auspices of French General Louis 
Franchet d’Esperey, then in occupation of southern Hungary, would forestall further 
incursions of Successor State troops into historic Hungary, and be more advantageous 
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than the rather lenient but now abrogated Armistice of Villa Giusti between the Entente 
and Austria-Hungary, Károlyi signed the Belgrade Armistice that proved instead to be 
much harsher. The first action of General d’Esperey through Lieutenant Colonel 
Ferdinand Vix of the French Military Mission, sent to Budapest to supervise the 
implementation of the Belgrade Armistice Agreement, was to convey to the Hungarian 
government the Entente demand to withdraw its troops from Slovakia that had been 
occupied by Czech troops.5 Meanwhile, Romanian troops occupied large areas of 
Transylvania that contained Hungary’s last remaining coalmines—the others already 
lost to Czech-controlled Slovakia. The result was that a very truncated Hungary’s future 
borders were determined even before the Peace Conference had begun.6 
Severe coal and food shortages in the dead of winter, runaway inflation and 
failed land reform—all these fuelled protests against the bungling Károlyi government 
instigated by conservative Count István Bethlen,7 who by February 1919 was 
considered the nominal leader of the counter-revolutionary opposition. 
As would later be the case in Vienna, Bethlen’s efforts to create a vital, united 
front from the disparate parties were frustrated due to the ideological positions of their 
leaders. Patriotic appeals at inter-party conferences to set differences aside produced 
vows of support for a united front solely from the liberal-conservative sections of the 
Party of National Work and the Hungarian Bourgeois Party.8 In late February 1919 
Bethlen decided to form a new party altogether. The resulting Party of National Unity 
(Nemzeti Egyesülés Pártja) had at its core unaffiliated, former conservative members of 
Parliament who would not join any of the post-war parties.9 In the opening address of 
the organizational meeting of the Party of National Unity only weeks before the 
Hungarian Soviet Republic was proclaimed, Bethlen did not speak of tactics or even an 
overarching goal but stressed the need for ‘nationalist’ interests over ‘class interests’ 
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through reconciling ‘democratic institutions with traditional institutions’;10 in other 
words, basic platitudes all could agree upon. 
For the purposes of this work, it is important to note the breadth of Bethlen’s 
reach in an effort to bring all counter-revolutionary groups under one umbrella. Besides 
working with moderates, he was also in contact with leaders of extreme right-wing 
organizations from whom Bauer would receive such enthusiastic support the following 
year. These included General Staff officer Captain Gyula Gömbös, who led an 
organization of discharged and active army officers called the Hungarian National 
Defence Union (Magyar Országos Véderő Egylet or MOVE), and Tibor Eckhardt, 
leader of the Union of Awakening Hungarians (Ébredő Magyarok Egyesülete or ÉME), 
both discussed in greater detail below. According to Gömbös’s memoirs, it was he who 
was dispatched by Bethlen to lay the groundwork for the establishment of a counter-
revolutionary committee in Vienna in the event of the Communists taking power in 
Hungary.11  
Meanwhile, Bethlen worked to undermine Károlyi’s standing with the Entente. 
He warned the French that the new cabinet appointed in February 1919 was a move in 
the direction of Bolshevism. Both the French Military Mission in Budapest and the Quai 
d’Orsay immediately accepted this. They were convinced that the contagion of 
Communism in Central Europe was a distinct possibility, especially given recent Red 
Army successes in the Russian Civil War.12 
Reacting to unfounded Romanian claims of an imminent Hungarian-Bolshevik 
Russian alliance, the Supreme Council of Four in Paris and the French government 
firmly in the hands of Clemençeau and Marshal Foch instructed Lieutenant Colonel 
Ferdinand Vix to inform the Károlyi government that Romanian troops were to be 
allowed to advance deeper into Hungary as far as the Szatmárnémeti-Nagykároly-
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Nagyvárad-Arad line.13 Having no other choice, on March 20, 1919, President Mihály 
Károlyi signed the Vix Note and promptly resigned. The Social Democrats, thinking of 
a possible approach to Bolshevik Russia in the light of the failed Western orientation, 
formed a coalition government with the Communists and proclaimed the Hungarian 
Soviet Republic under the direction of Foreign Minister Béla Kun.14 One day later, 
István Bethlen, along with close associates in the Party of National Unity, fled and set 
up a counter-revolutionary committee in Vienna where Gyula Gömbös had already 
made the necessary preparations.15 
The Hungarian Soviet Republic was short-lived but, defying the Vix Note, it 
made a genuine effort to evict the Czechoslovak Army from Slovakia and the Romanian 
Army from Transylvania.16 With virtually no army at Kun’s deposal due to Károlyi’s 
policy of demilitarizing Hungary in the hope of gaining Entente favour, a Red Army of 
young KuK officers and Budapest workers was hastily formed. They agreed to serve not 
because of any shared social values or political philosophies but as the only means 
available to maintain––or regain—Hungary’s territorial integrity and hopefully turn 
back the Entente-supported Romanian and Czech armies. Many of these same officers 
who survived the purges of the army would subsequently serve in Admiral Horthy’s 
Hungarian National Army with no less patriotic goals. There were some initial 
successes in Slovakia but Entente representatives in Paris were hostile to the idea of a 
‘red’ army warring against forces of the Entente-sponsored Successor States, and 
military reverses soon followed.17 By June and July mounting dissatisfaction amongst 
all classes with Bolshevik policy,18 and the initiation of a Red Terror of rogue 
revolutionary courts that resulted in the execution of hundreds suspected of counter-
revolutionary activities, cost Kun his popular support, especially in the countryside 
where promised land reform was not carried out.19 
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Thus both the pro-Entente approach of Károlyi’s Hungarian Democratic 
Republic and the Hungarian Soviet Republic of Béla Kun had been discredited. This 
was not lost on Bauer and accorded with his rejection of both the Entente and the 
Bolsheviks as panaceas for Central Europe’s woes.  
 
 
A.  Emergence of the Vienna-based Anti-Bolshevik Committee and the  
      Szeged Government-in-exile 
 
       
It is argued that beyond shared goals of destroying the Soviet Republic in 
Budapest, the radicalized, displaced nobility and the middle classes that made up the 
self-exiled groups in Vienna and Szeged were too factious, and the newly established 
Hungarian National Army and its detachments too inept, to launch an attack without 
significant foreign assistance. It is further argued that during the year of self-exile, two 
main factions developed: one would prove receptive to Bauer’s plan and the other 
obstructive. The ascendancy of the latter to a position of influence during the 
transitional period between Kun’s fall and Horthy’s election would ultimately prevail.  
Upon the declaration of the Hungarian Soviet Republic in Budapest in mid-
March, the so-called Anti-Bolshevik Committee (ABC) led by Count István Bethlen 
was founded in Vienna.20 Some two months later a second committee under the 
leadership of Count Gyula Károlyi21 set up a group in his home county of Arad in 
eastern Hungary, but owing to pressures from the Romanian Army relocated to French-
occupied Szeged in the south where on May 31 he proclaimed a Hungarian government-
in-exile with himself as prime minister. 
The two committees were different in make-up, due to the differences in their 
respective participants, but not necessarily antagonistic; they shared a broad set of 
political assumptions. However, in the Vienna-based ABC one found a greater number 
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of traditional, conservative statesmen who maintained a limited commitment to some 
liberal principles but often conflicted on matters of method. Within the ABC was also 
found the core of the pro-Habsburg movement. The Szeged group, on the other hand, 
was more militant in its rhetoric and methods. Many of its members embraced a strident 
anti-Semitism and were open to demagoguery, whilst some of the more radical elements 
were willing to employ violence and terror as political weapons, as had been used in the 
Baltic Campaign and within Germany proper.22 Szeged, too, was where Admiral Miklós 
Horthy would build his new Hungarian National Army that Colonel Bauer saw as ideal 
to the needs of his White International. 
Importantly, both the ABC and the Szeged group suffered from irreconcilable 
internal divisions. Aside from the overarching consensus shared by both that the Kun 
government must be swept away, factions, especially within the ABC, could not agree 
on method or the nature of the Hungary that would follow. In the end neither group 
‘swept’ the Hungarian soviet away; it dissolved of its own accord. What is noteworthy 
here is that the conflicting nature of the various groups endured into the transitional 
post-Kun period of late 1919 and into the early days of the Horthy regime.  
The Vienna-based ABC comprised the cream of Budapest business interests 
including Jewish bankers, high-ranking officers and traditional statesmen of long 
standing. The largest single group consisted of aristocratic refugees who had fled their 
vast estates in advance of the Romanian, Czechoslovak and Yugoslav armies, and 
Hungary itself when the Hungarian soviet was proclaimed. In all, nearly 100,000 
Hungarians flooded into Vienna alone including ten to fifteen thousand officers 
radicalized by the loss of land and status. The bulk of these were from the middle and 
upper classes, of which royalist aristocratic officers of the old Habsburg Dual Monarchy 
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were the most apparent.23 Because one of Bauer’s greatest challenges would be with the 
legitimists, a closer look is warranted.  
According to fellow ABC participant and future Hungarian Minister in Vienna 
Gusztáv Gratz,24 the ABC encompassed two basic and often contentious groups. The 
first was composed of the founders of Bethlen’s Party of National Unity who were 
mostly from the east and south-east. They tended to be Protestant, patriotic and 
demonstratively anti-Semitic. They rallied around Count István Bethlen, an anti-liberal 
of the old school with legitimist tendencies, and Count Pál Teleki,25 both from ancient 
and respected noble Transylvanian families whose lands were now in Romanian hands. 
Others of note were Count Igmándy-Hegyessy Géza; three counts of the ancient Zichy 
family, János, Géza and Aladár, who had lost estates ceded to Czechoslovakia; and 
Gusztáv Gratz himself. According to Bethlen’s biographer Ignác Romsics, Captain 
Gyula Gömbös was included within this group.26 
The larger second group was heavily made up of the aristocratic, émigré great 
estate owners who stood strongly within the pro-Habsburg, legitimist circles. They 
tended to be from Transdanubia, particularly the western counties of Vas, Sopron and 
Zala, and from northern areas now lost to Slovakia. They were Catholic and 
cosmopolitan, mingling freely with Austrians and often having estates in more than one 
country. They included such magnates as Margrave György Pallavicini of the 
Constitutional Party from central Hungary,27 Count Gyula Andrássy the Younger28 and, 
like the other group, prominent members of the noble Zichy family. From western 
Hungary were Count Antal Sigray,29 Count Zsigmond Batthyány and powerful 
members of the middle class such as György Szmrecsányi of the People’s Party30 and 
Ödön Beniczky.31  
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Generally speaking, ABC participants were more circumspect and less violent 
then their Szeged counterparts. It would be a mistake to consider them all so, however, 
especially among the more militant, younger aristocratic legitimists. Several examples 
serve to illustrate this. Against Bethlen’s wishes, György Szmrecsányi and Count 
Pallavicini organized a robbery of some 150-160 million crowns from the Hungarian 
Legation in Vienna. A portion of it was used to finance an abortive, comic-opera 
attempt at a military breakthrough in the Austrian border town of Bruck.32 In another 
example, Count Antal Sigray instructed ardent legitimist Baron Antal Lehár to form a 
legitimist, counter-revolutionary centre in Graz, which he did. There Szmrecsányi 
joined him in June, following disagreements between rival legitimist camps in Vienna, 
and brought sufficient funds taken in the robbery to purchase weapons and materiel for 
another invasion attempt of West Hungary that, however, never took place. Still, the 
‘Graz Command’ did become the headquarters for orchestrating attempts to restore the 
Habsburg Károly IV to the throne of Hungary.33 Finally, the aristocratic legitimist 
Count Ostenburg34 was just as notorious as Pál Prónay and Iván Héjjas when it came to 
atrocities meted out to anyone suspected of collusion with the Communists. It was these 
Transdanubian radicalized, aristocratic legitimists that would later obstruct Bauer at 
every turn. 
 On the recommendation of Count Bethlen of the Vienna group, Count Gyula 
Károlyi founded the Hungarian government-in-exile in Szeged and invited the closest 
thing Hungary had to a war hero, Admiral Horthy, to accept the portfolio of Minister of 
National Defence and to act as fővezér (Commander-in-Chief) of the yet to be 
established Hungarian National ‘White’ Army to rid Hungary of the Bolsheviks.35 
One of the fatal flaws in Bauer’s plan to create a White International was his 
unshaken belief that paramilitary units would triumph over the more disciplined state 
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armies of the Successor States and, if put to the test, over Entente forces. A key 
component in Bauer’s scheme was the role the essentially paramilitary Hungarian 
National Army was to play, which therefore needs to be examined in more detail here.  
Horthy’s army was overwhelmingly made up of young officers in their twenties 
drawn from the lower gentry. Like their German Freikorps counterparts, they had gone 
through an intense post-war period of radicalization. This radicalism born of 
displacement was not unlike that found among the Baltic German and Russian émigré 
officers Bauer worked with in Munich.36 Of the mere 6,570 volunteers who heeded 
Horthy’s call, more than half were either former infantry or cavalry officers, or officers 
of the gendarmerie.37 The separate paramilitary ‘detachments’ also attracted displaced 
and disgruntled Hungarian citizens who had lost their positions with the railways, 
utilities and other institutions that once belonged to the Hungarian state and were now 
in the hands of the Successor States.  
According to Mária Ormos, the Hungarian National Army was really no national 
army in any sense. It was basically an amalgam of individual detachments recognizing 
no hierarchy beyond their respective commanders.38 Besides the wartime experiences of 
many of the officers, it was untested in any form of disciplined field combat; the same 
applied to the so-called special detachments. The army was without any real structure, 
ranks or even weapons, the latter due to conditions insisted upon by the French.39 This 
organization—or lack thereof—was typical of Central European paramilitary forces 
such as the Austrian Heimwehr and the Bavarian Einwohnerwehr. Though it is true that 
Admiral Horthy was the main cohesive force of the army, he did not organize it nor did 
his Deputy Minister of National Defence, Gyula Gömbös, as Thomas Sakmyster 
holds.40 This was the work of field officers who were often leaders of the semi-
independent ‘special detachments’ such as that under Lieutenant Colonel Pál Prónay. 
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Other historians challenge this assessment. In Robert Gerwarth’s article on 
transnational cooperation, he correctly identifies the pervasiveness of paramilitary 
activity throughout the vanquished nations. He argues, however, that the Hungarian 
Army and paramilitary units were much more structured and capable of maintaining a 
vibrant network of information and active cooperation across borders that ‘contributed 
to the creation of a transnational zone of paramilitary violence’.41 Thomas Lorman 
agrees with Ormos about the lack of any real hierarchical structure and restraint in the 
Hungarian Army that, like the detachments, regularly conducted independent 
‘liberations’ on its own authority as late as 1923, despite attempts by the civilian 
government to curtail such paramilitary actions.42 
Béla Bodó counters rather weakly in his 2006 article ‘Militia Violence and State 
Power in Hungary, 1919-1922’ that since neither Prónay, Héjjas nor Lehár and their 
paramilitary detachments joined the National Army, Hungary was not a ‘paramilitary 
state’.43 He goes as far as to reason that because the detachment leaders never entered 
the National Army, there was no link between them and the army—thus no link 
between the White Terror and the state.44 This is echoed in his 2010 article ‘Hungarian 
Aristocracy and the White Terror’, wherein he asserts that the detachments were entities 
unto themselves of mostly radical right aristocrats that did not enter the National 
Army.45  
Ormos argues that in any case, whatever Horthy may have thought about the 
excesses of the detachments, their dissolution during the Szeged period and 
immediately thereafter would have resulted ‘in the evaporation of his National Army’.46  
Thus a mutualism existed whereby Horthy needed to allow a large measure of 
independence to both the detachments and the leaders within the Hungarian Army if he 
hoped to have an army at all; and the detachments themselves needed the authoritative 
 166 
 
patronage that only Commander-in-Chief Horthy could offer in order to carry out their 
terrorist activities. This would imply that, contrary to the historical interpretations of 
some, Hungary could be seen as a paramilitary state.47 This further shows that the 
renegade and uncontrollable Hungarian forces were no more suitable for the job Bauer 
would assign them than the docile, untested rural Bavarian Einwohnerwehr.  
At Szeged one also found the aforementioned leaders of ultra-nationalist 
associations who, at least until the establishment of the Regency in March 1920, had 
some influence on Horthy. Many of these same extreme right leaders would make up 
the so-called Hungarian Supreme Committee of Bauer’s White International established 
in May 1920.  
The first of these was Tibor Eckhardt who in 1917 had founded the nationalist 
organization ÉME to which many leading political and military persons belonged. At its 
inception the organization was shaped by officers and soldiers discharged during the 
war. The initial aim of ÉME was to maintain the pre-war borders of Hungary. With the 
proclamation of Károlyi’s Hungarian Democratic Republic in November 1918, 
however, the organization became the epicentre of the Hungarian counter-revolution 
that later found its most violent expression against the remnants of the Kun regime. 
ÉME proudly declared itself to be anti-democratic, anti-socialist and anti-Semitic, and 
adhered to a stridently völkisch programme based on Magyarság (‘Hungarianness’)—an 
obvious parallel to Deutschtum and the sentiments taking root at that time in Germany. 
From 1919 until 1921, when it was formally banned, ÉME chiefly comprised high-
ranking officials and ex-officers who saw themselves as the standard-bearers of the 
Hungarian counter-revolutionary movement.48 
Eckhardt’s contact with the Bavarian right was alluded to in his autobiography 
wherein he stated that Hungary, surrounded on the east, north and south by the new 
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hostile Successor States and ‘isolated by Marxist [sic] Austria from the West, was 
desperately in need of a friend’.49 He was thus commissioned by Regent Horthy in May 
1920 to meet with Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria, who informed him that ‘the 
secret plan, in which the Hungarian Regent took great interest, had to be dropped.’50 
The nature of the ‘secret plan’ was not explained, but we know from Eckhardt’s 
recollections that it included an attempt for a Wittelsbach restoration to the throne of 
Bavaria in the name of the Crown Prince and that French Premier Clemençeau had 
rejected the idea.51 The importance lies in that Tibor Eckhardt, officially representing 
the Hungarian government, was in communication with the Bavarian radical right at the 
very time that Bauer and Trebitsch were seeking Hungarian cooperation. Although ÉME 
is said to have been the most bloodthirsty of the patriotic associations, its influence was 
rather limited and it never developed into the kind of organization that included a large 
number of state policy-makers, as was the case with MOVE.  
Because of its similarities to the Berlin-based, pre-Kapp NV wherein Ludendorff 
and Bauer played such leading roles, and because its founder and leader would 
subsequently be Bauer’s main link with Horthy, a closer look at MOVE is appropriate.  
Originally designed during the last years of the Habsburg era to defend 
Hungary’s (not Austria-Hungary’s) national integrity and social stability,52 it was 
transformed and reinvigorated into an anti-legitimist, rabidly anti-Semitic, ultra-
reactionary organization when ex-General Staff officer Captain Gyula Gömbös was 
elected MOVE president in January 1919.53 A natural organizer in much the same way 
as was Georg Escherich in Bavaria, Gömbös established covert societies couched within 
the more overt, public organization. Two such secret societies, one military and one 
civilian, functioned as the inner forces of MOVE.54 Associated with MOVE, among 
other right-wing, patriotic associations, was the Christian National League (Keretsztény 
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Nemzeti Liga), a secret society within the league ‘Resurrection’ (Feltámadás), which 
was led by 50 ‘Battle Leaders’ made up of many prominent individuals, including the 
influential diplomat Kálmán Kánya and future prime ministers such as Bethlen, Teleki 
and László Bárdossy, as well as important bishops.55 
This loose affiliation of patriotic associations amounted to an enormous 
nationwide network covering virtually every interest group. They were often 
encouraged and even clandestinely subsidized by members of the government and 
became the chief vehicle for the spread of nationalist revisionism, irredentism and anti-
Semitism. Consequently, Gömbös through MOVE and its affiliations, was in a powerful 
position to influence matters of state.56 Hungarian-American historian Nagy-Talavera 
argued along similar lines, characterizing Gömbös as ‘the most significant figure among 
the Szeged men’.57 
With the fall of the Károlyi government in March 1919 and MOVE officially 
dissolved, Gömbös fled to the Vienna headquarters of the émigré political right where 
he wrote newspaper articles against the Bolshevik regime in Budapest. After the fall of 
Kun in August 1919, Gömbös returned to Budapest and continued where he had left off 
with a resuscitated MOVE.58 
The historical assessment of Gömbös has changed somewhat since the fall of 
Central European Communism in the early 1990s.59 He is no longer regarded as the 
proto-fascist, arch-enemy of such conservatives as Teleki and Bethlen. The links 
between the moderates and the radicals remained fairly close throughout the interwar 
years, and the hostility between the moderates in Vienna and the Szeged group was 
grossly exaggerated in the Cold War historiography.60 Gömbös along with Eckhardt and 
Miklós Kozma would later become deputies of the Smallholders’ Party in the Lower 
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House of Parliament and Gömbös, from 1922 on, a member of Bethlen’s Party of 
National Unity.  
Gömbös is credited with a number of firsts within the sphere of proto-fascists, 
such as coining the terms ‘national socialism’ and ‘Rome-Berlin Axis’. More to the 
point, in a speech to the Lower House of Parliament, he advised his counter-
revolutionary fellows of the need to form a ‘Nationalist International’ for the purpose of 
collectively battling against the ‘gold international’ (Jewish-dominated capitalism) and 
the Moscow international.61  
Eventually expelled from Szeged by the French due to his radical activities, 
Gömbös continued to work with the government-in-exile.62 By the time the Bauer group 
arrived in Budapest in May 1920, Gömbös was serving as State Secretary and would 
continue to be a confidential adviser to Regent Horthy. 
Another individual who is counted among the early radical right organizers was 
Miklós Kozma. In late 1918 he was a leader of a small group of officers when, it is 
surmised, he met Gömbös in November 1918.63 Kozma was a staunch supporter of 
MOVE and spent his energy promoting it nationwide until its ban in February 1919. He 
was subsequently to reach Szeged and, with Horthy’s help, be named for an intelligence 
post in the government-in-exile in June. His task was to establish a network of 
communication between counter-revolutionary groups at home and abroad, and bring 
them all under the leadership of the Ministry of Defence.64 After the fall of the 
Bolshevik regime, he organized an intelligence and counter-intelligence service, first in 
Szeged then in Siófok and Budapest, until March 1920. He was also involved with the 
more unsavoury types such as Pál Prónay in capturing and ‘kidnapping’ former 
members of the Communist government who had fled to Vienna.65 
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Later Kozma would play an active role in Horthy’s government as head of the 
Hungarian Telegraph Agency (Magyar Távirati Iroda) and become an active member of 
the Smallholders’ Party with Eckhardt and Gömbös.66 The three men were all friends 
and would remain important advisers to Admiral Horthy.67 The significance for this 
work lies in that Kozma’s papers and diary, housed in the Hungarian State Archives, 
now serve as one of the very few glimpses accorded the historian into Bauer’s dealings 
with the Hungarian government during the summer of 1920. 
Certainly the most notorious individual within the Szeged group—but to some 
extent acting independently of Gömbös and Eckhardt and their organizations—was 
Lieutenant Colonel Pál Prónay, a most virulent anti-Semite who displayed a 
pathological lust for torture and murder in inventive ways.68 Prónay, who became a 
‘Battle Leader’ in Eckhardt’s ÉME in 1919, had more in common with the likes of 
Freikorpskämpfer Major Stephani than with Gömbös or Eckhardt.69 He formed both 
Admiral Horthy’s personal bodyguard at Szeged and a partisan militia known as the 
White Guard. Though officially part of Horthy’s new National Army, Lieutenant 
Colonel Prónay’s detachment conducted a self-initiated, two-year White Terror 
campaign of reprisals against Jews, Social Democrats or anyone else deemed to have 
anything to do with the Soviet Republic of Hungary.70 With Kun’s fall in August, the 
atrocities only intensified as the National Army—with Prónay’s detachment as its 
vanguard—moved north and some months afterwards entered Budapest. Prónay had 
wished to stage a city-wide pogrom but was prohibited by Horthy.71 This man of action, 
whose legendary cruelty and visceral hatred of all that was liberal and democratic, 
eventually became an embarrassment to Horthy’s new conservative regime.72 
According to Bauer’s personal secretary who accompanied him to Budapest, Prónay 
was to become the closest of all the Hungarians to the Bauer group.73  
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The Szeged government-in-exile was unable to realize its goals for two reasons. 
Firstly, the French never recognized its validity and refused any Entente co-intervention 
against Kun. In response to French Command criticism that its leaders were too 
reactionary, Premier Gyula Károlyi resigned in mid-July in favour of Dezső Ábrahám, 
who had served in the pre-Kun government of Count Mihály Károlyi, hoping, in vain, to 
put a more democratic face on the administration. Secondly, like the ABC, the Szeged 
government-in-exile was neither unified nor unifying. It was condemned by officers 
who wished to form a dictatorship under Horthy, and by bourgeois liberal civilians who 
were unable to sway Horthy to their intentions.74 On August 19 the Ábrahám political 
administration dissolved itself without a successor, basically leaving Horthy with a 
Hungarian National Army but no government. 
In sum, the counter-revolutionary committees in Szeged and Vienna both failed 
in their avowed aims. They could no more convince the Entente to intervene on their 
behalf than they could take action themselves against the Kun regime, save for such 
foolhardy fiascos as the Bruck venture. Also, the two committees were plagued by 
diverse groups vying for control, so preventing any kind of unanimity of purpose, which 
would echo in the post-Kun era and the early Horthy Regency. 
Although the extreme nationalist organizations ÉME and MOVE, and their far-
reaching networks, could serve Bauer well were they put at his disposal, the 
undisciplined, rogue, militarily untested paramilitary forces that were associated with 
them were little different from their counterparts in the Baltic and Bavaria. These ‘elite 
detachments’ engaged in gang-style beatings, kidnappings, robbery, extortion and 
outright murder. Though the Prónay detachment had the worst reputation for violence, it 
was representative of the detachment mentality in general.75 
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B.  Transition: From the Fall of the Hungarian Soviet Republic to the Regency, 
      August 1919 until March 1920 
 
 
 The transitional period serves to illustrate both the influence of the various 
groups on the Horthy leadership and the nature of the leadership itself. As for the first 
consideration, according to Mócsy,76 after the fall of the Hungarian Soviet Republic it 
was simply a matter of which royalist group of two would emerge as the most powerful: 
the Szeged-based, free-elector, anti-Habsburg group with which Bauer would find 
support, or the Vienna-based aristocratic pro-Habsburg legitimist group whose estates 
now lay outside Hungarian control. It became clear that though the Entente would not 
allow the return of a Habsburg as head of state, the noble legitimists would slowly be 
brought into the Friedrich and Huszár provisional governments that ushered in the 
Horthy Regency, thus placing Bauer’s legitimist detractors in positions of more direct 
influence over Horthy. 
As for the nature of the leadership itself, Horthy has often been cast as 
Sakmyster portrays him: an upright gentleman and national symbol, but at the same 
time an incoherent babbler and intellectual lightweight easily manipulated by the 
leaders of the detachments throughout the early days of his Regency. Further, 
Sakmyster depicts both Gyula Gömbös and Pál Prónay as supremely ruthless, sadistic 
paramilitary leaders who, as Horthy’s closest advisers, relentlessly steered the malleable 
Commander-in-Chief in the direction of establishing a military dictatorship.77 
As shown below, Ormos correctly argues that after Szeged Horthy was far from 
being an intellectual lightweight, revealing an instinctive political acumen and, though 
the detachments were still useful, gradually weaning himself off them as he pursued a 
more moderate course in the interest of creating a state acceptable to the Entente.78 
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 Admiral Horthy as Commander of the Hungarian National Army disassociated 
himself from the Szeged government-in-exile even before it ceased to exist in August 
1919. He bided his time as the six-day social-democratic government of Gyula Peidl, 
which held office just long enough to repeal most of the legislation passed by the 
Hungarian Soviet Republic, was followed by a coup d’état that forced Peidl to accept 
Archduke Joseph von Habsburg as Regent who, in turn, appointed István Friedrich of 
the Christian National Unity Party as the new Prime Minister. It was at this point that 
Horthy began a series of moves that seven months later would see him installed as Head 
of State.79 
Having divested himself of the office of Minister of National Defence with the 
Szeged government, and recognizing neither the Peidl nor the Friedrich governments, 
Horthy first managed to convince ‘Homo Regius’ Archduke Joseph von Habsburg to 
recognize him as Commander-in-Chief. This legalized Horthy’s position somewhat in 
this very fluid political environment.80  
 Commander-in-Chief Horthy next needed to negotiate with the other armies 
operating within Hungary. Completely on his own authority, he secured permission 
from the Romanian Command in Budapest to occupy areas of north-west and south-
west Transdanubia where he set up his headquarters in the north-central city of Siófok. 
Meanwhile, legitimist Colonel Antal Lehár’s Graz Command had quickly moved east 
over the Austrian border into Hungary as soon as Kun fell and now controlled the 
western counties of Sopron, Vas and Zala.81 Horthy was also able to secure Colonel 
Lehár’s formal recognition of him as Commander-in-Chief, with Lehár to continue his 
own military activities under the auspices of fellow legitimist and patron Count Antal 
Sigray. 
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Horthy knew full well that the Entente and the Successor States would never 
allow the return of a Habsburg. For that reason, he began to distance himself from 
legitimists such as Lehár, whose position declined in the eyes of the Entente as his own 
correspondingly rose. Upon the withdrawal of the Romanian forces from the 
countryside, Horthy occupied the rest of Transdanubia with the Entente’s blessing. 
Preferring their support rather than their enmity, Horthy wisely did not exclude 
the legitimists from the process of state-building. Once the Romanian Army had 
withdrawn from the capital, Horthy and British High Commissioner Sir George Clerk—
sent by the Council of Ambassadors in Paris to midwife the establishment of a new 
Hungarian state—arranged for the same Colonel Lehár to have the honour of entering 
Budapest with the National Army on November 14. Horthy made his own ceremonial 
entry two days later.82  
 Meanwhile, the Entente continued to withhold official recognition of the 
Friedrich government even as the Prime Minister repeatedly reshuffled his cabinet to 
suit the former.83 These constant changes, however, inadvertently laid the cornerstone 
of the right-wing coalition that would ultimately rule Hungary for a decade. At the 
beginning of September Friedrich began filling posts with the ABC legitimist radicals 
and conservative supporters of the aristocracy once they started returning from 
Vienna.84 Ödön Beniczky became Minister of the Interior and thus controlled the 
police; to Count József Somssich, a wealthy aristocrat, went the portfolio of Foreign 
Minister; and Gyula Rubinek, leader of the powerful Association of Hungarian Great 
Estate Owners, was named Minister of Agriculture. In Friedrich’s last government, 
ABC returnees held nine of sixteen posts.85 The nature of Friedrich’s cabinet resulted in 
an alliance of the rightist, conservative parties of the Christian bloc that would govern 
Hungary for years. The Christian National Unity Party was strongly backed by such 
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magnates as Count Gyula Andrássy, the Zichy family and Count Albert Apponyi, not to 
mention Bethlen and Teleki, the latter much more ardent a legitimist than the wily 
Bethlen who tended to indulge Horthy’s ambitions.86 In short, the political machinery of 
the legitimist-leaning Christian National Unity Party that would do so much to derail 
Bauer’s plans had been established. 
Hungary and the Entente were anxious to build a legitimate government so that 
the economic blockade could be lifted and a peace treaty be concluded. To that end, the 
Clerk Mission insisted that a provisional government be formed that would later 
conduct democratic elections. Friedrich appointed Károly Huszár, a relatively unknown 
politician, as provisional Prime Minister. Both these men were among the contacts 
Trebitsch would make on his pre-Kapp Putsch visits to Budapest in late 1919 and early 
1920. Bauer would be seemingly oblivious of the fact that neither man was considered 
influential enough to have Horthy’s ear. 
The next task of the Clerk Mission was to oversee the creation of a provisional 
Head of State. According to Sakmyster, Gyula Gömbös and Director of Military 
Intelligence Miklós Kozma fed Horthy exaggerated or inaccurate reports of an 
impending Communist coup d’état in Austria to point the ‘impressionable Horthy’ in 
the direction of establishing a military dictatorship.87 While it is true that Horthy saw 
the Huszár government as inept, he also knew that regardless of how appealing the 
creation of a military dictatorship might be, the Entente would never allow it. This soon 
became a moot point when the first British Minister in Budapest, Sir Thomas Hohler, an 
old naval acquaintance of Horthy’s, backed the idea of Horthy as a candidate for the 
office of Head of State. The National Assembly thus overwhelmingly elected Admiral 
Horthy as ‘Provisional Regent’ in March 1920, an office he held for the next 24 years. 
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Not everybody supported Horthy’s election. A brief examination of those groups 
in opposition helps to define their relative positions in the new regime. The most 
obvious were the aforementioned Social Democrats and Liberals—thoroughly without 
any influence in the government and, due to lingering intimidation from the various 
detachments, unable to seek redress. 
 A more immediate threat to Horthy came from the strong legitimist wing of the 
traditional conservatives in the Christian National Unity Party.88 Horthy’s close 
relations with free-elector, anti-Habsburg Gömbös and various detachment leaders made 
the legitimists wonder just how much Horthy as Regent of the Kingdom of Hungary 
was committed to a restoration.89 
Conservative traditionalists such as Counts Bethlen, Teleki, Apponyi and 
Andrássy who supported Horthy’s candidacy also had concerns about a military 
commander as Head of State and could only soothe their anxieties by telling themselves 
that once in, Horthy could be controlled, his army tamed and the atrocities of the 
detachments ended.90 Interestingly, Sakmyster notes that Colonel Lehár, ‘who had been 
revolted by the excesses of the “White Terror,” rejoiced over Horthy’s election 
[thinking now] the special detachments would be curbed’.91 In more recent sources, 
Lehár has been roundly implicated as a contributor to the White Terror, putting in doubt 
his role as a ‘revolted’ observer.92  
 There were also those who were hopeful that Horthy as Regent would address 
their respective agendas. The legitimists saw the title of ‘Regent’ as a symbol of 
historical continuity, and a cautious first step towards the return of the exiled Habsburg 
King Károly IV after the signing of the Peace Treaty. The free-elector faction, like 
Horthy, was fully aware that the Entente would not entertain a Habsburg on the throne 
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and hoped that Horthy, as Regent, would next arrange for the election of a king with no 
ties to the former Empire. 
Meanwhile, Huszár resigned, according to the requirements of his provisional 
status, and Horthy invited Sándor Simonyi-Semadam to form a government as the new 
Prime Minister. On April 14 Horthy’s respected friend Count Pál Teleki became 
Foreign Minister, which brought a decidedly liberal-conservative hue to the 
government.  
  
 
Chapter 13 
Negotiations with the Hungarians and Further Development of the 
White International Plot 
 
  
The Hungarian government was facing the imminent signing of the Trianon 
Treaty that would truncate Hungary to its ethnic core. Indeed, the signing of the diktat 
from the Grand Trianon Palace in Paris on June 4, 1920, would reduce the land holdings 
of Hungary more than those of any other defeated power from World War I. Within 
weeks of Bauer and Trebitsch’s arrival in Budapest, the former kingdom stood to lose 
67.3% of its territory (including Croatia), 32.5% of its ethnic Hungarians, access to the 
sea and half of its larger cities.93 There would also exist an increasingly irredentist 
nationalism in large portions of Romania, Slovakia and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats 
and Slovenes; and a border dispute over Burgenland on the Austrian-Hungarian border 
with what was deemed the ‘revolutionary, left-wing government’ of Karl Renner’s 
Republic of Austria. To a large degree the cordiality extended to Bauer and the 
Ludendorff group showed a desperate Horthy grasping at straws, ready to consider any 
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means possible whether diplomatic or military, if not to thwart the inevitable treaty, at 
least to see it revised. 
 
 
A.  Favourable Reception of the Bauer Group in Budapest 
 
On May 15 Colonel Max Bauer, Ignatius Trebitsch-Lincoln and Luise Engeler 
arrived in Budapest by steamer from Vienna. They were warmly greeted at the landing 
place by a certain Baron Kovács and immediately lodged in the luxurious Hotel 
Pannonia under their new Hungarian passport identities of Dr Bürger and Dr Tibor 
Lehotzky respectively, obtained for them by the Hungarian Minister in Vienna, Gusztáv 
Gratz.94 
The next day a series of meetings ensued headed up by Colonel Bauer and 
Trebitsch, and leading Hungarian officials.95 The group met with Pál Prónay, Tibor 
Eckhardt and Gyula Gömbös at the Hotel Pannonia. Gömbös received Bauer’s plan with 
enthusiasm and promptly arranged for Bauer to be presented to Regent Horthy on May 
18.96 In his memoirs, Prónay praised Colonel Bauer for his intelligence and 
organizational skills, but thought him gullible for ‘trusting the Jew Trebitsch-Lincoln’.97 
Prónay also noted that Bauer and his group wanted to create an ‘international, anti-
Bolshevik, anti-Semitic alliance’.98 
Two days later Bauer handed Admiral Horthy a letter of introduction given to him 
by General Ludendorff that outlined the basic tenets of the Rosenheim plan to form a 
White International.99 Bauer pointed out to Horthy the great opportunity at hand for 
Hungary to win back its former national borders. He went on to explain the problems 
involved in organizing and financing such an undertaking against both the Bolshevists 
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and the Entente, and added that due to the presence of the Inter-Allied Military Control 
Commission in the capitals of the defeated powers—including Budapest—any open 
work along the lines indicated in the plan was out of the question. Bauer therefore 
suggested the formation of a secret committee within which the three most important 
groups (or ‘Supreme Committees’) could work unmolested. These three groups were to 
be the ‘German Supreme Committee’ made up of Colonel Max Bauer, Trebitsch-
Lincoln, Major Franz von Stephani (who was soon to join the two in Budapest) and 
representatives of the Bavarian-based Orgesch; the ‘Russian Supreme Committee’ 
comprising representatives of the Berlin and Munich émigré communities of White 
Russians around General Vasili Biskupsky; and the ‘Hungarian Supreme Committee’. 
Bauer proceeded to clarify that the financial burden would be eased by the production of 
counterfeit Russian Duma roubles, as trialled in the Bermondt-Avalov scheme during 
the Baltic Campaign the year before.100 Horthy promised to give his answer concerning 
Hungarian participation at a later time.101 
During the last half of May 1920, interest in the Germans had grown within the 
official circles of the Hungarian capital. Some days after the Horthy audience, Bauer 
and Trebitsch were received by the Chief of the General Staff, Count Béla Berzeviczy, 
whose feigned curiosity about the Rosenheim plan betrayed a hidden agenda, for he 
represented the Habsburg legitimists and saw in Bauer’s plan a possible obstacle to the 
restoration of King Károly to the throne of St Stephen.102 Thus within days of their 
arrival in Budapest, the Bauer group had encountered both their most enthusiastic 
supporters, found in the Szeged Prónay-Eckhardt-Gömbös trio, and their ultimately 
victorious detractors amongst the legitimist aristocratic statesmen. 
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B.  The May 26 Memorandum: ‘Liquidation of all Revolutionary Elements’ 
 
 
Heartened by the vague but promising audience with Regent Horthy, Colonel 
Bauer and Trebitsch, joined by Major Stephani who had since arrived from Munich, 
embarked on a series of meetings with their Hungarian counterparts, headed up by 
Eckhardt, Gömbös and Prónay, to work out the details along organizational, financial 
and political lines. The Rosenheim plan was greatly broadened to include the 
cooperation of all the old wartime Central Powers and any group who might, for any 
reason, stand against Bolshevism and the nations of the Entente. The resulting 
document referred to in Bauer’s papers as the ‘May 26 memorandum’ was, thus, the 
furthest expression of interwar transnational conspiracies. This can only be appreciated 
by recital in extenso here. A cautionary note should be added: the general consensus 
among historians is that the actual memorandum was likely drafted by Trebitsch but 
initiated by Bauer with his characteristic ‘B’ as a mark of his approval. 
The memorandum first named the key German, Hungarian and Russian 
representatives from their respective Supreme Committees to form a Central Committee 
whose task was made clear by the heading of the document: ‘Liquidation of all 
Revolutionary Elements’ (Beseitigung aller Umsturzelemente). 
This refined and more detailed version of the plan was even more fantastic than 
the original drafted in Rosenheim. It called for a simultaneous revolt of Irish 
revolutionaries and Arab nationalists with the idea that while the English were busy in 
Ireland, and the French with their mandate in the Near East, the plan would be initiated 
in Central Europe.103 Meanwhile, Hungary was to close its borders and stand in 
readiness for eventualities, should they arise.104 Nationalist organizations in the separate 
member countries were to subordinate their activities to German leadership (presumably 
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through Orgesch) with its central base in Budapest from where all actions would be 
coordinated. Next, German and Hungarian forces were to support General Biskupsky in 
the liberation of Russia from Bolshevism. Finally, upon success in the east, Germany 
and Hungary would turn westwards and engage the armies of the Entente who would be 
caught unawares. 
The resulting map would contain only four powerful states in Central and 
Eastern Europe. Firstly, a Greater Germany would stretch from the English Channel and 
the western frontier of Alsace-Lorraine in the west to include West Prussia and 
Bohemia in the east. The north-south dimensions were to be from the southern border of 
Denmark up to and including German-Austria in the south. Secondly, in the south-west 
would lie a Greater Hungary that would include Burgenland in the west and extend to 
the Black Sea105 and from Slovakia’s northern border to Croatia. Thirdly, a Greater 
Bulgaria would encompass Romanian Dobrudja, Turkish Thrace, northern Albania and 
Serbia. Fourthly, Russia would regain its pre-1914 borders and, as compensation for 
relinquishing its pre-war pan-slavism, be given a free hand in the Dardanelles and 
northern Persia.106 
The separate countries were to finance their activities themselves but would be 
supported by the Central Committee who, through the efforts of the White Russian 
representatives in Hungary (Biskupsky et al.), would produce counterfeit Russian Duma 
roubles at that time still considered legal tender.107 The memorandum also put special 
emphasis on the importance of a unified press service (Trebitsch had served as ‘Press 
Agent’ for the short-lived Kapp government). It was further decided that representatives 
from all the important nations involved in the plot would meet once weekly, when they 
would have an open opportunity to report on activities and make requests as needed. 
Section I closed with notice that all collaborators must swear an oath of loyalty––any 
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breach of which was to be answered by death. This was an interesting stipulation given 
the betrayal of the White International by Trebitsch himself early that autumn.  
Section II concerned preparations for eventual war against the Entente. Bauer 
stated that each of the participating nations must renew their respective military forces 
so as to thwart any interference of the Entente with ‘our liquidation of all revolutionary 
elements [and] … our efforts to compel the annulment of the so-called “Peace 
Treaties”’.108 The description of military preparations continued:  
1) The organization of the separate armed forces is to be the responsibility of the 
nations concerned. Germany is to concern itself with the organization and 
coordination of the training of officers to be sent to the individual participating 
countries. 
2) Germany is to be charged with the purchase of weapons and ammunition 
from German representatives [which should be] distributed according to need.109 
The procurement of weapons is to be initiated as soon as possible. 
3) In the event weapons cannot be delivered from Germany or the individual 
countries are unable to procure them themselves, Germany is to arrange the 
necessary machines, raw material and personnel for the manufacture of new 
weapons [presumably in Hungary].110 
 
Section III outlined the economic and political concerns, and charged the 
Hungarian government with providing ‘produce, livestock, wine and so forth’ for export 
from surplus stock—a crucial consideration in the event that the Entente decided to 
renew the blockade against Germany. The exports themselves were to be controlled by 
an undesignated German-Hungarian private company through which the secret 
distribution of foodstuffs to the individual forces would be carried out. 
The placement of troops within Hungary was to include the settlement of 
Freikorps and Einwohnerwehr personnel conducted by German and Hungarian 
representatives, who had been chosen by the Central Committee, posing as a civilian 
immigration agency. The ‘settlers’ would come over the borders as civilian workers, be 
given residence permits by the Hungarian government and gather in specific locations 
awaiting their deployment. This scheme would also serve to ‘save’ (Bauer’s term) key 
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Freikorps and Einwohnerwehr units from dissolution, as currently demanded by the 
Entente. They would simply disperse in Germany and reassemble in Hungary.111 
Colonel Bauer’s May 26 memorandum is indicative of what his biographer, 
Adolf Vogt, refers to as Bauer’s inclination towards abstract thinking and draftsmanship 
without any real consideration as to how his plans would be carried out.112 
 With growing impatience for an official declaration of Hungary’s willingness to 
participate, Bauer sent a note on May 30 reminding his Hungarian hosts that he was 
‘still without a binding answer’. He tried to impress upon them the urgency of their 
decision in view of ‘the expected rapid development in the policies of the great powers 
as with the events in the Russo-Polish War’,113 adding that ‘Turkey and Germany 
necessitate quick action to take advantage of the favourable opportunities.’114 On June 1 
Horthy, through his representatives on the Hungarian Supreme Committee, made a 
promise to take part and to give the Bauer undertaking his full support.115  
 Bauer and his colleagues also found a receptive audience in Budapest from the 
more radical elements of the Szeged group. The crowning moment, though, was when 
Admiral Horthy as head of the Hungarian state had offered his participation in the 
daring venture.  
What Bauer did not understand was that his scheme, with all its meticulous 
planning and memoranda, was little more than a desperate fallback plan for the 
Hungarians—taken seriously by few—should the preferred traditional, diplomatic 
approach to securing treaty revisions fail.  
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Chapter 14 
Hungarian Foreign Policy and the Incongruous Position of the White 
International 
 
 
 
 This chapter discusses two examples illustrating that Hungary’s foreign policy 
approach from the early days of the transitional period to the summer of 1920 was 
contrary to Bauer’s plan. In the first example, Hungary pursued a secret policy of 
rapprochement towards France based on massive economic concessions in the hope of 
French support for border revisions. In the second example, the Hungarians, in their 
negotiations with the Austrian right regarding the Burgenland issue and the fight against 
the left, favoured a policy of the legal removal of Chancellor Renner over the military 
solution advocated by Bauer that was, in fact, slated as the first action of the White 
International.  
Hungary was now surrounded by Entente-sponsored Successor States that had 
made up two-thirds of the former Kingdom of Hungary. The result was a foreign policy 
bent on territorial revision once the Treaty of Trianon was signed. Certainly, all rightist 
groups within Hungary shared this goal but there were very different ideas as to how 
this was to be achieved. One side believed Hungary’s fate lay in the traditional German 
orientation. Among this group may be counted Tibor Eckhardt, Gyula Gömbös and the 
former Prime Minister István Friedrich who on May 25 addressed the Hungarian 
National Assembly and declared, ‘The Entente created the League of Nations for the 
exploitation of its victory; the World War vanquished must, therefore, form a 
counterweight together to secure our common interests; Hungary must again look to her 
old and faithful federal partners.’116 With this group Bauer was likely to find at least 
sympathy if not outright support. 
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It is argued here that an orientation towards Germany and espousing the need for 
a ‘counterweight … to secure … common interests’,117 while consistent with the basis 
of Bauer’s scheme, does not mean that the Rosenheim plan was endorsed or even 
considered by the pro-German elements in the Hungarian government. Nor does it mean 
that those who thought it prudent to contemplate both Entente and German orientations 
in the interest of keeping Hungary’s options open included anything beyond a simple 
alliance of the vanquished within the Danubian region—which would effectively 
exclude the fantastic and wholly unworkable extremes that Bauer’s plan brought to the 
table. 
The other side was made up of career diplomats and more traditional statesmen 
who saw Hungary’s future better based on a rapprochement with France, hoping to 
secure investments in Hungarian enterprises that would so engage the Parisian 
government in Hungarian economic matters that France would itself seek a revision of 
the Trianon settlements in its own interest.118 
Bauer and his group were well aware of the latter school of thought. Had not the 
Bavarian ‘Bauerndoktor’, Georg Heim, pursued a similar approach to France? What the 
Bauer group did not know, however––nor were they told when they arrived––was that 
secret talks with the French had long been under way.  
The legitimist faction around the relatively moderate Foreign Minister, Count 
Pál Teleki, and his co-workers—the Deputy Foreign Minister, Baron Kálmán Kánya, 
the Department Chief of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, Count Khuen-Héderváry, and 
the Chief of the General Staff, Major General Béla Berzeviczy119—favoured playing the 
French card. For that reason, the activities of the pro-German, anti-Habsburg Gömbös-
Eckhardt-Kozma group were viewed with concern. In short, Bauer and his Rosenheim 
plan stood at cross purposes to the Francophile legitimists. Trebitsch was well aware of 
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this, stating in his autobiography that ‘we had to encounter the opposition of the 
Hungarian Legitimists, who—justly—regarded our plans as likely to create obstacles 
for any restoration of the Habsburgs, and who, therefore, worked against us wherever 
they could.’120  
 
A.  Secret Franco-Hungarian Negotiations: Territorial Revision 
 
 Admiral Horthy realized the importance of staffing his cabinet, especially his 
Royal Hungarian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, with professional civil servants well 
versed in the arts of diplomacy. He achieved this long before the arrival of the Bauer 
group in Budapest in May 1920. These highly skilled individuals had been hard at work 
exploring diplomatic solutions with the Entente, particularly France. The goal was, of 
course, to find a mutually beneficial basis for constructive Franco-Hungarian 
cooperation in the region with possible treaty revisions in mind. 
Hopes rose when the new French Prime Minister, Alexandre Millerand, assigned 
the supposedly pro-Hungarian Maurice Paléologue to the post of General Secretary of 
Foreign Affairs at the Quai d’Orsay. Alexandre Millerand was one of those in Paris who 
questioned the wisdom of the complete break-up of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire. 
The instability of the entire Balkan Peninsula, greatly exacerbated by the current Russo-
Polish War, only served to justify French concern and a way was sought to establish a 
political and economic presence in the region. Because the Italians feared the creation of 
a strong Danubian confederation and the French were hostile to an Austrian-German 
Anschluß, a bargain was struck whereby Italy would oppose an Anschluß and France 
would oppose a Danubian union.121 This was welcome news to the Horthy regime, as 
well as to Britain. The Foreign Office was naturally concerned that the advantages the 
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British High Commission enjoyed over other Entente missions in Budapest through 
Hohler’s close friendship with the Regent would be eroded by a strong French presence 
in the area. Further concern surfaced with the appointment of Count Teleki, a known 
Francophile, to the office of prime minister in July.122 
Initial contact between Hungary and France took place, in the first half of April 
1920, concurrently with the negotiations at Trianon. The talks were based on extending 
economic concessions to France for which Hungary would expect military and 
territorial revisions to the Treaty.123 At the same time Count Armand de Saint-Sauveur, 
director of the Lothering plant of the powerful Schneider-Creusot foundry, entered into 
talks with Dr Károly Halmos, a Hungarian lawyer with strong connections to the major 
banking houses in Budapest.124 According to a document allegedly given to him by 
Paléologue, dated April 15, 1920, Halmos reported to the Hungarian government that 
France had promised a Hungarian military convention allowing for a larger army; the 
French government was willing to favour Hungary in treaty revision negotiations, and 
Hungary would become the centre of a new combination in Central Europe.125 After 
what seemed an encouraging beginning, Foreign Minister Teleki (as he still was then) 
sent a delegation led by Count István Bethlen, diplomat Count Imre Csáky and the 
director of the state railways, M. Tolnay, to Paris on April 23 to open official talks, 
making options offered to Schneider-Creusot conditional on French government 
assurances.126 On May 4 an agreement was reached that Schneider-Creusot would lease 
the Hungarian railways, build a port in Budapest and hold control of the General Credit 
Bank, if and when approved by the French Parliament. The Hungarians then added 
conditions, in particular an increase in the size of the army, a delay in handing over 
West Hungary (Burgenland) to Austria and the speedy Romanian and Yugoslavian 
evacuation of occupied territory.127 The French government answered that it had no 
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authority to meet any of the Hungarian demands but the matter of locating an 
‘International Commission’ in Budapest would be discussed.128 
Paléologue was concerned that the Hungarians were reading too much into the 
talks regarding treaty revisions. There was no chance that any of Hungary’s independent 
neighbours would hand over territory to Hungary and there was little desire from the 
Entente to compel them to do so. The Hungarians would, for the moment, have to be 
satisfied with the dictates of the French but revision of the borders remained the 
cornerstone of Hungarian foreign policy for years to come. 
The changing military situation in Russia strengthened Hungary’s bargaining 
position in June 1920. Up until that time Horthy had openly listened to his advisers 
around Gömbös and Kozma who served as the Regent’s official links with the Bauer 
group.129 He now informed Baron Lehár, a prominent leader of the legitimists, that from 
now on he was ready to engage ‘in the dirty business’ with France, which meant 
offering Hungarian economic concessions in return for border revisions.130 Moreover, 
Horthy declared to German Military Attaché General Massov that at this juncture, 
France presented a quicker and less risky way for Hungarian revisionism than did his 
German counterparts around Bauer.131 
To ingratiate himself further with France, Regent Horthy considered a possible 
role in military aid to Poland. Accordingly, Teleki let the French government know that 
he was prepared not only to pledge Hungarian munitions reserves to Poland but also to 
restart the munitions plant in Csepel if the need arose. On July 14 Teleki asked 
Paléologue directly whether Hungary should form a strike force for the defence of 
Poland through Slovakia.132 
In mid-July the French delegation headed by Saint-Sauveur gathered at Horthy’s 
summer palace in Gödöllő, some twenty miles from Budapest, to finalize three treaties 
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concerned with economic concessions to France, at the very time when the Bauer group 
was at the height of its negotiations with the Hungarians.133 The first was the so-called 
Railway Lease Treaty of July 19, which stipulated that Hungary’s railway system was 
to be set up as a Hungarian-French railway lease joint-stock company controlled by 
representatives of several large French banks (Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas and 
Crédit Lyonnais) for a period of fifty years. The second Treaty of Gödöllő of July 23 
contained vague promises of French assistance with the territorial revision of the 
Trianon Treaty. The third treaty was the Military Convention of July 27 that dealt with 
the French agreement to offer financial and materiel aid to boost the strength of the 
Hungarian Army from 35,000 (as stipulated at Trianon) to 150,000 so as to strike 
against the Bolshevik Russian forces in Poland.134 
This would certainly appear a very encouraging gain in the revisionist-inspired 
foreign policy of Prime Minister Pál Teleki (as he had now become), but all was not as 
it seemed. Paléologue assured Teleki that Millerand was not averse to some kind of 
strengthening of the Hungarian Army in future but the time was not ripe for this yet.135 
Some weeks later at the British-French Conference at Port Lympne, near Hythe in Kent, 
the Polish crisis was discussed. Lloyd George and Clemençeau decided that no Entente 
troops were to be sent to Warsaw. Shortly thereafter Paléologue’s adversaries in the 
French Foreign Ministry, notably Philippe Berthelot, managed to outmanoeuvre the pro-
Hungarian party and the French Parliament failed to ratify the treaties. Thus in one fell 
swoop, any hope of territorial revision by the French was dashed.136 
 The consequences for the Bauer group were significant. Not only had Horthy 
pursued a course of diplomacy contrary to the spirit of the White International behind 
Bauer’s back, but he had also reduced the influence of the extreme nationalists by 
making common cause with Teleki and the legitimists within the Foreign Ministry. In 
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other words, Bauer’s pro-German link to Horthy through Gömbös, Eckhardt and Kozma 
was now much more tenuous. 
 Meanwhile, in mid-August the Polish Army launched a desperate attack against 
the weaker of the pincer arms surrounding it. The result was the so-called Miracle on 
the Vistula whereby a combination of intense fatigue of the Red Army and 
overextended supply lines led to Russian defeat on August 16 and the humiliating Peace 
of Riga. The French could then gracefully inform the Hungarians that the Polish victory 
removed any danger of Bolshevism in Europe and thus there no longer existed any need 
to strengthen the Hungarian Army.137 For the Hungarians the dream of revising the 
Trianon Treaty with the blessing of the French was over. Horthy’s view then reverted to 
the Austrian matter in the hope that at least a small revision concerning Burgenland 
could be achieved. 
 
 
B.  Austro-Hungarian Negotiations: The Fate of Burgenland and the Fight against  
      the Left 
 
This section will show that, in stark contrast to Bauer’s plan, during Hungary’s 
long negotiations with the rightist opposition to the Austrian government, there was no 
talk of militarily removing Karl Renner or even offering assistance were the Austrian 
right to attempt such a coup. The desired end would come through the constitutional 
processes of the state. 
As regards the Vienna government, a genuine belief prevailed amongst most 
Hungarian policy-makers that the Renner administration was simply the precursor of a 
Bolshevik regime. It had happened before. The liberal left-leaning Hungarian 
government of Mihály Károlyi’s Chrysanthemum Revolution had paved the way for 
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133 days of Bolshevik rule. The USPD government of Kurt Eisner had been succeeded 
by the short-lived Bavarian Soviet Republic shortly after his assassination. Hungary saw 
the Renner-led Austria as a hostile nation no less than it did the surrounding Entente-
sponsored Successor States. In January 1920 Horthy explained to a British 
representative in Budapest that socialism in Austria was so strong that it was 
Bolshevism in all but name.138  
Hungary put out feelers to rightist organizations––mostly monarchist––in 
Austria as soon as the anti-Bolshevik government of István Friedrich139 took power 
from Béla Kun’s successor, the Social Democrat Gyula Peidl, in August 1919. The 
basis of this collaboration was a concern shared by Horthy and members of the loose 
Austrian organization Die Führer der konservativ-monarchistischen Richtungen 
(Leaders of the Conservative-Monarchist Direction) that the Renner government posed 
a threat of a social-democratic Central Europe. Elements among foreign policy-makers 
in Vienna seemed to be moving towards establishing a confederation with the Successor 
States; Horthy perceived this as encirclement. There had already been ill feeling due to 
the asylum granted by Austria to all fleeing Hungarians after the fall of the Kun regime. 
Besides most of the representatives of the People’s Commissars of the Hungarian Soviet 
Republic, Austria took in many left-wing journalists who immediately began printing 
weekly and monthly journals full of anti-Hungarian literature.140  
In December 1919 the rightist leader from the southern province of Styria, 
Landeshauptmann Dr Anton Rintelen,141 accompanied by his deputy Dr Jakob Ahrer, 
came to Budapest for talks with Hungarian Interior Minister Count Beniczky and with 
Count Antal Sigray, both well-known legitimists. Rintelen was concerned with the 
existence of a strong left-wing movement in the Styrian industrial centre around Graz 
and Kapfenberg, and requested that Hungary send troops along the Hungarian-Styrian 
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border to intimidate the left and, if that did not hinder their growth, across the border to 
secure local food supplies.142 After the talks, the royalist Head of the Hungarian 
Legation in Vienna, Count Gusztáv Gratz, informed Rintelen that due to the current 
international tensions, direct military action in Styria was out of the question.143 Whilst 
such an event was hardly likely, the Austrian extreme right certainly did not shy away 
from requesting Hungarian aid in pursuit of their domestic political agenda. Thus at 
least the idea of transnational rightist cooperation on a military level predated Bauer’s 
arrival, as did looking to Hungary for financial support of rightist activities outside its 
borders.  
Further contacts were made in the rightist Vereinigung für Ordnung und Recht 
(VOR; Union for Order and Justice), the Austrian equivalent of the old Berlin-based 
National Union, that was striving to remove the SPÖ government of Karl Renner.144 
Hungarian influence in VOR was so great that in January 1920 Gratz recommended to 
his government in Budapest that he serve as political leader of the organization.145 His 
reasons included keeping the proverbial ‘foot in the door’ to influence an acceptable 
settlement of the so-called Burgenland question involving the previous province of 
West Hungary awarded to Austria by the Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye on 
September 10, 1919.146 Eventually the question of financial support for the Austrian 
rightist movement, the leadership of VOR and the issue of Burgenland grew so 
intertwined that the future status of the province became a bargaining chip between the 
Austrian and Hungarian sides.  
On January 24, 1920, Count Leopold Hartig of VOR sent a message to Gratz in 
Vienna to ‘clarify the Austrian right’s position on the Burgenland issue’. Hartig stated, 
‘in the interests of both states, the Entente needed to be reminded that the territory under 
question should be settled through a plebiscite.’147 On March 23 a meeting was held, 
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attended by VOR leader Hartig, National Councillor Heinl, City Councillor Vaugoin and 
Dr Rader.148 A copy of the minutes exposes at least a willingness on the part of the 
Austrian right wing to consider an accommodation with the Hungarians regarding 
Burgenland, given that the disputed area was consistently referred to as Westungarn 
(West Hungary) throughout the text. The province in question was designated as being 
in the ‘temporary custody’ of Austria and the dictates of Saint-Germain were described 
as ‘very unhealthy to the interests of both states’.149 Furthermore, the document 
contained the following declaration: ‘we are of the view that a lasting neighbourly 
relationship between Austria and Hungary can only be [achieved] if a revision is 
submitted.’150 Accordingly, the status of West Hungary was to be solved through a 
plebiscite.151 In exchange for their support of Hungarian claims to Burgenland, Hartig 
requested both huge financial subsidies and the Hungarian government’s unconditional 
guarantee of Austria’s access to the province’s agricultural surplus. Hungary agreed to 
the conditions and Horthy authorized a remittance of 10 million Hungarian crowns to 
twelve councillors of VOR from January to mid-July.152  
In mid-March Hungary set a new condition for the arrangement: the VOR 
leadership must endorse all future negotiations. To this end, Father Ignaz Seipel, 
representing the new right-of-centre Christian Social Party wing of the organization, 
entered into discussions again with Gratz and stressed that the takeover of power in 
Vienna by the Christian Social Party was his most urgent concern.153 In the event of an 
armed, leftist backlash, he explained, the militia and Heimwehr must be better equipped. 
For this reason, Seipel requested that an additional 50 million Austrian crowns be 
transferred to VOR by the Hungarian government. Speaking for Horthy, Gratz made two 
conditions for the release of this sum: in the event of a Christian Social Party electoral 
victory, a swing to the right must shortly follow, and the new Austrian government must 
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solve the Burgenland question with Hungary in a peaceful manner. Seipel, of course, 
accepted the rather modest demand regarding a swing to the right and replied that, 
concerning Westungarn, there existed a willingness to accept Hungary’s desired 
solution but that immediate formal action would meet opposition and the issue must, 
therefore, be handled in an unhurried fashion. Most of the funds were thus handed over 
to Austrian Heimwehr leader Field Marshal Metzger and his successor, General 
Ehrenfels, through the Hungarian Legation in Vienna.154 
The negotiations discussed above show that, firstly, Hungary was making 
overtures in all directions long before, as well as during, Bauer’s stay in Budapest. 
Secondly—and most importantly—the Hungarian government plainly preferred the 
ascendancy of the moderate-right Christian Social Party through the legal political 
machinery of the Austrian Constitution to any military action. It offered the possibility 
of an amenable settlement of the Burgenland question in Hungary’s favour, precluding 
the need to get involved in an Austrian civil war and rendering Bauer’s master plan of 
militarily toppling ‘red Vienna’ unnecessary.  
 The attempted rapprochement between Hungary and France, and the nature of 
the extended negotiations with rightist elements in Austria, clearly serve to indicate that 
the methods advocated by Bauer were completely out of step with Hungary’s preferred 
approach to foreign policy. 
 
Chapter 15 
The White International and the Seeds of its Demise  
 
 
 
 It is argued here that despite the impressive progress made by Bauer in 
coordinating actions between Bavaria and Hungary concerning support for the Austrian 
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rightist leadership, the seeds of the White International’s demise had already been sown. 
These included the repeated failure of Ludendorff to come to Budapest in person to 
assume the leadership of the nascent organization. This gave the appearance of a lack of 
commitment on his part and also contributed to the beginnings of strife within the Bauer 
group itself. It is further argued that the insistence of the Bavarian Orgesch and Orka 
that they act as sole agents in dealing with Hungarian funds for the Austrian extreme 
right caused concern within the Hungarian camp, which eventually led to Hungary 
returning to the policy established with Austria before the Bauer group arrived and thus 
souring relations with Bavaria. 
 
 
A.  Ludendorff’s Refusal to Come to Budapest and the Weakening of  
      Bauer’s Authority 
 
  
Upon Horthy’s declaration of his willingness to cooperate with Ludendorff and 
his emissaries in creating a White International, Colonel Bauer was immediately 
confronted with obstacles. The first of these was Ludendorff’s absence in Budapest. 
Bauer posted a letter to Major Stephani, then in Munich, instructing him to bring 
Ludendorff to Budapest straight away so he could take charge of the White 
International.155 Due to an International Trade Union boycott of all communications in 
and out of Hungary in protest at the White Terror, Stephani did not receive Bauer’s 
letter until three weeks later. Bauer was thus confined to acting on his own without 
discussion or instructions from Ludendorff at this most crucial time. With the 
resumption of rail travel in late June, Colonel Bauer and Major Stephani travelled to 
Ludendorff’s Bavarian residence in Rosenheim to finally fetch Ludendorff but he 
refused to come to Budapest. It was at this time that Bauer reported back to Trebitsch, 
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still in the Hungarian capital, that differences had arisen between the Ludendorff circle 
and the Bavarian parties.156 On July 9 Bauer and Stephani returned to Budapest with 
representatives of Orgesch and the von Kahr government in tow—but without 
Ludendorff, much to the disappointment of the Hungarian activists around Gömbös and 
Trebitsch. 
In fact, General Ludendorff never ventured to Budapest to assume the leadership 
of the White International. He did, however, send Admiral Horthy a handwritten letter 
on August 19 wherein he gave the excuse that his presence in the Hungarian capital 
could compromise the ‘great cause’, and affirmed that he had full confidence in Colonel 
Bauer. Other than that, the letter simply outlined what Bauer had already explained to 
Horthy some three months earlier.157 Of course, Ludendorff’s reluctance to travel to 
Budapest was to a large extent justified by the duplicity of the Hungarians, as evidenced 
by their ongoing discussions with representatives of the Entente.  
The significance of Ludendorff’s absence is twofold: Ludendorff was not only 
the dominant German factor in the White International but also its spiritual leader. 
Without the famous general, the legitimacy of the German side––not much to begin 
with––was greatly reduced, to the advantage of the von Kahr circle that contemplated a 
possible bilateral combination of a Greater Bavaria (with Austria attached) and 
Hungary. Bavaria, like Hungary, had a legitimate government whereas Colonel Bauer 
represented no country at all. He was merely an emissary from someone the German 
government considered an outlaw and a counter-revolutionary loose cannon.  
A second obstacle facing Bauer, connected to the first, was the emergence of 
fissures in the German side. Trebitsch had long felt that the Bavarians could not be 
trusted. In an undated letter to Bauer, he expressed his frustration, stating he would not 
proceed ‘even one step further’, fearing that the ‘whole grandiose matter will degenerate 
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into a Bavarian party business’. Nor did Trebitsch shy away from attacking Bauer, 
personally forecasting a ‘second Kapp affair in grand style’. 
I … want to make world policy and not small-time Bavarian pettifoggery. It was 
agreed that Ludendorff would come here for the laying of the foundation stone. 
My decision is made. If L does not come, then the matter will not succeed. 
Neither you nor I can manage the Bavarians without Ludendorff. It will be a 
fiasco. One fiasco because of my blind trust in you was enough for me [a 
reference to the Kapp Putsch].158 
 
 
 
B.  An Uneasy Working Relationship between the Bavarians and the Hungarians 
 
        
 In the absence of Ludendorff, on July 9 a delegation representing Minister-
President von Kahr led by Orka Chief Rudolf Kanzler arrived in Budapest. On July 11 
they entered into initial discussions with Regent Horthy in Bauer’s company.159 The 
actual agenda of the meeting is not to be found in the documents but, as was Bauer’s 
practice, he produced a memorandum (not unlike that of May 26) in which he 
acknowledged Bavarian involvement. Below is a key passage:  
The suppressed Völker [people] of Europe must bind together, a) to battle 
against Bolshevism, Communism, radicalism, etc. on the one side and the 
growth of capitalism on the other and, b) to do away with the unfulfillable and 
disgraceful peace treaties. 
 
The following points of his text were marked as urgent: 
 
1) A common Bavarian-Hungarian border must be achieved as soon as possible 
… in order that economic and military cooperation is viable. Austria must 
therefore provide in the separate constitutions of its provinces the necessary 
clauses to occasion an Anschluß in relation to Bavaria160 and the establishment 
of a strong civilian government [from the right]. Actions in Austria must come 
from Austria itself through already prepared organizations that will be led by 
Bavarians. It is necessary to raise special operations troops from dependable 
German elements.161 Hungary and Bavaria are to remain officially neutral but at 
the ready if their help in the elimination of the … Renner government is needed. 
Hungary is to support the operation through financial loans to the Austrian 
government [sic] for payment of the raising of troops and the completion of 
arming the Austrian organizations. 
 
2) Hungary will be obliged to provide Bavaria with grain surplus. For its part, 
Bavaria will provide Hungary with farm machinery and fertilizer, etc. Bavaria is 
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also to send official representatives from the Agriculture and Finance Ministry 
to help in the coordination of the process. 
 
3) The delivery of arms from Bavaria to Hungary is to be undertaken by 
Orgesch. Hungary will determine the type and number of weapons and 
equipment needed and then make an advance payment. 
 
4) For Russia’s part it must make every effort to gain ground in Russia for the 
sake of the economic future of Hungary and Bavaria. The particulars are to be 
prepared by the current White Russian representatives in Budapest, Biskupsky 
and Miller.162 
 
5) On matters of organization, leadership and financial appropriations for their 
respective military needs, each country will be given a free hand. In the case of 
large military operations, however, a supreme command will take over 
coordination activities. On matters as to who would command in such a case, a 
speedy resolution is necessary. 
 
6) On matters of communication and discussion between Hungary and Bavaria a 
special system of couriers is to be set up. 
  
Bauer’s awareness of Bavarian sensitivities was reflected in the memorandum. 
He referred to an Anschluß between Austria and Bavaria—not Germany—that was 
consistent with the radical right Bavarian agenda. Perhaps the most important aspect 
was the issue of who was to assume overall command. It had always been understood 
that General Ludendorff would hold this position but Bauer only noted that a ‘choice 
must be made soon’.163 Little wonder Trebitsch often saw his co-conspirator as 
appeasing the Bavarian right at the expense of all-German considerations. 
 
 
C.  Orgesch and Orka in Austria and the Matter of Hungarian Funding 
 
Shortly after the Kanzler-Horthy discussions, Bauer began talks with 
representatives of the Austrian extreme right that included former Mayor of Vienna 
Richard Weiskirchner. The documents do not indicate if any Hungarians were present. 
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Bauer envisaged the participation of Bavarian, German and Hungarian troops in support 
of Austrian Freikorps collectively referred to as the Heimwehr. While Orgesch units 
were supposed to march over the eastern Bavarian border and occupy the western 
provinces of Tyrol, Salzburg and Upper Austria up to the Linz-Tauern Tunnel line, 
Austrian Orka troops would take charge of Carinthia and Styria bordering Italy and 
Slovenia in the south. The contribution of Hungarian troops was to be limited to the 
occupation of Burgenland.164 Lower Austria and the capital of Vienna were to be 
assigned to special units of the Organisation Consul, the assassination squad that ex-
putschist Freikorps leader Ehrhardt had been assembling throughout the summer of 
1920 mostly from northern German Freikorpskämpfer. 
In order to give a strictly Austrian appearance to the military undertaking, 
Hungarian and German paramilitary units were to be given Austrian military uniforms. 
Germany was to supply the necessary arms for the Hungarian and German troops by 
smuggling them over the borders. 
It was also intended that through the good offices of Bauer’s banking friends in 
Berlin from the pre-Kapp NV days, and his contacts in the Rhineland steel industry, 
arms factories would be founded in Hungary. The plan went as far as establishing a 
coordinating committee called the ‘Hungarian Trust’ under the leadership of Budapest 
Police Chief Gábor Béla.165 This was all in preparation for action scheduled to 
commence in November 1920.166 
By the beginning of August, Colonel Bauer’s efforts to bring the Bavarians and 
Hungarians together on the issue of military and economic cooperation began to bear 
fruit. In response to the Kanzler-Horthy talks, the Bavarian Economic Minister, 
accompanied by a representative of the Finance Ministry, arrived in Budapest quite 
openly for official talks concerning economic matters.167 
 200 
 
As a result of the talks the Hungarian government dispatched their 
representative, Colonel Kocsárd Janky,168 to Munich with the first instalment of the 
requested 12.5 million Hungarian crowns to arm and equip Ehrhardt’s forces. Colonel 
Janky had already held negotiations with the von Kahr government and Ludendorff in 
Munich, and had returned to Budapest with a memorandum concerned with fitting out 
the Austrian Orka and setting up a kind of propaganda bureau for dispensing anti-
Bolshevik information.169 
By mid-August, military preparations were under way on the borders with 
Austria. The Bavarian Orgesch had moved a considerable number of Freikorps troops 
into the provinces of Tyrol and Salzburg; Ehrhardt had placed his special units along the 
borders where they were to be smuggled into Austria; and Hungarian troops along with 
the Héjjas detachment170 were moving in the direction of Czechoslovakia.171 
The funding provided by Hungary for the Austrian operation was to be 
channelled to the Austrian Heimwehr through the Bavarian Orgesch. The loan was to be 
recognized and repaid by the new Austrian government once SPÖ Chancellor Karl 
Renner had been removed. 
The crucial point of this arrangement was that, unlike earlier transactions 
whereby Hungarian funds were channelled directly to VOR through the Hungarian 
Legation in Vienna to be distributed as it saw fit, the ‘channel’ in this case was the 
Bavarian Orgesch that, through Orka and its operatives in Austria (specifically those in 
Styria and Tyrol), would then disburse the funds to the individual Austrian Freikorps 
units.172 In this way, the Bavarian Orgesch would control the Austrian paramilitary 
units through its overarching role of financial middleman, leaving Hungary very much 
cut out of the process. Were Hungary to distribute the funding as it had before, it would 
do so at the expense of the Bavarian-led Orgesch. 
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Chapter 16 
Refusal of Support from Desired Participants  
 
 
 A.  Failure to Obtain Approval from White Russian Command 
 
     General Vasili Biskupsky, his ‘Foreign Minister’ Bruno Miller and his adjutant 
Colonel Zjakine were in Budapest at least by the middle of June 1920.173 Since the 
collapse of the Kapp Putsch they, too, had relocated from Berlin to Munich where many 
fellow monarchist émigrés were already well established. As the recognized leader of 
the White Russian monarchists, Biskupsky met with Horthy and members of the 
Foreign Ministry on or about June 21. The result was the naming of Baron Zsigmond 
Perényi174 as the official Hungarian contact with the new Russian Supreme 
Committee.175 
 While in Budapest, General Biskupsky produced a ‘strictly confidential’ 
memorandum dated July 8, 1920, which outlined his role in the international 
conspiracy, as he saw it. The document was replete with both pro-German and anti-
English sentiment—the latter he shared both with the vengeful Trebitsch and with 
Bauer, who saw the English policy of support for the white armies during the Baltic 
Campaign as a ploy to create an ‘English colony’ out of western Russia. Biskupsky 
warned that the only way to survive the present crisis in Central and Eastern Europe was 
through the creation of a ‘Greater Russia, a Greater Germany and a Greater 
Hungary’.176 He further called for the establishment of a ‘centrale militaire’ made up of 
‘Führers’ (Biskupsky’s term written in German) in a capital where such leaders could 
operate unmolested (Budapest). In short, Biskupsky was essentially parroting Bauer’s 
scheme but with a few suggestions of his own. 
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General Biskupsky’s memorandum revealed a profound lack of knowledge of 
the real situation in his native Russia. Its author displayed an amazing ability to draw up 
fantastic plans with no clue as to how they were to be carried out, an aptitude he clearly 
shared with Bauer. This was evident in his plan for the destruction of the Bolshevik 
regime and the subsequent restoration of the monarchy that relied upon a strict formula 
of a highly unlikely chain of events that required both collaboration with and betrayal of 
the Red Army. In the pre-Kapp days of the NV, Bauer had hatched a similar plan to that 
which Biskupsky was now trying to sell in Budapest.177 The Biskupsky memorandum 
ended with the following ‘Plan Général’ that showed the extremes to which the Bauer 
group’s fanciful ideas were being taken: 
1) The Red Army liquidates Poland and re-establishes the boundaries of 
1914;178 
 
            2) General Wrangel’s (White Russian) Army fights a holding action until the  
            moment when the 1914 borders are re-established by the Red Army; 
 
            3) Ukrainian partisans attack the Poles; 
 
            4) Belo-Russians conclude an agreement with Moscow and attack the 
            Poles when the (1914) borders are re-established; 
 
            5) Commanding officers of the Red Army mainly of the old regime prepare for  
            an uprising and the organization of a military dictatorship; 
 
6) Wrangel’s Army begins an offensive in coordination with the ‘military 
centre’; 
 
7) Armies of the central European states mobilize to face the threat of 
Bolshevism and attack the Communist armies with White Russian troops in the 
vanguard. The people will be prepared through propaganda and the distribution 
of an unlimited amount of Russian (counterfeit) money to organize an anti-
Communist movement in the rear of the Communist army;179  
 
8) Ukrainian partisans commanded by officers of the old regime attack the 
Communist army from the rear; 
 
9) Belo-Russians invite Russian and German volunteers to clear their country of 
the Communists;180 
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10) White sympathizers in the Red Army organize an uprising in the capitals and 
invite Russian, German, and Hungarian volunteers to restore public order; 
 
11) A union of Russia, Germany, and Hungary is announced on the basis of all 
three states promising eternal peace and mutual economic well being; 
 
12) The thrones will be restored and the republican states returned to the 
position they deserve.181 
 
Admiral Horthy responded favourably. Expressing his confidence in General 
Biskupsky, he authorized the sum of 2 million Hungarian crowns to finance his work in 
Budapest and Munich. 
The plan obviously required the establishment of a working association with 
White Russian General Piotr Wrangel then operating in the Ukraine. The ground was 
prepared by a cordial exchange of letters between Horthy and Wrangel in mid-July 
mutually recognizing the folly of having fought against each other in the Great War.182 
To win Wrangel’s support for the great transnational purposes of the White 
International, a series of meetings was convened.183 Representatives of the General 
Staff and Foreign Ministry made up the Hungarian side of the discussions. On the White 
Russian side were General Biskupsky, ‘Foreign Minister’ Bruno Miller, Adjutant 
Colonel Zjakine, former Mayor of Odessa Boris Pelikan and Black Hundreds publicist 
Mikhail Kommissarov.184 On the German side were two Munich-based businessmen 
and right-wing supporters, Ketschmar and Wagner, who represented the sympathetic 
Bavarian industrialists.185 Also present was military specialist Captain-Lieutenant von 
Sichart of the outlawed Marinebrigade-Ehrhardt who had accompanied the latter to 
Budapest. Acting for the growing circle of Russian émigré monarchists in Munich were 
Baltic Germans Max Erwin von Scheubner-Richter and Alfred Rosenberg.  
This was, in fact, nothing less than the reconvening of the so-called Society for 
Ukrainian-Bavarian Import and Export that had met in Regensburg in early May for the 
 204 
 
purpose of sending a delegation to Wrangel. The only real difference was the inclusion 
of the Hungarians representing the General Staff and the Foreign Ministry.  
The whole episode was an exercise in self-delusion. At the meetings the émigré 
Russians offered the Germans access to the vast resources of raw materials to be found 
in southern Russia––an area General Wrangel’s White Army no longer controlled––in 
exchange for the delivery of much-needed weapons for Wrangel’s forces.186 
At the insistence of the Hungarians, a delegation was to be dispatched to 
Wrangel’s headquarters in Sebastopol to assess the general situation in the Ukraine. 
This was done but with far from expected results.187 Firstly, General Wrangel informed 
Biskupsky’s emissary, Adjutant Colonel Zjakine, through intermediaries that he would 
not cooperate with, nor recognize the authority of, the Budapest-based Russian Supreme 
Committee. Secondly, he warned the Hungarian government to have nothing to do with 
General Biskupsky whom he characterized as a thoroughly untrustworthy officer.188 
As it so happened, General Wrangel had made a political swing towards the 
French from whom he sought assistance, facilitating the process by a marked 
condemnation of the pro-German, counter-revolutionary émigré monarchists such as the 
group surrounding Biskupsky. These he defined simply as ‘German agents’. According 
to Wrangel, Adjutant Colonel Zjakine, Mikhail Kommissarov, General Biskupsky and 
General von der Goltz (also in Budapest) had incorporated tsarist prisoners of war into 
the ranks of General Bermondt-Avalov’s Northern Russian Army during the Baltic 
Campaign on the pretext of combating Bolshevism but, in reality, were there to join 
with German Freikorps units to remove the Weimar government in favour of a 
Hohenzollern restoration ‘contrary to the wishes of the Entente’.189 
Wrangel’s response to the emissary sent by the Russian Supreme Committee in 
Budapest was most damaging. It rendered the latter devoid of any authority to speak for 
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the White Russian forces then combating the Red Army. Further, Wrangel cleverly 
made mention of those individuals of the radical right who were at that moment in 
Budapest and tied them to earlier foolhardy events in which they had played major 
roles, namely Trebitsch and Bauer in the restoration and Kapp fiascos. By this turn of 
events, one of the main missions of the White International, to rescue Russia from the 
Bolsheviks, was aborted. 
 
 
B.  Failure to Secure Italian Participation  
 
 In the unlikely event that the Rosenheim plan was ever set in motion, Entente 
intervention seemed to be a certainty. Trebitsch, however, felt confident that there was 
little chance of a move against them from the Western Powers. He based his assumption 
on what he saw as Britain’s lack of objection to the Kapp Putsch—so long as there was 
no attempt to restore a German monarchy.190 It followed, according to Trebitsch, that 
because there were no monarchist designs to the current endeavour, Britain’s position 
would be the same. Trebitsch also reasoned that due to France’s strong desire to see a 
weakened Germany, it would actually welcome the creation of a southern confederation 
of Bavaria, Austria and Hungary. Moreover, continued Trebitsch, France ‘looked on 
with benevolent neutrality at the creation of the Orgesch and peeped through her fingers 
at Hungary with its standing army … of perhaps fifty thousand men’.191 It was further 
thought that if France did respond as expected by occupying the Ruhr, this would rally 
the German working class behind the extreme nationalists.192 Whether Bauer shared this 
rather naïve view is not indicated by any of the documents. 
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There was concern, however, over how the young Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and 
Slovenes that bordered Hungary in the south and south-west might react to a counter-
revolutionary, military action in Austria. Geography dictated that the Yugoslav Army 
could do very little about any movement of German—or Bavarian—forces into Austria 
from the north. However, the Yugoslav Army could at least make it difficult for 
paramilitary troops to move westwards from Hungary into the southern Austrian 
provinces of Styria and even Carinthia. It was thus prudent to draw Italy into the plot so 
as to protect the southern flank against a Yugoslav invasion. 
At that time the Italians had some eight thousand men in and around Carinthia, 
and were still in occupation of Villach as stipulated by the Inter-Allied Military Control 
Commission. In late July Trebitsch, General Biskupsky and Colonel Bauer, 
accompanied by his personal secretary, Luise Engeler—and without the knowledge of 
either the Bavarians or the Hungarians—journeyed to Villach in southern Austria close 
to the Italian border.193 There they met with Italian General Nascimbene who listened to 
the details of Bauer’s mission. Besides military aid in the event of a Yugoslav attack, 
Bauer requested financial help and enough weapons and food for twenty thousand men. 
Some days later Bauer, Trebitsch and Biskupsky travelled by car to the influential 
General Caviglia’s headquarters in Trieste. After hours of questioning, Bauer was asked 
to produce a memorandum and send it directly to the Italian Prime Minister, Giovanni 
Giolitti, in Rome. According to Trebitsch’s autobiography, the document was also to be 
shown to the British Prime Minister, David Lloyd George, who was then in Lucerne.194 
There is a curious document in the Bauer Papers at the German Federal Archives 
that bears both Biskupsky and Bauer’s signatures. It is a letter of introduction, carried 
by Trebitsch, addressed to the leader of the still infant Fascist Party, Benito Mussolini. 
Apparently, Trebitsch was to go on his own to Milan to meet with the still relatively 
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unknown editor of the fascist newspaper Popolo d’Italia and ‘to discuss with him … all 
political, military, and financial questions and … to collect or receive money for [the 
White International’s] account’.195 It is safe to assume that the meeting never took 
place. There is no mention of it in any other documents or in Trebitsch’s autobiography. 
Written in 1931, it is doubtful that the author would have failed to mention a meeting 
with such an internationally recognized individual of the radical right as was Mussolini 
by that time. 
The final outcome of the Italian venture was little more than a polite refusal. 
Giolitti declared he would have nothing to do with the scheme but would not stand in 
the way of its execution. This benevolent neutrality indicated that there was no hope of 
Italy acting against the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes should the latter move 
against Ehrhardt’s troops in Carinthia or Styria in southern Austria but, by the same 
token, no fear of Italy joining in any Entente reaction.  
Clearly, the Giolitti government doubted that Bauer’s plan had any merit. More 
to the point, with Italy on the cusp of fascism, it was certainly not in Giolitti’s interest to 
facilitate the establishment of a strong, right-wing government in neighbouring Austria.  
 
 
Chapter 17 
The White International on the Eve of its Fall 
 
 
 The rapidly changing geopolitical realities conspired to make the spiritual 
leadership of the White International less than totally committed to seeing the plot 
through to its conclusion. It is thus argued that amongst the individuals who drove the 
nails into the coffin of the White International, General Ludendorff must be included. 
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A.  Resurrection of the German-Entente Alliance Scheme against Bolshevik Russia  
     
 
If there was one single foreign policy goal shared by all members of the 
international rightist community, it was the defeat of Bolshevism in Russia. In Germany 
this was coupled with the desire to return the Reich to its pre-war great-power status, 
and that meant the elimination of Poland. Efforts to this end were reflected in the Baltic 
Campaign and certainly in the Rosenheim plan. If the end justified the means, then in 
the event that both could be achieved through one action, it would be prudent to pursue 
this even if it meant deviating from whatever course was currently being followed. Such 
an opportunity did arise, and thus an old scheme was resurrected that called for General 
Ludendorff to make common cause with the Entente. Though the alliance scheme was 
never realized, the importance is that while Bauer was seeking the commitment of 
rightist elements and even heads of state to the Rosenheim plan, Ludendorff’s own 
commitment to it came into question. Whatever sense there might have been in working 
with the Entente, the idea of doing so contributed to the weakening of the Budapest-
based White International. 
On April 25, 1920, while Bauer and his co-conspirators were consolidating their 
connections with the Bavarian government, Poland’s military leader Józef Piłsudski196 
moved his troops into the Ukraine, initiating the last phase of the Russo-Polish War. 
Piłsudski dreamed of a Greater Poland reaching from the Baltic to the Black Sea and 
felt secure in the support of the Ukrainian nationalists.  
The Allies were split on the wisdom of such a move. Lloyd George was opposed 
and, citing recent reversals of Admiral Kolchak and White Generals Yudenich and 
Denikin, advised Piłsudski to sign a peace treaty with the Bolshevik Russians. The pro-
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Polish Marshal Foch supported the attack and saw in it a possible strengthening of the 
French security system in Eastern Europe as a block to Bolshevism.197  
 After initial Polish successes and the taking of Kiev on May 7, the Red Army 
regrouped to stabilize its lines by the river Dnieper. After a series of brilliant successes 
in June and July, the Red Army pushed Piłsudski all the way back into the heart of 
Poland. By the end of July the very gates of Warsaw were threatened and the rest of 
Europe began to contemplate life with the Bolsheviks at their front door. 
 This was especially the case for the German extreme right that again faced the 
old questions. Should Germany look to the east and work with the Bolsheviks to 
eliminate Poland and thus re-establish the old borders of 1914?198 Could an association 
with the Bolsheviks end Germany’s international isolation,199 as Colonel Bauer, Major 
Pabst and others had entertained in 1919? Or should Germany look westwards and 
request a cooperative military undertaking with the Entente against the Bolsheviks, as 
had also been considered in 1919? 
Such considerations were not limited to the extreme right. Within the highest 
levels of the Reichswehr—which had moved significantly to the political centre—
discussions had been under way since early1920. Major Werner von Fritsch in his 
‘Internal Conditions Speech’ of February 1920 commented that in the event of a Russo-
Polish War, Germany should work with the Entente in the hope of a revision of the 
Treaty of Versailles. General Seeckt, as overall commander of the German forces, felt 
that even ‘if for the moment we cannot help Russia to re-establish her old imperial 
boundaries, we should not interfere with her doing so.’200 Direct German support for 
Poland against the Bolsheviks was never discussed, however. The sole dilemma 
appeared to be whether Germany should stand by and let the Red Army smash Poland, 
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or offer its assistance to the formation of an Entente coalition force to come to Poland’s 
rescue and thus garner Entente favour. 
 It was the latter consideration that proved so debilitating for the White 
International. Among the most outspoken advocates of a German military intervention 
alongside the Entente was the liberal-right industrialist Arnold Rechberg of the 
Ludendorff circle, who during the Baltic Campaign had pressed for German-Entente 
cooperation against the Bolsheviks.201 In the current situation he saw an opportunity not 
only for possible treaty revision but also for the inevitable strengthening of the German 
military, which was at that time facing massive reductions as stipulated in the Versailles 
Treaty. Regardless of the outcome of a joint offensive against the Red Army 
surrounding Warsaw, he reckoned, the German military would be strong enough to 
serve the needs of a ‘war of Revanchement’, or so he had been assured by the radical 
rightist officers around Ludendorff and Bauer.202 
Rechberg made important contacts throughout the spring and summer of 1920, 
ranging from those around Ludendorff and von Kahr in Munich to Entente diplomats 
and Reichswehr officers. The issue caused many to reconsider the wisdom of the 
imminent dissolution of the Freikorps units, including von Kahr’s Einwohnerwehr. The 
American Supreme Commander in the Rhineland, General Allen, characterized the 
disarming order from the Spa Conference of July 1920, given the crisis in Poland, as 
‘playing with fire’.203 The British Ambassador in Berlin, Viscount d’Abernon, feared 
that the seriousness of the situation in Poland with its dangers of infecting Germany was 
greatly underestimated in London and Paris.204 Finally, the French Chargé d’Affaires in 
Berlin, Émile Haguenin, told Rechberg directly that his colleagues in Warsaw sent ‘very 
pessimistic news’ to which Paris was ‘apparently blind’.205 Rechberg was able to secure 
an audience with British General Malcolm who spoke of the possible success of such a 
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venture. Even more favourable were Rechberg’s contacts in Munich where he had the 
advantage of lines already open in the ongoing disarmament discussions between 
Bavaria and France.206 
 The creation of an Allied force including German troops was a bold idea, but 
also one that appealed to German politicians of different persuasions. The leader of the 
German People’s Party (Deutsche Volkspartei) and future chancellor Gustav 
Stresemann arranged a meeting between Rechberg and British representative Lord 
Kilmarnock in Berlin in mid-July. Stresemann was enthusiastically behind the German-
Entente joint intervention plan and suggested that overall command should go to French 
Marshal Foch with General Ludendorff as his Chief of Staff. As a guarantee against 
possible German designs to use their reinvigorated army to threaten the Entente and the 
Successor States, it was further suggested by him that French forces would be allowed 
to occupy German fortresses during the operation.207 
 Lord Kilmarnock was later to report from Berlin that émigré Russian groups 
seemed ‘ready to prepare a fresh Baltic manoeuvre’ using the remnants of the 
Bermondt-Avalov troops in Lithuania, East Prussia and Latvia.208  
 Some days later Rechberg passed on a note from Ludendorff to Lord 
Kilmarnock,209 stating that the general was agreed to the plan but that his willingness to 
accept the role of second in command was contingent upon a promise from the Entente 
that the enforcement of the stipulations of the Treaty of Versailles would be set aside 
during the course of the operation—an obvious attempt to halt the Einwohnerwehr 
disarmament. Ludendorff further requested that the Reichswehr would provide a force 
of 500,000 men under the command of himself and General Hoffmann.210  
 Ludendorff sent on an additional demand to Lord Kilmarnock that upon his 
acceptance of becoming Marshal Foch’s subordinate, the Rhineland must be 
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immediately and completely evacuated of all Entente troops and personnel. This was 
too much. The British Undersecretary Eric Phipps condemned the demand as 
‘laughable’.211 German President Ebert’s state secretary was approached about the idea 
and reported that neither the President nor the working classes of Germany could ever 
support Ludendorff in such a role.212 French Marshal Foch, under whose command 
Ludendorff was supposedly to serve, held that the very idea of arming half a million 
Germans was ‘out of the question’.213 
 It is a telling fact that Ludendorff was willing to join the Entente in a military 
operation whilst his subordinate in Budapest was arranging for the eventual declaration 
of war against it. Given Ludendorff’s continual refusal to go to Budapest to assume the 
leadership of the White International and his readiness to cooperate with the Bauer 
group’s sworn enemy, one must count General Ludendorff as a key factor in the failure 
of the White International. 
 
  
B.  Austro-Bavarian Relations in August 1920: Nationalist Agendas versus  
      Transnational Considerations 
 
In early August, while waiting for word from the Italian government, Colonel 
Bauer and Trebitsch journeyed to Vienna to shore up support from the considerable 
right-wing organizations there. They met with General Alfred Krauß, the influential 
leader of the Austrian Pan-German League who was active in VOR.214 It was hoped that 
his support would smooth the way for an Austrian Anschluß with Bavaria and facilitate 
the choosing of an overall Austrian Commander of the several Freikorps units there. 
Instead, it exposed serious divisions amongst the Austrian rightist leadership that would 
prove irreconcilable and a growing distrust of Bavarian motives. This seems to be a 
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typical example of the dominance of nationalist agendas over transnational 
considerations, which arguably hampered the whole project from the very outset. 
It was generally agreed that because Austrian ex-KuK officers would be directly 
under the auspices of the Bavarian Orka, overall command in Austria would be only 
nominal.215 It was also agreed that German commanders would lead the individual 
units.  
For the position of Austrian Supreme Commander there were two main 
candidates, General Alfred Krauß and Prince Johannes von Liechtenstein, each 
representing quite differing positions. The anti-Habsburg, pan-German, pro-Anschluß 
group—largely found within the Austrian Christian Social Party and amongst the 
Bavarians—favoured Krauß. Prince Johannes was an ardent legitimist and thus 
unacceptable to the Ludendorff-Bauer group and the anti-legitimists in Hungary that 
included Regent Horthy and the Hungarian Supreme Committee of Prónay, Gömbös 
and Eckhardt. 
Nor was this a simple matter of one side opposing the other. Many in the anti-
Habsburg camp in Hungary were opposed to any general of the old Austrian Army, 
especially a pan-German such as General Krauß, who, with such a force behind him, 
could forcibly hold Burgenland for Austria.216 A third candidate, the mutually 
acceptable Field Marshal Metzger, was chosen for the position in the more anti-
Habsburg environment of Munich, but this did little to address the differences between 
the parties that Bauer now found himself caught up in. 
The dynamics of conflict between two transnational concepts such as the White 
International and pan-Germanism exposed a serious flaw in the former. After Metzger 
was appointed Supreme Commander of the Austrian paramilitary forces, General Krauß 
began to withdraw his support for the White International, noting that he could not 
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endorse Bauer’s plan regarding Burgenland. For the pan-German Austrian general, the 
Bamberg Declaration of February 1919 was inviolable. He refused to sacrifice his 
völkisch goals for alliance opportunities, stating it was a ‘national indignity if one seeks 
… the friendship of 7 million Magyars for the 70 million people of Germany [and 
Austria] at the price of 400,000 Germans [living in Burgenland]’.217 Bauer would later 
complain of the Überalldeutsche (ultra-pan-Germans) such as Krauß and his Austrian 
colleagues as ‘holding their völkische principles higher than judicious recognition of 
necessity and opportunity’.218 
The matter of an Anschluß with the German Reich engendered its own problems 
that further exposed their nationalist agenda over international concerns. Of the 
Bavarians, Minister-President von Kahr, Georg Heim and Orgesch Deputy Leader 
Rudolf Kanzler favoured an Anschluß with Austria but only if Bavaria were to regain its 
pre-war, semi-autonomous status within the Reich and if the western panhandle 
provinces of Salzburg, Tyrol and Vorarlberg were to secede from Austria and be 
attached to Bavaria proper. Only then could the remaining rump of Austria in the east be 
joined with the German Reich, independent of Bavaria.  
The issue of the partitioning of Austria was the source of the eventual unilateral 
action by Austria’s extreme right. Again, pan-German leader General Krauß was 
adamantly against any partitioning of Austria on the one hand and distrustful of what he 
saw as the separatist leanings of the Bavarian Orgesch on the other, despite its 
declarations to the contrary. He was also against the Munich-based Orka’s assumption 
of leadership of the separate Austrian Heimwehr units and instead demanded a unified 
Austrian command over its own troops with Orgesch and Orka purely in support. In 
short, Krauß would welcome an Anschluß of Austria with Germany proper but not at the 
price of an Austrian partition. It would seem he was first and foremost a nationalist.  
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General Krauß further declared his lack of trust in the Bavarians, citing their 
‘ridiculous plan’ to separate themselves from the Reich as a red herring for the sake of 
fooling the French, the ulterior motive being to rejoin the rest of Germany at a later 
date. He saw it as ‘possible, even probable’ that Bavaria, once the separation was 
completed, would simply omit the second phase of the plan and remain an independent 
state.219 
Nationalist proclivities were not limited to the Austrian-Germans. By mid-
August the Hungarians had become just as adamant that the pre-war borders between 
Austria and Hungary that ran along the river Leitha should remain. This would place 
Burgenland within the Hungarian state. Moreover, during the summer of 1920, 
Hungarian troops were still occupying ‘West Hungary’.220 The Horthy regime also 
reminded the Austrian nationalists that, after the fall of the Hungarian Soviet Republic, 
Hungary had pledged materiel and financial aid to the Austrian right to build up its 
Heimwehr units on the understanding that Austria would consider the solving of the 
Burgenland question once the Renner government was removed.221 Bauer had been able 
to placate the Hungarians on the issue by vague promises during his sojourn in 
Budapest, for the sake of the advancement of the alliance, but the stubborn demands of 
General Krauß were bringing it all to the fore at a most inopportune time.222 
 
 
 
 
 
C.  Unravelling 
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Disappointment now seemed to be the rule rather than the exception for the 
Bauer group. At an early September Central Committee meeting in Munich, the group 
suffered yet another unpleasant surprise when the Austrian delegation leader, Dr 
Weisner, announced that the Christian Social Party had decided not to allow any armed 
action against the Renner government at all. The Austrian rightists saw the withdrawal 
of Renner and his SPÖ-led coalition, and the formation of a transitory government of 
the Christian Social Party under party leader Michael Mayr, as inevitable. The chances 
of a peaceful political turnabout in Austria in the upcoming National Council elections, 
set for October 17, were too promising to risk civil war by following the Rosenheim 
plan.223 Electoral victory would then allow the passing of the necessary legislation to 
disarm the various Austrian leftist Volkswehr (People’s Guard) units. Weisner 
acknowledged that the possibility of armed resistance from the left was still very real 
and urged that Bavarian and Hungarian support for the strengthening of the Austrian 
Selbstschutz (rural defence leagues loosely affiliated to the Heimwehr) should not be 
reduced. The Austrian rightists would, however, not engage in any Putsch.224 
 The defeat of the left by parliamentary means offered the Austrian right a double 
advantage: a civil war as well as a military invasion would be averted and the territorial 
recompense for the associated Bavarian and Hungarian forces—Burgenland and the 
western Austrian provinces—would be greatly diminished if not eliminated altogether. 
For Bauer and the Bavarians it was a terrible blow. The Rosenheim plan was 
sketched out according to a series of military strikes that had to occur in a 
predetermined order with Austria as the initial target. Also, the binding element 
between Austria and Bavaria had long been the Orka set up by Orgesch Deputy 
Kanzler. By maintaining units on both sides of the border, Orka had effectively already 
achieved a kind of paramilitary Anschluß upon which further transnational cooperation 
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could be built. With Austria’s new unilateral course––at least in matters military––Orka 
no longer served as a bridge between the two countries. 
There was another discouraging development. Although Hungary had agreed to 
continue its financial support for the Austrian extreme right defence units, in mid-
September news reached the Orgesch offices in Munich that the Austrians had 
requested that this financial support be transferred from Budapest directly to the 
Heimwehr, leaving Orgesch, Orka and the Ludendorff-Bauer group out of the Austrian 
picture entirely.225 Bauer hastily dispatched Major Stephani to Budapest to try and 
convince Prime Minister Teleki to revert to the previous arrangement, but to no avail. 
Pressing the issue, Stephani was informed by Count Khuen-Héderváry of the Foreign 
Ministry that from then on the monthly 2 million Hungarian crowns would be remitted 
to the Hungarian Minister in Vienna, Count Gusztáv Gratz, and from there distributed to 
the separate Heimwehr units, thus returning to the arrangement Hungary enjoyed with 
Austria before Bauer’s arrival. At about the same time, Baron Kálmán Kánya of the 
Foreign Ministry convinced the Regent to suspend payment of support funds that had 
hitherto flowed into the coffers of the Russian émigré community in Munich.226  
The whole affair was falling down around the German plotters’ ears. At this 
point even the unflappable Colonel Bauer had to admit the severity of the situation. In a 
letter to Trebitsch dated September 10, 1920, Bauer stated that the plans were in 
‘temporary suspension’.227  
On September 24 Bauer sent his ‘Memorandum of the Historical Development’ 
to Admiral Horthy, reminding him of the several promises made between May and 
August, and warned that efforts to procure Burgenland through negotiations with the 
Austrians could be ‘derailed from their course and thus be harmful to our intentioned 
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end goals’.228 Bauer’s warning seems to have been based on the illusion that Horthy and 
Teleki remained on board for the Rosenheim plan. 
  By mid-October the Bauer group had lost virtually all the participants with any 
power or influence in the countries they supposedly represented. The Austrians were 
going their own way, especially after the fall of the Renner government and the election 
of Michael Mayr on October 17, just as Dr Weisner had predicted. Orgesch was still 
intact but had no one to fight. Its continued existence was very much a matter of debate, 
as was that of the Bavarian Einwohnerwehr, as during the spring and summer of 1920 
membership had begun to wane.229 The von Kahr government in Munich was still very 
much alive but its particularist plans so embraced by Georg Heim were stalled and the 
matter of the Anschluß would have to wait for another time. The dreams of the rightist 
émigré Russian monarchists around General Biskupsky had dissipated with the last 
wisps of smoke of the Russo-Polish War and the Treaty of Riga that officially ended the 
struggle. The defeated General Wrangel, once so assured of victory that he snubbed the 
overtures of the Budapest-based Russian Supreme Committee in favour of the French, 
was now in Belgrade writing his memoirs. The Hungarians, who had all along played a 
double game between the Bauer group and the French, had lost both and were about to 
face the trials of two Habsburg restoration attempts in 1921 that would greatly discredit 
those legitimists that took part. There remained only the initial Bauer-Stephani-
Trebitsch group and that too was about to face its own crisis. 
Upon his return from his activities in Italy in mid-August, Trebitsch 
inadvertently came across a letter addressed to Bauer from Major Stephani.230 
According to Trebitsch’s autobiography and his Vienna court testimony, the letter 
suggested that he be eliminated due to suspicions of his treachery; as a Jew he was an 
easy target during the White Terror in Budapest.231 When confronted with the letter, 
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Bauer reaffirmed his complete trust in his long-time closest confidant but Trebitsch 
demanded that Stephani be paid off and released from the organization. This was done. 
Some weeks later Trebitsch, learning that Stephani had been reinstated and 
fearing for his life, packed a large suitcase with sensitive and ultimately incriminating 
documents, and attempted to sell them to the French Legation in Vienna and later to the 
Czechoslovak government. Trebitsch was held on charges of treason and conspiracy but 
acquitted. The documents were placed in the custody of the Czechoslovak government.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Much has been written about the international spread of Communism during the 
chaotic post-war years in Central Europe, and about right-wing counter-revolutionary 
measures to halt its advance. Studies of the radical right, however, deal almost 
exclusively with the efforts of individual nations. This work draws attention to a little-
known attempt to establish an ultra-rightist ‘white’ transnational organization of the 
vanquished as an answer to the ‘Red International’, with the dual goals of annulling the 
Paris Treaties by militarily destroying the Entente-sponsored Successor States and of 
eradicating Communism in all its forms from all of Europe including Russia. 
The declared scope and objectives of the plot itself also serve to highlight all 
that was wrong with post-war Central Europe in the eyes of the radical, disgruntled 
right. The mission of the White International was essentially to restore the pre-war 
order, the time when the Second Reich and the Triple Alliance were strong, the military 
enjoyed respect, people knew their place in society and Communism was a harmless if 
misguided theory discussed in coffee houses. In the aftermath of defeat, this belle 
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époque was gone, but Colonel Max Bauer tirelessly urged its return in his prolific 
wartime and post-war writings, his ill-conceived, counter-revolutionary ventures and his 
grand White International Aktionsplan that aimed above all to reinstall Germany at the 
pinnacle of power within a German-friendly Central Europe.  
The study of the White International exposes a political tipping point—a 
transitional phase between desperate attempts to reclaim that which was lost by the 
vanquished and endeavours to become reconciled to the new conditions in Central 
Europe with an eye to future cooperation with the Entente. For, as this study has shown, 
though there was no dearth of sympathetic officers and leaders of post-war Central 
Europe who shared Bauer’s vision, to the extent of participating in laying the 
foundations of the White International, they expressed merely feigned interest in his 
proposed methods. 
The White International was bound to fail for several reasons. Bauer saw 
cooperation between paramilitary Freikorps units of the vanquished nations as the first 
and only option to correct Germany’s position and thus as the ideal martial arm of his 
International. The precedent for this was provided by German paramilitary units who, 
after brutally smashing leftist unrest domestically, joined with tsarist ex-prisoners of 
war led by émigré Russian monarchists to form a rudimentary German and White 
Russian transnational army to fight against Bolshevism and perceived Entente colonial 
designs in the Baltic. With the withdrawal eastwards of the scattered remnants of the 
mercenary red armies from the Baltic region, these German-Russian ‘white 
international’ paramilitary units then became agents of blatant expansionist aggression 
against the Entente-sponsored new Baltic republics, as discussed in John Hiden and 
Patrick Salmon’s The Baltic Nations and Europe (1994) and Robert Gerwarth’s ‘The 
Central European Counter-revolution’ (2008). Outright defiance of Weimar and Entente 
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orders to cease operations and withdraw created a renegade paramilitary army—quite 
separate from the Reichswehr—that engaged in a stridently nationalist political agenda. 
Demonstratively anti-Entente and anti-Bolshevik, the agenda was consistent with the 
Pan-German League’s 1919 Bamberg Declaration that advocated the continuation of 
pre-war expansionist policy.  
The ultimate failure of the Baltic Campaign was conveniently and erroneously 
explained by Ludendorff, Bauer and his circle of co-conspirators at the NV as another 
‘stab in the back’ by the pro-Entente, leftist Weimar government that had so 
treacherously betrayed the Reichswehr and the German people in 1918. In truth, the 
Baltic Campaign failed largely because the German-Russian paramilitary formations 
did. While sufficiently brutal to terrorize the citizens of the Baltic republics, they were 
not militarily proficient enough to defeat their armies.  
The inability of Bauer to grasp this reality is clearly seen in the two examples of 
the Bavarian Einwohnerwehr and the Hungarian National Army, and the role that he 
assigned these essentially paramilitary forces in his grand plan. 
 It has been shown that though the Munich-based, paramilitary Einwohnerwehr 
constituted the single greatest Freikorps organization in all of Germany, even its leaders 
recognized its ineffectiveness beyond members’ own villages.  
It has also been demonstrated that the invasion and occupation by Hungary’s 
former ethnic minorities that displaced thousands of Magyar lower gentry and upper-
class nobility, and the establishment of the Soviet Republic in Budapest, conspired to 
create an intensely radical, new Hungarian National Army and numerous auxiliary 
detachments, both markedly paramilitary in nature. Other than the occasional failed 
attempts by the detachments to engage red forces, and the terror they successfully 
visited upon Hungarian civilians suspected of collusion with the Kun government, these 
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units were thoroughly untested. Thus, like the German-Russian paramilitary units in the 
Baltic and the Bavarian Einwohnerwehr, the Hungarian National Army was unsuited to 
face any of the disciplined field forces that Bauer’s plan would have provoked from the 
Entente and the Successor States. The only conclusion to be drawn is that, were the 
paramilitary forces of the White International to actually take the field, they would be 
no match for those who would certainly oppose them.  
It has been argued that the Reichswehr was quite willing to covertly support the 
respective paramilitary units while feigning non-involvement. General von der Goltz 
was overall commander of the Baltic Campaign but not as an officer in the Reichswehr. 
Neither did General Seeckt participate in the paramilitary-led Kapp Putsch, nor did he 
attempt to stop it. During the Kapp Putsch, Bavarian Reichswehr General Arnold von 
Möhl did convince incumbent Bavarian Minister-President Johannes Hoffmann to 
proclaim a state of emergency but just until the legal transfer of power to Gustav von 
Kahr was completed. In Austria there was no national army to speak of until 1926. Prior 
to that, there existed only the Volkswehr—replaced by the Republikanische Schutzbund 
(Republican Defence League) in 1923—and the Heimwehr, which served as the 
paramilitary formations of the left and the right respectively.  
Contributing to the general failure of the plan was Bauer’s inability to correctly 
read the meaning of events. This was evidenced in his post-Kapp Putsch tract Der 13. 
März 1920 wherein he cited the lack of not involving other war vanquished nations, the 
involvement of ‘weak-kneed civil servants’ and the completeness of Bolshevik 
contamination in Berlin as the three outstanding reasons for the failure of the Baltic 
Campaign, his farcical Hohenzollern restoration plot and the Kapp Putsch. These 
patently delusional assessments were clearly echoed in his White International plot.  
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The inclusion of all the war vanquished in the plot was the most obvious change 
as the now officially banned, Berlin-based NV was replaced by a Budapest-based 
international body. There was also a noticeable lack of civilian involvement—a matter 
that was not well received by Horthy’s civilian government. The self-exiled Bauer 
abandoned ‘red’ Prussia for a Munich-Budapest axis as the new centre of the counter-
revolution where, in his mind, Bolshevism had already been destroyed by victorious 
rightist forces. In fact, the White International was in many ways a much expanded and 
more complex version of the failed Baltic Campaign that had preceded it but with 
German and Hungarian officers and exiled Russian monarchists at its core. 
Paradoxically, its multinational nature further contributed to its demise. 
On the one hand, the plot’s international dimensions set it far apart from all 
other right-wing efforts to challenge the post-war settlement in Europe. On the other 
hand, the internationalist credentials of the German officers who championed a 
paramilitary collaboration of the right were hampered from the outset by nationalist 
concerns. The dynamics between member nations and the former comrades-in-arms 
who proposed to take on the victor powers exposed irreconcilable and fundamental 
differences that manifestly hindered transnational cooperation.  
By mid-1920 the more explosive events such as the Spartacist Uprising, the 
Posen and Baltic Campaigns, the Kapp Putsch and the rise and fall of the short-lived 
Soviet Republics of Bavaria and Hungary were over. In their place there emerged a 
willingness on the part of the vanquished nations to forgo counter-productive defiance 
of the Entente and accept that the sole road to political and economic recovery lay 
through seeking a rapprochement.  
While international cooperation between the extralegal German Freikorps 
commanders and Russian émigré monarchist leaders in the politically fluid days of the 
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Baltic Campaign did not require the forfeiture of the national goals of either, this simply 
was not the case with Bavaria, Austria or Hungary. There are ample examples of how, 
regardless of what the Central European leaders were communicating to the Bauer 
group, each was pursuing policies unique to their own needs.  
Bavaria had been long engaged in discussions with France about support for the 
Einwohnerwehr, arguing that it was not only a hedge against a resurgent left but also a 
French-friendly force in a reorganized Reich. Moreover, there were Franco-Bavarian 
negotiations on the idea of attaching areas of western Germany, including sections of 
the French-occupied Rhineland, to a Greater Bavaria, essentially isolating Prussia. 
Although these came to nothing, they indicate a Bavarian Weltanschauung that was 
quite out of step with Bauer’s plans for an eventual reinvigorated Germany with all 
power emanating from a redeemed Berlin under a military dictatorship of General 
Ludendorff. 
Hungary too played a double game. While overtly supporting the Ludendorff-
Bauer plan that promised the return of lost territories through military means, it 
simultaneously sought a rapprochement with France based on economic concessions in 
the hope of securing support for treaty revisions. In addition, well before Bauer’s arrival 
in Budapest, Horthy had agreed with the Austrian right-of-centre Christian Social Party 
leadership to provide financial support for the Heimwehr if, once the Renner 
government were legally overturned in the next general election, Austria would be 
willing to discuss border revisions favourable to Hungary concerning Burgenland. 
Hungary could thus achieve its foreign policy goals vis-à-vis Austria through peaceful 
means, rendering Bauer’s plan for an Orgesch- and Orka-led military coup in Vienna 
wholly unnecessary. 
 225 
 
Further, dismayed that the above-mentioned funds it provided Austria now 
flowed through the Munich-based Orgesch as per Bauer’s plan, the Budapest 
government simply defied the arrangement and resumed its former method of aiding the 
Austrian counter-revolutionaries directly through its Legation in Vienna, greatly 
reducing Bavarian (and Bauer’s) influence in Austria. 
Even the Austrian right threw up obstacles. Bauer was unable to gain the crucial 
endorsement for his plan from General Alfred Krauß, the powerful leader of the 
Austrian Pan-German League, not due to the latter’s desire to work with the Entente but 
rather his unwillingness to work with prospective White International members. As a 
pan-German, Krauß objected to Bauer’s promise to cede the heavily German-populated 
Burgenland to Hungary. As an Austrian nationalist, he objected to the plan to cede three 
western Austrian provinces to Bavaria—the latter’s precondition for an Anschluß. Nor 
did Krauß trust the Bavarian ‘los von Berlin’ scheme to placate French fears, in which 
Bavaria would rejoin the German Reich after Bauer’s plan was initiated, citing that 
Bavarians were separatists first and foremost and would likely not rejoin. 
To the list of those Central and Eastern European powers and their 
representatives looking to the Entente must be added White Russian General Wrangel. 
His adamant refusal to recognize the authority of the Budapest-based Russian Supreme 
Committee and its leader, General Biskupsky, more or less eliminated Russia from the 
German-Hungarian-Russian troika that was at the very core of the White International. 
Wrangel also took pains to cast the Ludendorff-Bauer circle as working in defiance of 
Entente policies in Eastern Europe. As well as discrediting the Bauer group, this 
resulted in Hungary’s refusal to further fund Biskupsky and his Russian Committee, so 
completing the latter’s removal as a political factor. 
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The Stresemann proposal for General Ludendorff to serve as second in 
command to French Marshal Foch in a German-Entente joint effort against the Red 
Army then surrounding Warsaw is significant to this study for a number of reasons. Its 
rejection by the Entente illustrates well the mindset of the victors who were more 
inclined to coexist with the Bolsheviks contained within their western border, as later 
defined by the Treaty of Riga in 1921, than to contribute to a reinvigoration of the 
Germany military. The episode also exemplifies the above-mentioned tipping point 
between radical and rational approaches in foreign policy. British documents reveal that 
consideration of the proposal was not limited to the ultra-right circle around Ludendorff 
but reached the upper levels of the Weimar government, the Reichswehr and Entente 
diplomats. France’s vitriolic reaction to Ludendorff’s demands aside, such widespread 
deliberations clearly showed a remaining vestige of the type of support once extended to 
the German government in the spring of 1919 during the Baltic Campaign. The decision 
at the Port Lympne Conference in August 1920 to reject the idea just as plainly 
indicated the shape of things to come in Central and Eastern Europe. 
It has been argued throughout that the White International was destined to fail. 
This begs the question of why Bauer and his plan received the support they did. The 
backing of the émigré Baltic German and Russian monarchist groups in Berlin and 
Munich can be readily understood for, like Ludendorff, Bauer and his entourage after 
the Kapp Putsch, they had little to lose. The reasons why the legitimate, incumbent 
governments of Bavaria and Hungary should have supported Bauer are more complex. 
Cautious speculation would suggest that if there was a greater willingness to work with 
the Entente, there was also an unwillingness to limit one’s options. 
In the case of Bavaria, it has been shown that the safe haven enjoyed by the 
fleeing putschists was not because the Kapp Putsch had been welcomed in Munich, 
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because it had not. In fact, the turn to the conservative right was engineered to prevent 
the more radical elements that the Kapp Putsch represented from getting a foothold in 
Bavaria. Bavarian hospitality to Ludendorff and Bauer was instead based on the desire 
to create an Ordnungszelle independent of Berlin in the form of an all-German 
paramilitary-coordination organization (Orgesch), and a transnational Austro-Bavarian 
organization (Orka) to facilitate an Anschluß after Austrian Chancellor Renner’s 
ousting. For these purposes, the war hero Ludendorff and his politically active 
entourage still stood for something, as Bruno Thoß has correctly suggested.232 Further, 
Bauer’s plan contained elements not dissimilar to BVP leader Georg Heim’s regarding 
the threat of Communism in the essentially agrarian Danubian countries. While von 
Kahr, Escherich and Heim’s particularist proclivities worried Bauer, he felt such 
problems could be smoothed out once Hungary was on board.  
Hungarian secondary sources are dismissive on the question of why Teleki, 
Kánya, Bethlen and other seasoned diplomats and politicians went along with Bauer’s 
radical plan for as long as they did. Treatment by Sakmyster, Romsics and Ormos is 
generally confined to a brief mention of Bauer’s plan as merely one of several fantastic 
ideas that Horthy was advised to steer clear of by his more circumspect government. It 
is maintained in Sakmyster’s Hungary’s Admiral on Horseback (1994) that the 
government expressed interest in the plan to humour Horthy while slowly undermining 
Bauer’s access to the Regent.233 However, as Ormos asserts in Hungary in the Age of 
the Two World Wars (2007), it seems unlikely that Horthy would have been so easily 
duped.234 
Understandably, German secondary sources such as Thoß’s signal work Der 
Ludendorff-Kreis (1978) and Vogt’s biography Oberst Max Bauer (1974) cover Bauer’s 
activities in Budapest in greater detail because of their respective foci on the radical 
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right activities of both men. In any case, amongst the few available documents on the 
subject at the Hungarian State Archives and the copious documents found in the Bauer 
Papers at the German Federal Archives, as well as amongst the autobiographies of the 
principals involved, it is clear that Regent Horthy and his government—especially his 
Foreign Ministry—held meetings with Bauer, with members of his entourage and with 
representatives from Austria, Bavaria and the Baltic German and White Russian émigré 
communities on a regular basis from May until well into August 1920. 
The reasons are open to conjecture. If the means are directly proportionate to the 
needs, a nation in chaos (as was Hungary), directionless and surrounded by hostile 
neighbours, may well regard a plan such as Bauer’s as at least a contingency while 
pursuing more traditional modes to redress its international situation. 
Another possible reason is that much in Bauer’s plan, as in Bavaria, was not 
inconsistent with Hungary’s policies already in hand. Methods aside, the goal of 
coordinating efforts to thwart the spread of Communism was consistent with the goals 
in all areas outside Bolshevik Russia. Bauer’s more specific agenda of negotiations with 
the Austrian right regarding the return of Burgenland, the creation of a Danubian 
combination with Austria attached to Germany and the removal of Renner from Austria 
also held considerable appeal for Hungary. The realization of any singular aspects of the 
plan, however, did not necessarily mean that any or all of the parties would be willing to 
participate in it to the full. 
It has been shown that in Hungary the greatest support came from those with 
whom Bauer and his entourage had the most in common, such as free electors and ultra-
rightists Gömbös, Eckhardt, Kozma and Prónay. The former two led organizations not 
unlike the pre-Kapp NV in Berlin and were designated by Horthy as liaisons between 
the Hungarian government and Bauer. By varying degrees, the historical literature tends 
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to cast all four as influential proto-fascists in their relationship to Horthy. Romsics’s 
István Bethlen (1995), Kádár Lynn’s Tibor Eckhardt in his Own Words (2005) and both 
Ormos’s Hungary and her biography on Kozma, Egy magyar médiavézer (2000), rectify 
such partisan blanket assumptions by showing Gömbös and Eckhardt as evolving, like 
Horthy, from advocates of a military dictatorship to parliamentarians, and Kozma as 
becoming a respected senior public servant as head of the Hungarian Telegraph Agency. 
In truth, the only few individuals the framers of the plan to create a White 
International could fully count upon were those within Bauer’s entourage itself. Not one 
national leader in all of Germany, Austria and Hungary, and no recognized leader of the 
White Russians, was ready to support Bauer’s plan to its ultimate extent. Those who did 
hold the reins of power amongst the desired participants of the plan were more 
interested in securing their respective positions in the new order dictated by the Entente 
than abandoning all reason in the name of a plot conceived of by radical dreamers and 
political adventurers.  
In sum, the reasons why the White International never developed tell us more 
about post-war Europe than does the conception of the plot itself. The direction in 
which inter-European relations were moving after 1920 signalled a spirit of cooperation 
wherein Bauer’s White International had no place. Within a few years of Bauer’s initial 
audience with Horthy, the Treaties of Rapallo and Locarno were signed and, one by 
one, Austria, Hungary and Germany became members of the League of Nations.  
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